skip to Main Content

Of Great Fears and Greater Hopes: The GPH-MILF Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

By: Celeste Marie R. Cruz[*]

Prologue

Peace and economic development have long remained elusive to the conflict-torn region of Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines. Since the late 1960s, the Conflict in Mindanao, led by a secessionist independence movement of the Islamic minority in a predominantly Catholic country,[1] has led to an enormous loss of life and suffering, claiming an estimated 120,000 lives and displacing more than 2 million people.[2] The ongoing peace process between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH), under President Benigno Aquino III, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) reached a significant milestone with the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro[3] (Framework) last October 15, 2012. The Framework seeks to establish a “federal” type of sub-state in the said region[4] that is currently under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindano (ARMM).

Read More

The prohibition of surrogate motherhood in France

The French prohibition of surrogate motherhood, resting on moral and ethical considerations, raises complex issues of private international law.

Surrogate motherhood has been prohibited in France since 1991, under a decision by the Cour de cassation (France’s highest court), (Cass. Ass. plén., 31/05/1991). This prohibition was confirmed in the bioethics law of 1994, and is codified in article 16-7 of French Civil Code (“Civil Code”). Article 16-9 of the Civil Code makes this a prohibition of public order (In France, prohibitions of ordre public or public order are mandatory rules created unilaterally by the state to protect fundamental values of the society, and from which parties have no freedom to derogate. A foreign law applicable under a conflict of laws analysis would be evicted if contrary to a mandatory rule). A surrogacy contract is null and void, and violations are punished by civil and criminal sanctions (civil sanctions are described in articles 311-25, 325 and 332-1 of the Civil Code and criminal sanctions at articles 227-12 §3 and 227-13 of the Penal Code).

The prohibition is justified by different moral and ethical concerns: to prevent children from becoming commodities traded as merchandise between infertile couples and surrogate mothers; to protect the interest of children who are psychologically at risk in such transaction; and to prevent the exploitation of surrogate mothers who must relinquish parental rights to the child after giving birth. Surrogate mothers are usually from lower economic strata and are economically exploited in this transaction. Statistically there is an inherent social division in this practice. This is evinced by the fact that most surrogacy contracts require compensation because very few women would bear someone else’s child for free. This social division is not new – surrogate mothers were slaves in the days of the Bible and Ancient Rome.

Read More

The Amendment of Spain’s Arbitration Act: A Promising But Unfinished Agenda

By Guillermo Bayas Fernández
Attorney-at-law in Spain
Fundación Rafael del Pino scholar
NYU LL.M. Candidate, Class of 2011

Abstract

Last September, the Spanish Government sent to the Parliament a bill (the Bill) to reform the current Spanish Arbitration Act (Ley 60/2003, de 23 de diciembre, de Arbitraje), which is now being discussed in Congress. The Bill improves different aspects of the existing regulation, mainly those concerning the action to set aside the award, arbitrators’ liability, arbitration of corporate disputes and the effect of insolvency proceedings on arbitration agreements. However, the possible suppression of dissenting opinions prejudices arbitration and the regulation on challenge of judicial jurisdiction favors frivolous attempts to avoid abiding by arbitration agreements. respective  Additionally, the proposed assignment of functions among judicial bodies in arbitration issues lacks coherence and does not create a long-demanded unification appeal on arbitration matters. While this article welcomes some of the intended modifications, it raises concerns that Spain might be losing a unique opportunity to adopt a modern regulation that would advance its chances of becoming a prime international arbitration seat.

Read More

Prisoners’ voting rights: a success story for the enforceability of the ECHR?

By Emily MacKenzie, NYU School of Law, (LL.M Candidate, 2011)

The last week has seen a tense discourse in political and legal circles in the UK centering on prisoners’ voting rights. This discussion in some sense represents the culmination of five years of debate about the enforceability of judgments made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In March 2004 the ECtHR held unanimously in Hirst v UK that the UK’s blanket ban on prisoners voting violated Article 3 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Despite the rejection of the UK’s appeal to the Grand Chamber, and the obligation under Article 46 ECHR to enforce Strasbourg judgments, the government has to date failed to enact legal reform to implement this decision. Whilst there has been an ongoing consultation, it is not overly cynical to describe the process as merely ‘going through the motions.’ The unexplained delays, refusal to entertain the option of allowing all prisoners to vote, and the government’s consistent expression of its disagreement with the ruling all attest to this conclusion.

Repeated criticisms by the Council of Europe came to a head when the government failed to act on any of the proposals in time to allow prisoners to vote in the June 2010 election.  Last week, however, UK newspapers reported that the new coalition government is finally going to implement the judgment. (See coverage by The Guardian here.)  The exact program and timescale of reform remain unclear, but it seems to be generally accepted that a change is in the offing. The governmental attitude remains, however, that such reform is something imposed on the UK by Europe, that it is not something that the government wants, and that they will apply it as restrictively as possible. In light of this continued reticence, one may ask: why after five years of stalling is the government finally giving in?

Read More

The International Relations Value of Criminal Tribunals

By Graham Dumas, (J.D. Candidate 2011)

Much has been made in recent(ish) literature about the defects of criminal tribunals in post-conflict societies. Multiple authors over the past decade have rightly noted that such fora have dubious positive effects on the transitional justice process when viewed internally: tribunals fail to deter war criminals either because the chances of prosecution are very low, or because offenders act within the context of overwhelming social stress, often believing they are working for the greater good of society; as a measure of retributive justice, tribunals fail because the vast majority of perpetrators go unpunished; trials may upset the delicate balance of peace and conciliation, which in the end is the bedrock of ongoing stability in post-conflict societies. The list is long, and the points are largely valid.

Read More
Back To Top
Search