Visa Restrictions and the Scrutiny of Chinese Scholars in the United States: National Security or Politicization?

By MJ Kang, J.D. Candidate, NYU Law Class of 2027.

Introduction

In January 2021, federal agents arrested Gang Chen, a mechanical engineering professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), accusing him of concealing routine academic ties to Chinese institutions on federal grant forms. After a year of legal proceedings and intense public scrutiny, prosecutors at the U.S. Department of Justice took the exceptionally rare step of dropping all charges, thereby effectively conceding that the government’s case had been so insubstantial that the evidence could not support the allegations. For many observers, Chen’s ordeal came to symbolize a broader pattern: Chinese scientists and students caught in the crosshairs of U.S. national security policy.

According to the Migration Policy Institute, Chinese nationals constitute nearly one quarter of all international students in the United States, about 277,000 during the 2023–24 academic year, contributing billions of dollars to universities and local economies. Yet their long-standing role in American higher education now faces unprecedented scrutiny. Over the past decade, U.S. policymakers have introduced visa restrictions, intensified background checks, and pursued criminal prosecutions under misguided, often prejudicial initiatives such as the Department of Justice’s “China Initiative.”

Historical Background: From Exclusion to Security-Driven Restrictions

Historically, U.S. policymakers have alternated between openness and suspicion toward Chinese migrants. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which barred Chinese laborers for decades, embodied the openly racialized nativism that shaped American suspicion toward “the Orient” long before its repeal in 1943. Chinese student migration to the United States surged after China’s late-1970s economic reforms. By 2019, more than 370,000 Chinese students were studying in the United States, but in recent years those numbers have declined sharply, driven first by the COVID-19 pandemic and then sustained by escalating geopolitical tensions.

A key turning point in this shift came in May 2020, when President Trump issued Proclamation 10043, suspending F- and J-visa entry for Chinese graduate students and researchers associated with entities linked to the Chinese government’s military-civil fusion strategy. The proclamation warned that some Chinese students act as “non-traditional collectors” of intellectual property that could “bolster the modernization” of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The order’s rationale rested on the structure of China’s higher-education and research system, in which several universities, such as the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) and other institutions affiliated with the PLA, conduct both civilian and defense-related research. This military-civil fusion framework encourages collaboration among civilian universities, state-owned enterprises, and defense agencies, blurring the boundary between academic and military work. U.S. officials argued that this integration enables technology transfers with potential military applications.

Proclamation 10043 therefore barred entry to anyone who had studied at, worked for, or received funding from a military-civil fusion university or research institute, while exempting undergraduates and certain other categories. Reports from Boston University indicated that U.S. consular officers denied visas to several Chinese graduate students based on prior enrollment at Chinese universities listed on their résumés. The restrictions remained in force under the Biden Administration and continue to result in visa denials and revocations, often without any clear or predictable pattern in how those decisions are made.

The 2025 Visa Revocation Announcement

According to Reuters, in May 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as part of the Trump Administration’s broader national security agenda, announced a proposed policy to “aggressively revoke” the visas of Chinese students with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or those studying in designated “critical fields.” The State Department, working in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, was tasked with implementing the policy through heightened scrutiny of both new and existing student visas. Officials did not specify how many students or researchers would be affected, but university administrators, higher-education associations, and policy analysts warned that even limited enforcement could disrupt key academic programs and research laboratories that rely heavily on Chinese researchers. Chinese government officials condemned the proposal as discriminatory and lodged formal protests. In response to sustained pressure from universities, industry groups, and trade negotiators, the Trump Administration partially scaled back the plan but maintained a policy of heightened scrutiny.

This announcement came amid an already sharp decline in Chinese student enrollment in the United States. A 2024 survey by Multicultural Insights of 1,300 Chinese students found that 60 percent experienced discrimination or poor treatment while studying in the United States. Combined with pandemic-related disruptions and growing competition from other countries, U.S. visa restrictions pushed many prospective students toward Europe or back to China. Despite these obstacles, Chinese students and scientists remain central to U.S. innovation, making up a large share of doctoral recipients in science and engineering and contributing significantly to the STEM workforce.

The China Initiative: Origins and Evolution

Launched in November 2018, the China Initiative was the Department of Justice’s program aimed at countering what it identified as economic espionage and intellectual property theft linked to the Chinese government. Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions described it as a campaign to prosecute “Chinese trade theft cases” in research laboratories and universities. Former FBI Director Christopher Wray even warned of a “whole-of-society threat” from China.

Critics soon argued that the initiative had drifted from its original purpose counterespionage purpose. A 2021 MIT Technology Review investigation found that many prosecutions were unrelated to espionage and that nearly 90 percent of defendants were of Chinese heritage, a pattern that raised concerns about bias and the use of pretextual charges. While roughly one-quarter of defendants were convicted, most other cases remained pending or untried, largely because the United States lacks an extradition treaty with China. The review also found numerous cases in which charges were dropped or defendants were acquitted. Notably, the convictions that occurred were mostly for economic espionage, trade secret theft, or grant and tax fraud, rather than research integrity violations. Over time, however, the initiative increasingly targeted disclosure related issues, such as failures to report foreign affiliations or funding, many of which were later dismissed or quietly abandoned.

According to the Brennan Center for Justice, the initiative devolved into a campaign of “racial profiling and fearmongering” that targeted scientists based on ethnicity rather than evidence. The Biden Administration terminated the program in February 2022, citing concerns about bias and its chilling effect on scientific research. Congress has since debated reviving the initiative under different names, reflecting the enduring tension between national security enforcement and academic openness.

High-Profile Prosecutions and Dropped Charges

Several China Initiative cases illustrate its shortcomings. In 2021, federal agents arrested Gang Chen, an MIT professor, for allegedly failing to disclose ties to Chinese institutions on federal grant forms, but prosecutors dropped all charges the following year for lack of evidence. That same year, the Department of Justice dismissed visa fraud charges against five Chinese researchers accused of concealing ties to the People’s Liberation Army, after an internal review and FBI analysis raised doubts about the clarity and relevance of the visa application questions. Those cases were dropped just as trials were set to begin, with the department citing the “interest of justice,” in contrast to the Chen case, where weaknesses in the government’s theory surfaced only through litigation.

Another prominent case involved Anming Hu, a University of Tennessee professor accused of concealing ties to a Chinese university. After his first trial ended in a hung jury, Judge Thomas Varlan of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee issued a directed verdict acquitting Hu on all charges in September 2021. In a written opinion, the court found that the government failed to prove intent to defraud, concluding that “no rational jury” could find that Hu acted with criminal intent to deceive NASA.

Investigations and Funding Agency Scrutiny

Federal investigations have extended beyond the Department of Justice. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) substantially increased oversight of researchers’ foreign affiliations in response to concerns about undisclosed relationships and alleged foreign influence in federally-funded research. A 2024 NIH report found that 87.7 percent of investigated cases involved undisclosed affiliations, and only 2.6 percent ended without a finding of violation, a rate that suggests the underlying conduct may be common and that the investigative process leaves little room for exoneration. The majority of cases involved scientists who had Chinese connections.

These investigations unfolded against the backdrop of China’s academic system, where Communist Party committees are embedded in every university and research institute as a routine feature of governance. This structure is related to, but distinct from, China’s military-civil fusion strategy: while Beijing has sought to align research with state priorities, Party oversight and state-linked affiliations have long been a normal part of Chinese academic life. As a result, relationships or activities that U.S. authorities may view as suspicious, such as serving on advisory boards or participating in government programs, often reflect ordinary, non-ideological academic practice rather than covert political intent.

Outcomes of NIH and NSF inquiries frequently included removal from grants or peer-review panels and, in many cases, termination or resignation. The NSF likewise suspended or terminated dozens of grants, most linked to Chinese institutions. While intended to strengthen research integrity, these actions have also fueled perceptions of bias and contributed to a pervasive chilling effect in academia, discouraging international collaboration, prompting self-censorship among researchers, and deterring some Chinese and Chinese American scholars from pursuing or continuing academic work in the United States.

The Brain Drain and Survey Evidence

Multiple studies show that a “reverse migration” of scientists is the result of the dual threat of visa restrictions and federal investigations. A Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions brief found that, following the launch of the China Initiative, departures of U.S.-based, China-born scientists rose by 75 percent. Between 2010 and 2021, nearly 20,000 scientists of Chinese descent left the United States, two-thirds relocating to mainland China or Hong Kong.

Survey data reveal deep unease among Chinese scientists. Seventy-two percent reported feeling unsafe as researchers, 61 percent considered leaving the United States, and 45 percent said they now avoid applying for federal grants. An overwhelming majority of respondents also cited growing difficulty recruiting international students, suggesting longer-term harm to U.S. research capacity. These departures evoke a telling historical parallel. In the 1950s, physicist Qian Xuesen, a founding member of the U.S. Jet Propulsion Laboratory, was investigated on unsubstantiated security grounds, detained, and eventually deported to China, where he became a central figure in China’s missile and space programs. Many scholars now regard his case as an early example of how suspicion and exclusion can yield the very outcomes they seek to prevent. Similarly, the current climate risks creating a new generation of alienated or aggrieved scientists who take their expertise elsewhere, undermining the open research environment that has long fueled American innovation.

Effects on Scientific Collaboration and Innovation

Chinese scholars remain essential to the U.S. innovation ecosystem. International students contribute more than $43.8 billion annually to the U.S. economy, with foreign-born scientists making up roughly one quarter of the STEM workforce and over half of postdoctoral researchers, and Chinese nationals accounting for about 37 percent of international STEM graduate students at U.S. institutions in recent years.

During the China Initiative’s tenure, federal prosecutors investigated approximately 150 academic scientists and brought charges against 24. At least 85 resigned, retired, or were dismissed because of grant-related allegations. Universities fear that such policies may undermine collaboration: between 2008 and 2010, 11 percent of highly cited papers involving Chinese scientists had U.S. co-authors, while between 2018 and 2020 that share rose to over 33 percent. Yet rising concern over investigations has led some U.S. researchers to avoid partnerships with Chinese colleagues, even as China expands its own programs to recruit foreign and foreign-trained researchers. This shift risks eroding the long-standing networks of exchange that have underpinned American research leadership.

Balancing National Security and Academic Freedom

U.S. officials maintain that tighter oversight is necessary. The 2020 proclamation warned that the Chinese government uses students and researchers as “non-traditional collectors” of sensitive technologies, and the 2025 visa revocation plan echoed that concern. Supporters of increased scrutiny argue that Beijing exploits open research environments to circumvent export controls and that vigilance is needed to protect emerging technologies. Former FBI Director Christopher Wray has continued to frame China as “the biggest long-term threat” to U.S. innovation, signaling that the bureau’s posture has remained largely unchanged since the start of the first Trump Administration.

Yet broad restrictions risk alienating innocent scholars and damaging the very innovation ecosystem they are meant to safeguard. Yaqiu Wang, a human-rights researcher, cautioned that blanket visa revocations could erode both the rights of students and the United States’ reputation as a leader in global science. With only about one-third of China Initiative prosecutions resulting in conviction, and many others dismissed outright or collapsing before trial, critics have called for a more targeted, evidence-based approach.

Conclusion: Toward a Nuanced Approach

The United States faces a legitimate challenge in protecting sensitive research from foreign exploitation. Yet the current approach often blurs the line between national security and xenophobia. Visa restrictions such as Proclamation 10043 and the 2025 revocation plan rely on broad associations with military-civil fusion or party membership, discouraging legitimate scholars. The China Initiative, though presented as a counterespionage effort, ultimately focused on paperwork and disclosure errors before being abandoned amid concerns about bias. Meanwhile, NIH and NSF investigations, while important for accountability, have disproportionately affected researchers with Chinese affiliations.

For U.S. science and higher education to thrive, policymakers must strike a balance between security and openness. Achieving that balance requires clear definitions of prohibited conduct, transparent visa criteria, and safeguards against profiling. Narrow, evidence-driven enforcement can protect national interests without deterring the international talent that sustains American research. As competition with China deepens, maintaining openness in academia may prove one of the United States’ greatest strategic strengths.