

BOOK ANNOTATIONS

The Twilight of Human Rights Law. By Eric Posner. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. x, 185. \$23.95 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY CHELSEA ANELLI

A small library could be filled with books critiquing the tenets of international law. Many of these books prefer to inflame and misconstrue the ideals of international law, rather than engage in a substantive, reasonable critique. Luckily, Eric Posner's book *The Twilight of Human Rights Law* is not one of these books. *The Twilight of Human Rights Law* is one part human rights law primer and one part cynical evaluation of human rights laws' many inefficiencies. Posner doesn't offer many ground-breaking criticisms throughout the work; most of his arguments are tried and true assessments of the difficulties of enforcing international law. However, his overview of the human rights regime is a fair and comprehensive, albeit not very optimistic, evaluation of human rights law.

Posner's starting point for the book is that "there is little evidence that human rights treaties, on the whole, have improved the well-being of people, or even resulted in respect for the rights in those treaties." Accordingly, Posner systematically sets out to engage with this statement and to show why, exactly, there is a lack of respect for human rights law. The book is sprinkled with a healthy dose of skepticism about the respect granted to the human rights regime in the contemporary world. To anybody familiar with human rights law, his perspective that human rights are under-enforced is unsurprising. He is correct that while at least contemporary Western culture is much more familiar with human rights law, greater enforcement hasn't accompanied this awakening. There is a bounty of literature that seeks to determine why states shirk their duties under international law to respect human rights. Posner's examination distinguishes itself from the pack with its cool and measured tone. Apart from the rather histrionic title, the rest of the book is a just and rational approach to supporting his argument that human rights law has not done as much good

as one would hope. It is clear that Posner does not have high hopes for a legally enforceable human rights system, but his approach to proving why he believes this to be so is analytical and lawyerly. He presents points and counterpoints equitably, and dismantles opposing arguments without resorting to hyperbole. Although Posner may have been tempted to use his first two chapters, which deal with the history of international human rights law, to present a narrative that ultimately supports his thesis, his account squares with what most textbooks and articles would deem the highlights of the history of human rights. Two chapters can by no means provide a complete picture of the history of human rights; but he does accurately, if briefly, depict the development of the human rights regime in the international sphere.

The Twilight of Human Rights Law further does a neat job of presenting the numerous criticisms of human rights law in a digestible and presentable manner. If there was need for yet another book critiquing the human rights regime, Posner's thorough and accurate summary of the many arguments on human rights law's comparative weakness is a welcome addition. Many of Posner's arguments on the under-enforcement of human rights treaties are of the type that appear in a well-taught introductory course to human rights; the hypocrisy of Western countries in deciding which rights to champion, nations' lack of incentives to comply, and the general lack of enforcement. However, few instructors may teach Posner's viewpoint that human rights law is weak or to follow that the human rights regime has produced little tangible benefit in society.

Perhaps Posner does go too far in one element of his assessment. Posner primarily discusses treaties and international governmental bodies, such as the United Nations and the European Court of Human Rights. These organizations are fairly easy targets; it's not a tremendous surprise that there is a great deal of inefficiency in supra-governmental organizations that take on some of the largest societal issues of the time all while navigating low budgets, intercultural issues, and lack of a means to judicially enforce their mandate. Posner, somewhat curiously, leaves non-governmental organizations (NGOs) largely to the wayside. This is true both for larger ones like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and the numerous small NGOs that deal with human rights. Perhaps the

treaty regime is an essentially ineffective means of enforcing human rights law, but a huge segment of the work performed nowadays in the international human rights system involves the pressure put on governments to follow human rights norms by non-governmental organizations. It would be an interesting addition to see his assessment on how NGOs, supragovernmental organizations, and national governments all intersect and whether as a whole he still believes international law is fundamentally weak.

Posner may lump the work of large international NGOs in with the rest of the human rights regime when assessing data on the lack of compliance with treaties. Since governmental organizations have not been able to pressure other states into compliance with their treaties, he may presume that this lack of compliance encapsulates the work that NGOs are performing. In any event, as these NGOs have become more powerful means of encouraging the enforcement of human rights treaties, the possibility that their efforts have made the human rights regime more enforceable and legitimate should not be overlooked. When Posner does touch upon the work NGOs perform, it is generally a brief discussion of how they fail along similar lines as do the supra-governmental organizations. For example, in a short aside on Human Rights Watch, Posner mentions that “NGOs focus on whatever rights they care about.” He is, of course, correct. Human rights NGOs can pick and choose which rights to focus on to fit their agenda; this is a common criticism. Yet in terms of human rights NGOs’ relation to his actual thesis, it is somewhat troubling that he treats all aspects of the human rights system as one and the same, and does not delve into where the true inefficiencies arise and which branch of the human rights regime is responsible for which weakness. To treat all aspects of the human rights regime as equivalent does a disservice to his research. There are many moving parts in the human rights system, and it would have been far more compelling if he were able to pinpoint which element was responsible for which weakness, instead of presenting a gestalt overview of the weaknesses of the system as a whole.

Given general under-enforcement of human rights law, Posner could have made a far more compelling investigation, one that would have made his critique truly unique. He could have examined how the human rights regime can act to en-

courage states to better comply with the basic tenets of human rights law. This is a much more difficult question, but one that was not broached in Posner's book. It is fairly easy to be a cynic about the state of human rights enforcement in the world. To distinguish his book from the many others that pertain to this topic, it would have been exceedingly interesting if Posner presented solutions to these inefficiencies, instead of the same relatively tired discussion on international law's weakness—no matter how well-reasoned his arguments are. Posner comes off as a respectable realist in *The Twilight of Human Rights*, but it works to his detriment that he does not address solutions for the weaknesses. It's possible that his cynicism on human rights law precludes any full solutions, but if Posner's interest in the human rights regime is deep enough to compel him to write a book on the matter, then surely he must have some interesting thoughts on how compliance with human rights could be improved. It would have been more interesting to read suggestions for improvement than another take on a tired topic.

As a survey, Posner's book is well done. His book is accessible, interesting, and what it lacks in novelty, it makes up for in well-reasoned and sound arguments. This book may come off as a bit stale for someone who has studied international law and human rights before, but it is easily approachable for someone with an interest in the field, but who has not accessed the material before. Posner is undoubtedly skeptical about the human rights regime throughout the book, but his style of writing and his thorough research make his skepticism more credible. Many people could take issue with Posner's overarching theme that human rights have done little good for the people they aim to protect, but this would likely be due to a difference in ideology rather than problems with his arguments. For these reasons, *The Twilight of Human Rights* is an appreciated addition to the pantheon of literature that discusses the relative weakness of human rights law.

Power and Global Economic Institutions. By Ayse Kaya. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. x, 285. \$99.99 (Hardback).

REVIEWED BY SHIYI FAN

It is well known that *Pax Americana* has been on the decline while a few emerging economies are on the rise. The 2008 Great Recession may have marked the historical point of a true change in the international political order, causing a chain reaction within the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Many expect that the “rising states”—a term employed in Ayse Kaya’s book for countries such as China, India, Brazil, and Russia—will transform their economic importance into more political representation in the World Bank and the IMF. It remains unclear, however, how they will do so. Kaya’s *Power and Global Economic Institutions* fills in the missing piece of the puzzle by suggesting an “adjusted power approach.” Through detailed qualitative and quantitative analyses of the IMF, the World Bank, the G20, and the structure of the International Trade Organization (ITO, the predecessor of the World Trade Organization), Kaya shows how these institutional settings reduce the underlying economic significance of the rising states and the speed at which economic power transforms into political power in those institutions. Chapter Two introduces the theoretical framework of the adjusted power approach. Chapter Three briefly explains the structure of the IMF and the World Bank, which is contrasted against that of the ITO in Chapter Four. Then Chapters Five, Six, and Seven apply the adjusted power approach to the 2008–2010 reforms in the IMF, the World Bank, and G20 to show how the purposes and functions of the institutions, the institutions’ funding sources, and the institutions’ rules and conventions would lead to different reform results. The book succeeds in introducing the new theoretical tool of the adjusted power approach as a means of analyzing the transformation of economic status into institutional political power. But due to the timing of the book’s publication, it fails to consider the approach’s application to recent political developments including China’s leadership in establishing alternative economic institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the United States’ intention to withdraw its

involvement in international economic affairs, evidenced by the Trump administration's abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Future research could help reveal the adjusted power approach's application to these new institutions and potentially expand its applicability to the analysis of power dynamics in establishing new international economic institutions as well.

Chapter Two—Conceptualizing Political Asymmetries in Multilateral Economic Institutions—unfolds Kaya's core theory of the adjusted power approach. The adjusted power approach suggests that the transformation of a country's underlying economic power into political power depends on three factors. An easy way to think of the adjusted power approach is to imagine a set of computer programs with algorithms tailored to each economic institution. Because of the difference in the algorithms, even if the inputs (i.e., rising states' economic power) are the same, the programs spit out different results reflecting rising states' transformed political power within those institutions.

First, it depends on the interpretation of the purposes and functions of the institutions of the dominant states. For instance, because the United States and the European countries wanted the IMF to leverage its "lender of last resort" role to export the Western, free-market model to lending countries, rising states' success in gaining greater political power in those institutions is subject to greater challenge. Second, how the institutions are funded also affects the outcome of the proposed institutional reforms. For instance, because the World Bank is funded partly by loan interest, while the IMF relies primarily on its member countries' funding, rising economies have comparatively less power in steering the direction and magnitude of reform in the World Bank than in the IMF. Third, institutional rules and conventions also explain institutional "stickiness" and path dependency, which leads to "incremental changes" rather than sudden and significant reforms within those institutions. The adjusted power approach dissects the institutions' murky bureaucratic mechanisms based on statistical studies and existing international relations theory. The adjusted power approach also explains the different outcomes of institutional reforms in the IMF, the World Bank, and the G20, as discussed in following chapters.

Chapter Three discusses the origins of the member states' formal equality in the two Bretton Woods global financial institutions—the IMF and the World Bank. Taking note of the institutions' historical background, it moves on to examine existing international relations scholarship by using a statistical analysis to verify whether political-economic proximity to the United States positively and significantly affects members' voting quota shifts. The statistical study confirms that informal power—i.e. alternatives outside the institutions that increase in tandem with the economic power of the state—also plays a role in shaping institutional structures and reforms. For instance, because quota changes in the IMF and the World Bank were subject to extensive political negotiations, there was enormous room for interference on the part of the United States.

Chapter Four analyzes the ITO, an early precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that failed to come into being due to lack of support from the United States. Like its successor, yet unlike the two Bretton Woods institutions, the ITO would have employed an unweighted equal voting mechanism for its member states. The ITO was designed a couple years after the establishment of the IMF and the World Bank. At that time, the world was being pulled into a bipolar political order, and the United States wanted to attract as many member states as possible to its alliance. In addition, the purpose and functions of the ITO differed from those of the Bretton Woods institutions in that the former was to serve as a platform for “continuous consultation.” Each member was expected to reveal information about its trade policies and would have to be engaged in an open discussion with others regarding those policies. In other words, it was designed to solve the collective action problem in international trade and lower trade barriers to everyone's benefit. Because the member states' economic interests seldom stay steady, there would be constant shifts of coalitions among the member states, which meant that the effect of one-member-one-vote on the United States would be mitigated. These differences in time and power dynamics explain why the ITO was designed with an equal voting system instead of one weighted based on quota. The equal voting system, like that of the WTO we see today, gives the rising states a louder voice and makes them better able to transform their growing economic power into political power in those institutions, while the World Bank and the

IMF's voting quota buffers their effort of power transformation.

In Chapters Five and Six, Kaya continues to expand upon her analysis using the adjusted power approach, exploring how the IMF and the World Bank's institutional design and structure transform member states' underlying economic status into formal political representation within the two institutions. The United States designers entrusted the World Bank with the responsibility to extend loans to help economic development, and the IMF with the role of last-resort lender. The originators also charged the two institutions with promoting the Western free market economic model within borrowing member states. Therefore, a weighted voting system and a *de facto* veto power by the United States was crucial for these functions and purposes so that the United States, as the biggest donor, could have a tighter control of the two institutions' policies.

Chapter Five is devoted to the 2008–2010 reforms within the IMF. The reforms centered on the formula that determines the relative weights of the member states' votes. A detailed analysis shows that the rising states managed to reform the formula by giving more weight to gross domestic product purchasing power parity (GDP PPP) and transparency in terms of the calculation process itself. Echoing Chapter Three, the advanced economies had an incentive to promote the political representation of the rising states. The loss of domestic support for U.S. involvement in international institutions incentivized it to pass on the responsibility to the rising states. Because the IMF relies on its funding from member states, as opposed to the World Bank which could issue Triple A bonds to raise funds in international capital markets, the underlying economic power of the member states determines how much funding they are able to contribute to the institution and consequently their political hierarchy within it.

Returning to the third factor of institutional conventions, the adjusted power approach also elaborately explains the lack of "true reform" in the 2008–2010 reforms in the IMF. Although the various formulae to determine quota were condensed into one, the rising states were not able to put as much weight on GDP PPP in the reformed formula as they had wanted. On the other hand, while the advanced economies collectively gave up a substantial portion of their political

power in the IMF, most of the loss was borne by the Europeans and the United States remained the dominant figure.

Similarly, Chapter Six analyzes the subsequent reform in the World Bank following that of the IMF. As noted above, the World Bank did not rely as much on state finance as the IMF. While the rising states believe that their borrower status is crucial to the purpose of the World Bank—because the loan interest of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is an important source of its income—the Bank raises most of its money from Triple A bonds. Therefore, “the relatively lower pressure for financial burden sharing reinforced the declining states’ already existing tendency for limited accommodation.” The rules and conventions of the World Bank also made its path dependent on the IMF’s simultaneous reform. As a result, it adopted a new formula similar to that of the IMF’s to include GDP PPP as an important factor in determining the quota of the member states.

Chapter Seven analyzes the G20’s institutional design and function as a delegatory forum for international cooperation. The analysis of the G20 serves as an anchor for the previous analyses of the two Bretton Woods institutions in that the former’s informality imposes relatively lower “sovereign costs” on its member states. As a result, the G20, similar to the International Trade Organization and the World Trade Organization, tends to focus less on formal political power within this forum.

Because of the limitation of when the book was written (before 2015) it fails to address the potential challenges and influence of alternative arenas, such as the newly established AIIB and the TPP (recently abandoned by the Trump administration). China’s leading effort in funding the AIIB in 2016 allegedly complements but also challenges the importance of the roles that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank play in supporting economic development in Asia. This, despite the fact that the new institution’s capital is only equivalent to two-thirds of that of the ADB and about half of that of the World Bank. China’s initiative in establishing this regional institution probably results from its dissatisfaction with the lack of thoroughness in the IMF and the World Bank. The new Bank has existed for only a year, and we can expect its influence to continue to grow even as the influence of the ADB and the World Bank (where the United States maintains a dominant position) continues to decline. The AIIB is strong

evidence that the rising states may not be satisfied with the original international institutions dominated by the United States. The possibility of establishing a competing institution may be another form of “informal power” discussed in the book and may play a significant role in the political negotiations shaping the formulae in both the IMF and the World Bank.

Another important, unaddressed recent development is U.S. domestic politics and specifically the Trump administration’s current antagonism towards globalization and the loss of trust in solving problems within international institutions. The U.S. withdrawal from active participation in international institutions provides a potential vacancy to be exploited by the rising economies. After Trump announced that the United States would not continue with the negotiation of the TPP, the Australian government immediately responded that it would push ahead without the United States, leaving it open to Indonesia, China, and others seeking to join the agreement. This change in leadership could mean accelerated decline of U.S. influence in the Pacific region—both economically and politically. If G. John Ikenberry is right that the United States’ best means of preserving its international power is through the institutions in which it remains dominant, the Trump administration’s strategic moves may be the beginning of a catastrophe. Like the AIIB, the TPP is another perfect study of how the competition from other institutions could affect reforms in the IMF and the World Bank.

In conclusion, Kaya’s *Power and Global Economic Institutions* is a wonderful piece of work that begins the process of analyzing how the change in economic power distribution among states contributes to that of political influence in international institutions. This, even as changes in both international and domestic political environments open the door for additional study of potential competition from other international institutions. Such study could complement the book’s analysis by further developing the point of how states’ external, informal power can influence institutional reforms.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir: The Untold Story of the Liberation Party. By Reza Pankhurst. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2016. Pp. ix, 247. \$37.50 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY ALISTAIR FATHEAZAM

Discussions of international affairs (and, indeed, domestic ones too) since September 2001 have been racked by anxiety, curiosity, and bewilderment towards Islamic fundamentalists and even the Muslim world in general. Regrettably, the actions of a few have colored the West's view of a huge swath of the world. The concerns created by instances of hostility are made worse by an imperfect understanding of the Muslim world. Cultural differences and geographic distance do not make this understanding easier. A book on a specific Islamic movement is therefore a welcome source of information. Reza Pankhurst, a British academic (and former political prisoner of the Mubarak regime in Egypt) writes about the origin and evolution of Hizb-ut-Tahrir ("Liberation Party" in Arabic), an international Islamic political and theological organization. Hizb-ut-Tahrir believes in the establishment of a Caliphate, which is to say, the unification of the entire Muslim world as a single empire, with Islam as its source of laws and values. For readers seeking to learn about the Middle East, it is important to know what this book is and what it is not.

Pankhurst recounts the history of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, from its founding up to 2012. His book does not offer a clear thesis or argument about Hizb ut Tahrir's role in the world today—it is purely a historical account. What it does have, however, are details that give the reader insight into the various underpinnings of an Islamic movement.

These details are impressively researched. Pankhurst wisely saw that if first-hand information about Hizb-ut-Tahrir was not gathered soon, it could be lost as witnesses to the movement died and different versions of its history began to conflict, making an authoritative work on the movement impossible. As it happened, both the movement's founder and his successor had already died as Pankhurst's research began—the latter in 2004. To this end, Pankhurst engaged in extensive archival research, as well as interviews with many "remaining members of the first and second generations" of the movement. Typically, it would be very hard to access the move-

ment's leaders for interviews, but in 2012—in the aftermath of the Arab Spring—Pankhurst seized on their temporary willingness to speak, and conducted forty interviews across several countries. Pankhurst also studied books and other works published by Taqiudeen al-Nabhani, the movement's founder. Using these sources, he pieced together not only historical facts, but personal details and color that make for a thorough picture of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the circumstances out of which it sprang.

One way in which Pankhurst overcomes the potential dryness of a chronological account is to structure the book according to important phases in the life of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. The first two chapters are devoted to its founder which, as is mentioned later, is essential to understanding the mission of the organization. Next is a chapter titled "Trying to Enter Society" describing Hizb-ut-Tahrir's transition from infancy to wider social and political relevance. From then on, the movement's political actions, and its treatment by various governments in the region are examined. The last couple of chapters describe Hizb-ut-Tahrir after its founder's death, and frames the movement in today's geopolitical context.

Much of the first half of the book is devoted to describing Hizb-ut-Tahrir's founder; indeed, the name of the first chapter is simply "Taqiudeen al-Nabhani." Pankhurst sets the scene by portraying the area in Palestine where al-Nabhani's family came from. Palestine during al-Nabhani's early years was a crossroads for Muslims, Jews, Christians, the British Empire, and the recently-defunct Ottoman Empire. While these descriptions may seem like gratuitous detail, this stew of clashing cultures and mutual resentments will prove important in the formation of Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

Also crucial to understanding the birth of the movement is al-Nabhani's family history. His grandfather, Sheikh Yusuf al-Nabhani, was born in Palestine in the mid-nineteenth century, was brought up to be a man of letters, and eventually became a judge. At this time, the Ottoman Empire was still in existence. As an Islamic empire ruling over Arabs and Turks (among other ethnicities), the Ottoman Empire was essentially a caliphate, and Yusuf al-Nabhani was extremely loyal to the Ottoman Empire and more generally to the concept of a caliphate. Yusuf maintained that "loyalty to the caliph was a religious obligation" and he "considered the caliphate to be a symbol and

executive power of Islam.” Yusuf decried all European efforts to encroach on Ottoman territory, which during this time was shrinking. Another strong opinion of Yusuf’s was opposition to the trend of “reformism” in Islam. This reformism came either in the form of a more moderate, progressive view of the religion, or of the stricter *Wahhabi* movement, which today is associated with Saudi Arabia. Yusuf found both of these positions to be deviations from true Islam. Yusuf al-Nabhani helped raise his grandson, and was his intellectual mentor, so these points of view were passed down and played a role in Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s formation.

Pankurst goes into more detail when describing Taqiudeen al-Nabhani’s upbringing. Of all his accomplishments and traits, Pankhurst pays special attention to al-Nabhani’s intellectual pursuits. He was sent to Cairo, then an academic hub of the Arab world, to study Islamic thought at al-Azhar university, where he claimed to have read 16,000 books. While this was clearly hyperbole, he did have a reputation as a voracious and careful reader. Another interesting aspect of al-Nabhani’s education was his lack of interest in rote memorization (the standard form of religious training), in favor of debate, and the weighing of opposing theological arguments. These unorthodox interests paid off, and after university, al-Nabhani returned to Palestine and became a judge in the Shari’a court system like his grandfather.

Chapter Two deals with al-Nabhani’s formation of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. There are a few very important sections in particular, in which Pankhurst ties al-Nabhani’s intellectual rigor back to the movement’s formation. He describes the period between 1949 and 1951, during which al-Nabhani wrote prolifically, articulating certain foundational points adopted by Hizb-ut-Tahrir. His first book, titled *Inqath Filistin* (Saving Palestine) highlighted, among other things, al-Nabhani’s belief that Islam and Arab ethnic pride were intertwined. This is significant because “pan-Arabism,” alluded to multiple times in the book, was a movement promoting the unity of Arabs across the various Arab countries. Most pan-Arabists thought of it in mainly secular terms, but al-Nabhani thought this type of ethnic unity was worthless without Islam. This book also encouraged taking action on the basis of these beliefs, such as taking up arms against the British or Jews. During this time, al-Nabhani’s writing expanded in scope from just Palestinian issues to those of

the Arab world as a whole. Finally, al-Nabhani stressed the importance of Islam not just as a rallying tool to take over land, but as a system of laws and values to eventually govern every aspect of life in a caliphate. In this Chapter Pankhurst appears to respect the intellectual rigor al-Nabhani offers as a foundation to Hizb-ut-Tahrir. He even contrasts it with other movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, which contemporaneously left some followers disillusioned due to its lack of intellectual and theological clarity.

Finally, there are two themes that help frame the information in this book. In his introduction, Pankhurst mentions that various Islamic movements, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, and others, can be easy to conflate. This is especially true of observers in the West who are disadvantaged by both cultural and geographic distance. Pankhurst's observation, intentionally or unintentionally, frames his book as a resource to help readers appreciate the nuances of Islamic movements. The second theme is defeat or frustration in the Muslim world leading to solidarity between, and rallying amongst, Arabs. Pankhurst offers various illustrations of this. For example, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century resulted in "general dismay and disbelief," was viewed as a defeat for Islam, and fueled Muslims' desire for a revival of the caliphate, which al-Nabhani capitalized on. Another cause of resentment among Arabs was if one of their own was too willing to compromise with Britain, the United States, or the Jews. For instance, before the formation of Israel, King Abdullah of Jordan had negotiated with the Jews to split part of Palestine with them, taking the rest for Transjordan. This was an example of conciliatory behavior that led to "widespread disillusionment with the Arab regimes of the time." Pankhurst writes that stances such as these were widely seen as a betrayal of fellow Arabs, and further fueled solidarity against the non-Muslim world. In the midst of this discontent, a deeply religious and passionately Arab movement like Hizb-ut-Tahrir was welcomed by many.

Themes and larger significance are not immediately apparent in Pankhurst's book because of its purely historical nature. However, this is not to say that the book does not have value beyond historical facts. The detailed information it provides, and the ground-level perspectives it offers will enhance readers' understanding of the intersection of Islam and polit-

ics. In the end, in addition to being a highly specific account of a little-known religious movement, the book acts as a kind of antidote to the oversimplification and misunderstanding that plagues analysis of the Middle East.

Popular Contention, Regime, and Transition: Arab Revolts in Comparative Global Perspective. Edited by Eitan Y. Alimi, Avraham Sela, and Mario Sznajder. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xiv, 368. \$74.00 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY IRINA GOGA

When the Arab Spring began in 2011, many observers believed it to be a uniquely Middle Eastern event. The rapid spread of anti-government protests was largely lauded in the West and seen as a large step in the inevitable global march toward liberal democracy. Today, with half a decade of hindsight under our belt, it seems that both these perspectives are oversimplified. As more and more populations across the globe clamor for political change, the Arab Spring seems both less unique and less of a move towards a global liberal-democratic order. However, the popular revolts in the Middle East have something to tell us about our changing political landscape. In *Popular Contention, Regime, & Transition*, Eitan Alimi, Abraham Sela, and Mario Sznajder attempt to parse through the many moving parts of the Arab Spring in order to find some explanatory model of what makes popular uprisings in authoritarian regimes rise or fall.

In *Popular Contention*, Alimi, Sela, and Sznajder criticize past scholarly perspectives on the Arab Spring. Previous scholars viewed the Arab Spring either as a uniquely Middle Eastern event, too imbued with regional history and culture to be compared to other uprisings around the world, or they analyzed these events from a liberal-democratic vantage, implying a similarity between the Arab Spring and other revolts in time and history. Alimi et al. believe neither of these approaches to be helpful, in isolation. In order to understand the complexity of the Arab Spring, the vastly different trajectories and outcomes, one needs to be able to draw broadly from resistance to authoritarian regimes around the world. *Popular Contention* attempts to provide a comparative global perspective to shed

light on the many moving parts that can help determine the success or failure of revolts.

The editors of *Popular Contention* focus on what they call the “dynamics of contentious politics” and identify three main processes at work—popular contention, regime, and transition. The contributors focus on the interaction of these processes.

The first section of the book, “Between Structure and Contention,” focuses on the dynamics between popular contention and regime. The editors define popular contention as a “sustained, coordinated effort to claim-making” by groups organizing around shared interests with the goal of achieving political change. The type of regime in power and its response to popular contentions both affects and is influenced by the manner of revolts that arise, creating a cycle of influence between the two processes. In Chapter One in this section, Mario Diani, a professor at the University of Trento who focuses on social network approaches to social movements and collective action, and Caelum Moffat, an independent scholar with expertise in the Middle East, focus on the importance of modes of communication during the Arab Spring. The modes of communication available to protesters are determined by factors like the social cohesion of the dissenting group and the ability of the regime to repress discontent.

The next chapter is by Katia Pilati, a sociologist at the University of Trento who studies social movements and protests under authoritarian regimes. Pilati draws comparisons from repressive regimes in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. She contends that the extent to which protesters can mobilize depends heavily on how well a regime can adapt to popular contention. She argues that the organizational structure of the protesters’ opposition is key to determining how repressive or adaptive it will be in reaction to popular contention.

In his chapter, Mario Quaranta, a political science Ph.D. focusing on democracy, directs his attention towards the regime. He compares a number of recent democracies in Latin America to understand how certain elements of regime types influence the mode of popular contention. He studies regimes that are neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic. He finds that some of the most important elements of these regimes are the extent of freedom, equality and government re-

sponsiveness, as well as the role played by traditionally non-political actors such as the military. Considering the crucial role the military played in Egypt's uprisings, Quaranta's attention to regimes where militaries have played similar roles in uprisings is particularly important.

Jack Goldstone, the current Director of the Institute for Public Policy at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, closes out the section on regime and popular contention. Goldstone eschews global comparisons for a regional one, focusing solely on the Middle Eastern countries involved in the Arab Spring. While a more limited sample, these countries still provide a large variety of both popular contentions, from small protests to complete popular uprisings that overthrew governments, and regime reaction, from total repression to peaceful concessions. While Goldstone's approach is not lacking in sample size or explanatory power, the limited geographic scope defeats the book's main purpose of providing a global comparative perspective.

The second section of the book focuses on the interplay between regimes and transition. Transition here does not indicate a complete change in governmental structure or effective political resolution. Rather, transition reflects the full spectrum of outcomes available to the contentious populace. This section examines the effect of concessions, big or small, on subsequent opposition movements, analyzing the interaction between an ever changing system of government and its ever changing public opposition.

The first contributor on this topic is Valerie Bunce, a professor of government at Cornell University who focuses on authoritarianism in Eastern Europe. She studies how protest movements seep across borders and identifies demonstration effects and transnational networks as the two main factors of that spread. Her comparison of post-communist Eastern Europe and the Arab Spring reveals the importance of regional state powers during key stages of the protests and their influence on the diffusion of popular contention.

Gregory Maney, a professor at Hofstra University who specializes in nonviolent social change, focuses his comparisons on ethnic democracies or segmented composite regimes. These are essentially countries that are deeply divided on cultural or religious lines and whose segregated population

groups experience different treatments by their government. Maney focuses his analysis on Northern Ireland and MENA countries, but there are a host of other states, such as Sri Lanka, that could deepen the reliability of his theory. It is particularly interesting to study transition in these types of regimes because when social groups are at odds, any move by the government will be met with contention by the group against whose interest it acted.

Eitan Alimi and David Meyer, who both focus their research on social movements and politics, emphasize the role of international actors in their chapter. Unsurprisingly, they posit that the degree of military and economic interdependence is a driving factor in whether another state will intervene in a regime experiencing political contention.

Karen Rasler, who focuses her work on extreme political conflict, rounds out this section with a comparison of Egypt's initial experience with the Arab Spring and the Iranian Revolution. She identifies three key factors to the outcome of these uprisings—the ability of protestors to frame the claims of different groups as similar, a movement's ability to mobilize other actors, and the regime's use of repression and concession to incentivize (or dis-incentivize) the protestors. It is the interaction between these factors that drive the process and outcome of revolutions. However, her points of comparison are both few and from the same region, weakening the editors stated goals of bringing global perspective to the Arab Spring.

The final section of the book focuses on the interaction between contention and transition. It is important to note that transition here is not portrayed as an endpoint, but merely another part of a cycling process of political change. Egypt's experience is particularly revealing. While many thought the ouster of Mubarak signaled an end to the country's popular contention, it was merely a way point. More protests soon broke out, more governments were ousted, and the process of contention continues.

Political science professor Vincent Boudreau brings his expertise in social movements under repressive regimes to the first chapter in this section. His analysis of democratization of Indonesia and the Philippines reveals that the social groups leading these movements are often driven by different or additional goals. The civil society groups that make up this pro-

democracy movement have their own varying interests at play and those influence the transition process. Boudreau applies his Southeast Asian model to Egypt and Tunisia.

Mario Sznajder uses Chile to demonstrate how the goal of popular contention isn't always political. The Chilean demonstrations, which happened at about the same time as the Arab Spring, were driven by the desire for upward economic mobility and closing the wide wealth gap in the country. But while the political structure was largely untouched, the politics of economic policy was clearly the root cause of the movement. Sznajder likens this experience to how Jordan weathered the Arab Spring.

Gayil Talshir takes a truly global approach by comparing the 2011 protest movements around the world, including the United States to Israel. He uses the Habermas legitimation crises theory to explain these protests, essentially rooting the issue in declining confidence in the functionality of government. This model seems particularly relevant today, as we continue to see a crisis of confidence against governments that were long thought stable and democratic.

Avraham Sela's concluding chapter highlights the importance of nuance in *Popular Contention*. After relating some of the key factors other contributors raised, Sela identifies a few more, such as the role of the military. His goal is to emphasize that the key to understanding such complicated processes is to avoid oversimplification, reiterating the theme of the book.

Given its complexity and nuance, *Popular Contention, Regime, & Transition* is not for the casual reader. It is geared towards academics in search of an introduction to the many moving parts of the popular contention model. It is not intended to provide answers, but rather to raise questions and provoke thoughtful analysis. The editors do not seek one overarching explanatory model for the Middle East or popular contentions anywhere in the world. Rather, it is the interactions between many different factors that determine the course of popular uprisings. This call to deepen our understanding of popular contention seems particularly apt in our current global political climate.

Bosnia's Paralyzed Peace. By Christopher Bennett. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. vii, 388. \$35.00 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY TOBIAS KRAFT

On November 21, 1995, representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia gathered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, to announce a peace agreement intended to halt the brutal three-and-a-half-year Bosnian War. The Dayton Peace Agreement, as it came to be known, would prove to be successful in putting an end to the violence, and subsequently enabled Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter Bosnia) to make significant progress in institution-building and reconstruction during the first decade after Dayton. However, the Agreement has ultimately failed as an instrument of peace, as it has struggled to put the country on a path to long-term stability, and the first decade's progress has regressed in the past ten years. Two decades on from Dayton, Bosnia is neither at war nor at peace; instead, the bitterly divided country is trapped in a state of political and social paralysis, with ethno-national tensions simmering threateningly beneath a mostly peaceful surface, as political gridlock reigns and the economy slowly stagnates.

This is the bleak picture Christopher Bennett paints in his detailed and ambitious work, *Bosnia's Paralyzed Peace*, in which he meticulously documents the country's slow descent over the past decade into a state of paralysis amid fear of renewed warfare across ethno-national lines, driven above all by a bitter zero-sum politics reinforced by a flawed peace agreement. Bennett warns that unless the international community reengages in Bosnia, reopens the Dayton Agreement, and radically changes its approach, Bosnia is likely to continue its downward trajectory and potentially descend once more into violence.

The fundamental source of Bosnia's instability, Bennett notes at the outset, is the formula of "one country, two entities, and three constituent peoples" underpinning the Dayton Agreement. Thus, while Bosnia is one state, it has a second tier of highly autonomous entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Sprska—which control most important government functions. According to Bennett, this system has helped reinforce ethno-national divisions exacer-

bated during the Bosnian War, while rewarding extremist behavior that undermines the prospects for multi-ethnicity. However, the roots of Bosnia's ills extend much further beyond Dayton. The "Bosnian Question" has been a recurring source of conflict for centuries, as Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims have sought to peacefully coexist—sometimes successfully, often not—under numerous empires and other political configurations.

While Bosnians experienced an extended period of peace across ethno-national lines throughout the Cold War as the glue of communism held peoples of all ethno-national backgrounds together, the collapse of Yugoslavia plunged the country into violence in the early 1990s as conflicts from other Yugoslav republics, particularly Croatia and Serbia, spilled across the country's borders. Amid the instability caused by the Yugoslav collapse, Bosnia held its first democratic elections in 1990. In the 1990 elections, Bosnians reacted to the emergence of ethno-national security as an issue (due to the rise of Croat and Serb nationalism in Croatia and Serbia) by voting for parties claiming to represent the interests of their own ethno-national group. The election results, Bennett argues, essentially sealed Bosnia's fate. Over 80 percent of the country voted for ethno-national-based parties, thus setting in motion a chain of events that would result in the country's three constituent groups going to war with one another, and even seeking one another's extermination, until the Dayton Agreement put an end to the violence in 1995. Bennett concisely recounts this history in the first third of the book before turning to the aftermath of Dayton.

What follows is a meticulous analysis of the country's evolution in the two decades since the Agreement was signed. As a former Deputy High Representative of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the ad hoc international institution created by the Dayton Agreement and charged with overseeing the implementation of the Agreement, Bennett's intimate familiarity with the key actors and developments in the country is immediately evident and manifests itself in a nuanced but highly accessible analysis of the country's complex cast of characters and institutions.

Bennett describes how, following the 1997 Bonn Peace Implementation Conference, the OHR became the key driving force behind the country's progress. This was accomplished by

repeatedly invoking the so-called Bonn Powers—executive powers granted to the OHR in Bonn—which allowed the OHR to adopt binding decisions necessary to realize the goals of Dayton. These powers were originally envisioned as only a last resort to overcome procedural deadlocks and to address specific and concrete threats to peace and stability. However, they quickly evolved into the primary means for advancing the goals of Dayton. Over the next decade, successive High Representatives invoked the Bonn Powers hundreds of times to override domestic institutions and actors, dismiss recalcitrant officials, and overcome paralysis in order to drive the peace process forward.

Yet, despite the frequent use of these extraordinary powers, significant international investment, and the political carrots of eventual EU and NATO membership, the results in terms of a stable, self-sustaining democracy after the first decade were modest. Bennett argues that by becoming so intimately involved with the peace process, the OHR soon established itself as the country's most important decision-maker, and thereafter had a tendency to overstate the extent of Bosnia's progress. Furthermore, the OHR's enhanced role had the effect of limiting accountability for domestic political actors, thus stifling the development of self-sustaining domestic institutions. Nevertheless, with the OHR wielding the Bonn Powers, the country was able to make necessary changes, overcome gridlock, and make progress. However, since 2006, when the OHR's ability to use the Bonn Powers was significantly reduced, Bosnia has regressed, as the lack of an impartial decision-maker able to break deadlocks has allowed political paralysis to become the norm. Furthermore, without the OHR's ability to dismiss corrupt and intransigent leaders, political parties have eschewed compromise with other ethno-national parties and focused their energies on controlling the public sector so as to be able to control networks of patronage with which to reward their own ethno-national supporters.

Bennett presents all of this with nuance and balance, providing the reader with an unvarnished view of the domestic and international situation in all of its complexity. For instance, he chides successive High Representatives for their timidity in refusing to reopen the Dayton Agreement, despite its obvious flaws. Nevertheless, despite recognizing the shortcomings of the OHR-led approach, Bennett remains critical of the

decision after 2006 to reduce the use of the Bonn Powers and thereby limit the OHR's role.

Bennett levels his sharpest attacks at the European Union. While acknowledging that by 2006, the limits of what could be achieved by OHR decree had been reached and the time during which the use of the Bonn Powers could be justified as emergency measures had been eclipsed, he is nonetheless critical of the shift in international strategy, led by the European Union, to local ownership. He characterizes the international strategy of the last decade as "diplomatic autopilot" driven by the mistaken belief that holding out EU membership as a carrot would provide a sufficient incentive for Bosnians to overcome their differences and establish a well-functioning, stable democracy. He also faults the European Union for its excessive short-termism, caving too easily to Bosnian obstructionism in the face of necessary reforms, and for its unwillingness to use force during the Wars of Yugoslav Dissolution. As a result, Bennett asserts, the European Union lacks credibility with Bosnians, who have learned that as long as they are sufficiently obstructionist, the European Union will drop its conditions.

Having spent the bulk of the work meticulously documenting how Dayton's flaws and the shift in the international strategy have allowed Bosnia to deteriorate over the past decade, Bennett finally offers a way forward in the book's penultimate chapter. Focusing on the root of Bosnia's political challenges, the zero-sum nature of the country's politics driven by ethno-national division, as well as the lack of an executive decision-maker able to overcome paralysis, Bennett lays out an ambitious proposal for a new system designed to radically alter politicians' incentives. The two key elements of Bennett's plan are long-term executive powers for an international institution with a peace-keeping mandate and constitutional reform of the country's political structure, particularly its election system.

In essence, Bennett argues that constitutional reform must be externally imposed, or it is doomed to fail. He points to the constant paralysis that has characterized Bosnian politics since the OHR's retreat from a dominant role as evidence that Bosnia cannot be expected to properly reform its constitutional structure itself. This view is further supported by the zero-sum nature of Bosnian politics, in which ethno-national groups perceive any shift in the status quo in favor of another

group as a threat to their own security, and thus any effort at constitutional reform would likely result in deadlock.

To resolve this issue, Bennett argues that the impetus for constitutional change must come from abroad. Specifically, he argues for an EU-led international institution with executive powers to lead and manage the process of constitutional reform. Citing the Allies' long-term occupation and retention of executive powers in Germany and the emerging "responsibility to protect" norm, Bennett argues that executive powers should be limited to extreme circumstances, such as preventing violence.

As for the issue of constitutional reform itself, Bennett puts forth an elaborate system which is designed to neutralize the detrimental impact of ethno-national identity by rewarding ethno-national collaboration instead of conflict. Thus, Bennett calls for Bosnia to abandon its consociational democracy and adopt a centripetal democracy. This system would rely on multiple proportional voting and divide the electorate into Bosniak (Muslim), Croat, and Serb electoral rolls. Thus, electors would vote as Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, and cast separate ballots for Bosniak, Croat, and Serb political representatives. In this way, politicians would have incentives to not only seek votes from their own ethno-national groups, but would also be encouraged to appeal to voters from other groups. Furthermore, for this system to work, several other features would also need to be included: the ethno-national results would either be set in advance or exactly reflect the proportion of each community in the electorate; each community would have the same influence on who is elected in other communities; a minimum threshold of support would be set to prevent the election of "straw men"; and decisions in the legislature would require super-majority approval.

One cannot fault Bennett's proposal for lacking ambition. As he himself concedes, such a political system has never before been attempted and thus its success is far from guaranteed. For this reason, Bennett suggests that his system be given a trial run in the self-governing administrative unit of Brčko or the city of Mostar, which have proven unable to effectively govern themselves.

Bennett's proposal nevertheless raises significant questions. To begin with, it relies on significant, long-term engage-

ment by the European Union to serve in an executive capacity and provide troops for keeping the peace. At best, this is unlikely. In the aftermath of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, the refugee crisis, not to mention the festering problems of the euro zone, the European Union faces significant—perhaps existential—challenges and is unlikely to be able to provide the level of support Bennett's proposal would require. Having faulted the European Union for its inability to develop a coherent long-term strategy in Bosnia after 2006, it is unrealistic to now rely on the European Union, particularly given its current challenges.

Furthermore, given that the fundamental root of Bosnia's instability is ethno-national conflict, it is worth considering whether three-way partition or secession of some or all of the country's ethno-national groups provides an alternative. Bennett dismisses this possibility with little explanation, simply noting that such a resolution would require significant population transfers and would result in indefensible new borders. Of course, new, more secure borders can be negotiated too, and the international community could maintain its peacekeeping presence in the region while new borders were established. Such a three-state solution would seem to address the root of the issue—namely, three ethno-national groups fearful of one another living in one country in the aftermath of horrific violence among the groups. Such a solution would likely require a shorter commitment from the European Union and the international community and thus may be more achievable.

To his credit, Bennett does not exaggerate the odds of success in the near term in order to leave the reader with a false sense of hope for Bosnia's future. He is candid about the long odds of any solution—particularly his own. He admits that his purpose in offering a solution is more about stimulating discussion of a better approach, rather than presenting a path to a sustainable peace itself. On this latter point, Bennett is surely correct. Despite its grim outlook, *Bosnia's Paralyzed Peace* provides a comprehensive overview of Bosnia's perilous current state, and proposes an audacious new strategy for overcoming its challenges that is worthy of attention.

The Terror Years: From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State. By Lawrence Wright. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016. Pp. xiii, 350. \$16.95 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY LORENA MICHELEN

Pulitzer Prize winner and American journalist Lawrence Wright does it again: he has managed to capture the recent historical events, of both the West and the East, that have taken us to an age of ubiquitous terrorist activity. Wright's 2006 book, *The Looming Tower*, narrated in-depth the rise of al-Qaeda from its very beginning up until the 9/11 attacks. Now in his new book, *The Terror Years: From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State*, he draws on several articles—including some that were part of *The Looming Tower* and others that he wrote for *The New Yorker*—to cast light on the development of terrorism post-9/11. This collection of articles is, at its core, a portrayal of the West and the Arab world's struggle to defeat terrorism and a depiction of the minds and motivations behind terrorist organizations.

Even though there is more than one narrative at play, Wright's writing is engaging and clear throughout the book. He is able to transform a simple person, place, or event, into a magical story. This book shows Wright's thorough understanding of the Middle East—a region that he has visited, worked in, reported on, and studied for more than thirty years. A varied compilation, each article narrates a story about either an event (like past terror attacks), a person (like FBI or secret intelligence officers), or a country (like Syria). Despite the different topics, there are recurring themes throughout the book. One of the main themes is *silence*.

Silence is a constant theme throughout the book, since the authoritarian governments that dominate the Middle East thrive by denying citizens the rights to voice their opinions and to have real representation. This was especially true before the Arab Spring, when popular demonstrations against regional governments were extremely rare. As Wright portrays, in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, government authorities would jail or torture those who voiced their anti-government opinions. In this way, Wright's most valuable contribution is to demonstrate how unrepresentative governments deprive communities of a democratic voice. The resulting feel-

ings of frustration and disempowerment give rise to discontent and political instability. Some examples include dictators' rise to power, violent resistance, and civil war.

How is terrorism engendered? *The Terror Years* focuses on the causes of Middle Eastern terrorism and what it means for the future. In today's discussion, scholars and political leaders have difficulty understanding the genesis and growth of different terrorist groups. In this way, Wright's theme of the silence imposed by authoritarian regimes casts a new light on the quandary. It makes the reader wonder whether this imposed silence in Middle Eastern dictatorial regimes is a driving force in the creation and recruitment of terrorists.

Through a description of the arts and film industry in Syria—or lack of thereof—Wright convincingly shows to the reader how the Syrian people were “beaten into silence.” As the stories of some of the people Wright met in the Middle East suggest, many young individuals who cannot voice their opinions and convictions in the democratic process do not know what to do with their anger. A charismatic extremist leader then comes into the picture and lets them redirect that fury and express it through terror. If forced silence is a recruiter of terror, shouldn't we let noise in?

In Chapter Two, Wright reports on the career of former FBI agent John O'Neill, who worked zealously trying to defeat al-Qaeda and terrorism pre-9/11. “The Counterterrorist,” one of the most shocking chapters of the book, recounts the story of O'Neill, the former head of counterterrorism in the New York office of the FBI. O'Neill was one of the pioneer terrorism investigators in the Bureau, years before the 9/11 attacks. Even when others did not take him seriously, O'Neill understood early on the immense threat that al-Qaeda posed to the United States. Months before the 9/11 attacks, the CIA allegedly withheld critical information from the FBI—information that, Wright suggests, would have probably alerted the government of the upcoming attacks.

O'Neill lost his job shortly before 9/11 because he had taken classified information outside of the office. He then became head of security at the World Trade Center and died there on the day of the attacks. As Wright described, “his death was ironic: instead of getting bin Laden, bin Laden got him.” In another chapter, Wright talks about Ali Soufan, an FBI

agent and O'Neill's protégé, who later went on to fight the interrogation techniques considered by many to be torture. Soufan, one of the few Arabic-speaking agents at the time, was the case agent for the USS Cole bombing by al-Qaeda in October 2000. The CIA, Wright explains, refused to cooperate with Soufan's investigation into the murder of seventeen American sailors. Had the agency responded to Soufan's requests for information, the FBI would have realized, twenty months before 9/11, that al-Qaeda was already present in the United States. Again, Wright suggests that this might perhaps have stopped the attacks from happening.

Wright is able to effortlessly describe people and their psyches and motivations in a profound way. In a Chapter titled "The Man Behind Bin Laden," Wright portrays the life of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was the number two man in al-Qaeda at the time of the the 9/11 attacks. Wright traveled to Egypt in order to learn more about Zawahiri, who became al-Qaeda's leader upon the death of Bin Laden. Wright had visited Egypt before. This time, he was surprised to find a different country: one in chaos and full of shame, anger, and denial that the 9/11 attacks had been somehow engendered there.

The book finishes with a Chapter on the capture and slaying by ISIS of four American journalists and aid workers, and what Wright deems was "our government's failed response." This chilling account ends with a warning: terrorism will be defeated at some point because terror never wins. When that day comes, this war on terror will be over. But if we forget what the world looked like before terrorism, if we lose sight of the liberties we enjoyed before the growth of the security state, we will not be able to go back and enjoy that old freedom. And it is then, he argues, that the terrorists will have won.

Finally, as Wright puts it, authoritarian regimes compelling silence from their people led to the civil conflicts during the Arab Spring. The Syrian civil war, in particular, has displaced countless refugees. As Wright explains in his epilogue, the United States has largely benefited from "great streams of refugees" in modern history. In the late 1970s, after the end of the Vietnam War, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese fled to the United States. In 1980, between April and October, 125,000 Cubans entered the United States. He admits that there are also a number of risks involved in admitting such a huge number of refugees. Yet, he points out, "if the world does

little, and fails to deal with this historic tide of [Syrian] refugees, there will be woeful consequences for decades to come.” The current refugee crisis is another consequence of the disempowerment of groups of people victimized by these authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes. If the West does not deal with the refugee crisis properly, it will contribute to the growth of terrorism. Refugees who feel abandoned and hopeless, who feel voiceless, will turn to groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda for protection and leadership.

As history shows us, terrorism is not something to be taken lightly. The power of charismatic extremist leaders to recruit thousands of individuals to their cause cannot be underestimated. If the United States categorically closes its doors to refugees, it will be strengthening the message of terrorist leaders that the United States is the enemy of the Arab world. This will be an extremely effective recruiting tool for terrorist organizations. At a time when ISIS is losing most of its physical territory and thus having trouble recruiting members, the West should be extremely careful with doing or saying anything that could help these terrorist groups recruit more people.

As Wright credibly shows, the policy of employing an anti-Islam discourse and anti-refugee policies can have long-lasting consequences. Moreover, ISIS has distinguished itself from al-Qaeda by having a decentralized terrorist organization in which so-called lone-wolf attacks are incredibly common. If our government remains unyielding, we can only expect more attacks to come. They will come from inside, not from refugees; they will be by lone wolves, and they will be extremely hard to predict and prevent.

Paradiplomacy: Cities and States as Global Players. By Rodrigo Tavares. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. x, 272. \$29.95 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY KALI MONTECALVO

Since the seventeenth century, conventional international relations theory has considered foreign affairs to be the domain of national governments. In *Paradiplomacy: Cities and States as Global Players*, Rodrigo Tavares challenges this orthodox view of considering “foreign affairs in a state-centric way”

and argues that sub-states and cities are new important actors on the world stage. Drawing from examples of nearly two hundred subnational governments, Tavares demonstrates that sub-states and cities are an ever-increasing international presence and are already engaging in foreign affairs. Additionally, he explores the implications of this continual increase in subnational governments' international activism both in the current international system and moving forward.

Throughout the book, Tavares provides a comprehensive and useful primer of paradiplomacy, expounding on its theory, its institutional infrastructure, and recent examples of the international activism of subnational governments. Tavares utilizes both a scholarly and pragmatic approach to the topic, producing a book that is satisfactory to scholars and policy-makers alike. His own experiences could have also informed this dual approach: in the academic realm—as a Research Fellow at the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) and as a former Senior Research Fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government—as well as in government—as Head of the Office of Foreign Affairs of São Paulo's State Government from 2011 to 2014. Overall, the book reads as it is marketed: a “definitive practitioner's guide to foreign policy at a subnational level.”

The first Chapter of *Paradiplomacy* is aptly called “Essentials of Paradiplomacy” and provides an important overview of the topic before moving into the more technical aspects of paradiplomacy in practice. As a substantial portion of the overall book—one integral to understanding the concept—this Chapter warrants a more detailed summary of each of its subparts. After a brief introduction, Tavares discusses his choice of the word “paradiplomacy” to describe the involvement of subnational governments in international relations. He then describes the history of this concept, arguing that paradiplomacy is a “natural consequence” of the increasingly globalizing world with a proliferation of new non-state international actors on the world stage. Considering the growing amount of power given to sub-states in the 1980s and 1990s, Tavares argues that paradiplomacy is here to stay. Yet he cautions that it is currently going through its most challenging phase. He advocates that “there is no need for more, but for better paradiplomacy,” an idea he further discusses in the last chapter of the book.

In the second portion of the first Chapter, Tavares examines paradiplomacy in its current context. He conveys that paradiplomacy is a multilayered term and distinguishes among four aspects of paradiplomacy: ceremonial paradiplomacy, single-themed paradiplomacy, global paradiplomacy, and sovereign paradiplomacy. This portion of the book provides essential background knowledge that greatly augments the reader's understanding of the cases studies and other examples of subnational governments in action discussed throughout the remainder of the book. It is also important to note that throughout this Chapter, as well as throughout the book as a whole, Tavares consistently provides a plethora of examples of subnational governments and practices to support his arguments and background information. It veritably grounds the more academic discussion of paradiplomacy in current and past real-world situations, which is consistent with the dual academic and pragmatic approach used throughout the book.

In the final portions of the first Chapter, Tavares first examines the issue of why subnational governments engage in paradiplomacy. He provides compelling justifications, citing a number of reasons including: seizing global opportunities, providing citizen services, promoting decentralization, addressing local claims, geography, and overcoming isolationism. Tavares then discusses responses to paradiplomacy, asserting that, presently, paradiplomacy is supported in varying degrees by countries as well as by international organizations. Finally, Tavares ends this essential overview of paradiplomacy with a segment on paradiplomacy rankings as a way to assess where cities and states stand in the global realm. He cites a number of instruments policymakers can use to assess the rankings of subnational governments and their influence in the international community, including the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network, the Global City Competitiveness Index, the Global Financial Centers Index (GFCI), and the South American States of the Future. Overall, the first Chapter of *Paradiplomacy* is incredibly important to the understanding of the concept and provides important background information that really increases the reader's understanding of the rest of the book.

In Chapter Two of *Paradiplomacy*, Tavares provides an overview of best practices for the institutional infrastructure of paradiplomacy. He primarily aims to address two aspects of its

legal framework: first, “the legal internal mandate of subnational entities to act abroad,” and second, “their capacity to sign agreements with foreign agents.” To augment this discussion, Tavares analyzes the legal framework governing the foreign affairs actions of subnational governments in sixteen different countries. Tavares then examines the various ways that state and local governments organize their governing bodies controlling foreign affairs, as well as common recurring themes in the internal structures of these bodies. He also considers the existence of additional structures that could be associated with these governing bodies, such as external associations, think tanks, and national forums of subnational governments. The remainder of the Chapter is devoted to discussing the position of various subnational practices pertaining to bilateral commissions (including an interesting overview of formal bilateral relations of the State of São Paulo), representations abroad, the staff of subnational foreign affairs offices, use of white papers, foreign partners, multilateral agreements, and awards. Though there is no overarching way that subnational governments structure their governmental bodies or any single way that governs how subnational governments engage in foreign affairs, Tavares successfully weaves them together with common themes supplemented by examples of state practice. He succeeds in this Chapter in providing a cohesive articulation of the various ways states have structured these offices. This Chapter is important in understanding the more technical aspects of how subnational governments can be structured and some commonalities among them.

Chapter Three focuses on subnational governments’ external policies. Tavares first distinguishes between paradiplomacy and diplomacy. At the outset, he indicates the differences between these two concepts in four general matters: issues addressed, participation, *modus operandi*, and final goal. Tavares asserts that paradiplomacy is mainly concerned with “low policy,” such as health, transportation, education, and culture, as opposed to “high policy” of diplomacy, such as military security. Then, Tavares suggests that in order to ensure the quality of their foreign affairs policy, paradiplomats should pursue a four-step track. Finally, Tavares identifies ten subnational public policy areas that tend to have a foreign affairs component. These policy areas include: trade and investment, environment and sustainable development, lobby-

ing, social policies, and international development assistance. Overall, this Chapter provides a deeper understanding of some of the policies pursued by various subnational governments, which is helpful in understanding how subnational governments fit into the international relations context.

In Chapter Four, Tavares dissects twenty different cases of subnational governments that pursue foreign policies, aiming “to show the universality of local foreign policy.” With this array of case studies, Tavares makes a compelling argument. Using language and concepts that were explained in earlier parts of the book, this section most serves as a practitioner’s guide to paradiplomacy in the sense that it looks at how a variety of sub-state and local governments conduct foreign affairs. Each case study contains some combination of explaining the structure of the subnational government, the policy agenda, and the agreements/memberships that they are a part of. His analysis of some of the most successful and well-known subnational governments conducting foreign relations, such as Buenos Aires in Argentina, California in the United States, and Tokyo in Japan, makes this an especially interesting chapter of the book.

Finally, Tavares ends his book with a Chapter discussing the challenges ahead for paradiplomacy and potential solutions for the future. Tavares asserts that some of the major challenges to paradiplomacy are lack of resources, lack of training, and fragile structures. To rectify these issues, Tavares argues that subnational governments need better (i.e. more streamlined and clear) internal policies and more resources, which should be used in particular to invest in training for diplomats, paradiplomats, and students. Additionally, Tavares advocates that there needs to be more coordination between subnational governments and national foreign policy.

Overall, *Paradiplomacy: Cities and States as Global Players* provides a compelling argument for considering the foreign affairs activities of subnational governments when studying international relations. Through extensive explanations and examples of current practice demonstrating the present role of sub-states and cities engaging in foreign affairs, Tavares makes a convincing case.

America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century.
By Stephen Brooks & William Wohlforth. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xii, 274. \$29.95
(hardcover).

REVIEWED BY CHRIS MULLEN

Upon hearing the news of his untimely demise, Mark Twain famously quipped, "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." This admonition against hasty proclamations undergirds Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth's *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century*, a new book assessing the alleged decline of American global power. In *America Abroad*, the authors assert that the United States must maintain a strategy of "global deep engagement"—defined as a continued active role in shaping the geopolitical environment—in order for the nation to secure its core interests. By providing an extensive and well-researched survey of current declinist theories, Brooks and Wohlforth offer a full-throated rebuke of retrenchment proponents who advocate a diminished role for America on the global stage. Given the emergent skepticism over the United States' role in the world voiced by prominent members of the Trump administration, such warnings seem particularly prescient.

Though some background conceptions of international relations theory are briefly explained, this book is not written for the lay observer, as many of its most important points presume a sufficient familiarity with current academic debate in the field. At times the book appears more a loose collection of scholarly articles linked together with cross-references and repeated assertions, but its central argument for continued U.S. involvement in the global order remains persuasive. Moreover, the authors deserve credit for expanding their analysis beyond theoretical conceptions into critical study of the practical implications of their propositions.

America Abroad begins with a critical assessment of the United States' current role in the global order. While the authors acknowledge that certain issues of interest have evolved over time, they assert that the United States has remained committed to three core objectives in the post-World War II era: (1) the reduction of threats to U.S. national security, (2) the expansion of a liberal economic order to maximize domes-

tic prosperity, and (3) the sustaining of a global institutional order that ensures interstate cooperation to promote U.S. interests. Brooks and Wohlforth claim to undertake the “most comprehensive assessment” to date of the United States’ “grand strategic choice” to pursue these goals, promising both theoretical and evidence-based foundations to underscore the need for continued U.S. engagement in global affairs. In this regard, the text certainly does not disappoint. After outlining the aims of the book, the authors quickly proceed to a quantitative analysis of the United States’ current global position.

Through a series of compelling graphical representations, the authors underscore the enormity by which the United States outpaces other nations’ military, technological, and economic capacities. These data sets provide a useful background for sustaining the book’s subsequent proposition that the United States will remain an unparalleled global force for many years to come. China is acknowledged as the sole state currently positioned to rival U.S. dominance, but factors such as an aging population, lack of sufficient educational opportunities, and a relative dearth of ownership in multinational corporations are seen as circumstances that will inevitably impede China’s growth trajectory. While China’s economic rise is certainly not discounted, the authors diligently assert that the Asian giant still lags far behind in technological and military capacity to effectively counter United States’ core objectives any time soon.

Beginning in Chapter Four and continuing throughout the remainder of the book, the authors identify crucial aspects of the United States’ “grand strategy choice” and undertake a critical assessment of whether the continued costs of “deep engagement” sufficiently benefit America’s national security and economic interests. While their support for America’s current global posture is never uncertain, Brooks and Wohlforth are careful to distinguish the limits of their proposed “deep engagement” model from what they consider the problematic overextensions of America’s recent past. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, are termed “deep engagement plus” factors—situations that exemplify the limits of American power abroad but are ultimately unnecessary for the continued maintenance of the present global system.

Though such stipulations certainly strengthen Brooks and Wohlforth’s argument, the distinction between a “deep en-

agement” and “deep engagement plus” factor remains too malleable. Conveniently, the authors appeal to the aforementioned three core objectives as the *proper* scope of U.S. global engagement policy but relegate specific examples of overextension as “plus” factors outside of their model. While this categorization does not undermine the book’s central thesis, it does raise potential concerns about the applicability of the model to future strategic decisions. Notably, the factors provided to distinguish “deep engagement plus” strategies from their less extensive counterparts such as “power” and “economic importance” seem too amorphous to effectively guide future policymakers and appear more as examples retrospectively categorized to fit the authors’ model.

Despite any misgivings of their model’s parameters, Brooks and Wohlforth spend the remainder of their book critically analyzing the costs and benefits of the U.S. policy of global engagement and cast sufficient doubt on the viability of retrenchment theories to meet America’s core objectives. The authors confidently assert that the security blanket provided by the United States results in a “net increase in security,” the benefits of which exceed the economic and political costs. Specifically, the authors assert that “deep engagement” deters challenges to regional security arrangements and prevents nuclear proliferation while also assuring the United States a strong hand in aligning such structures to its strategic interests. Both concepts—deterrence and assurance—strongly depend on the maintenance of leverage within the system, and this leverage would be significantly diminished if the United States were to pursue a policy of retrenchment.

The authors go on to examine specific instances of “net increases in security,” including the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and an analysis of regional security arrangements around the world. While these case studies highlight interesting observations such as the deterrence effect of regional alliances that help support the book’s central thesis, they seem more appropriately suited for stand-alone articles rather than the cursory treatment given in the book. To their credit, however, the authors acknowledge as much in the book’s concluding thoughts—specifically calling for more regionally-focused research to understand specific implications of retrenchment policies.

After extolling the benefits of a “deep entrenchment” policy, Brooks and Wohlforth spend the next two chapters analyzing the allegedly burdensome economic and security costs to the United States of maintaining the current system. Rather than providing a mere survey of system maintenance costs, the authors present a well-reasoned and critical rebuke of current declinist and retrenchment scholars. After an initial survey of the current literature in the field, Brooks and Wohlforth effectively argue against preconceived notions of the cost-savings effects of retrenchment. Drawing from available studies, the authors assert that there is no reason to believe military spending correlates with economic growth and admonishes those who propagate the false assumption that a shift in military spending would correspond to an equal increase in domestic welfare expenditures. In contrast, they argue that securing U.S. interests from a retrenched position of diminished global impact would actually be more expensive than a continuation of the status quo—namely because of the loss of security guarantees and the ability to rapidly deploy forces to address security threats.

Similarly, the authors see even deeper strategic costs of retrenchment in terms of national security. To frame the argument, the analogy between the hegemonic dominance of the United States and European powers of past centuries is forcefully denied. Drawing from their earlier quantitative analysis, the authors assert that the gap between the United States and other potential global powers is so vast compared to earlier eras that any analogical reasoning to previous balance-of-power structures is inadequate. The sheer expansion that any emerging global power or regional bloc would have to undergo to counterbalance the United States is too massive in terms of collective economic, military, and technological capacities. Thus, the United States currently exists as the sole credible guardian of the international system. However, the authors are careful to resurrect their previous warnings against “deep engagement plus” factors. They admonish the United States to chart a course of status quo maintenance and to avoid entrapment over non-essential interests and excess engagements as exemplified in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The book concludes with a renewed assertion of the importance of global engagement to securing U.S. interests domestically and abroad. To underscore their point, Brooks and

Wohlforth provide many examples of the benefits the United States has reaped from the postwar system, including the intelligence sharing networks of NATO, the ability of the United States to bend international rules to align with its interests, and the insulation of U.S. businesses from import competition. From these examples, the authors distill four key economic benefits of continuing “deep engagement” in global affairs: (1) U.S. trade has benefited from the stability of the global system, (2) institutional features of the global system such as the IMF reflect U.S. interests, (3) U.S. leverage in the system has allowed it to secure better bargains, and (4) continuous engagement prevents conflicts that could threaten system stability. Against these interests, the authors forcefully claim retrenchment theorists have given little thought to the major strategic blunders and irreparable damage that could occur to its national interests should the United States abandon the role it has shaped for itself in global affairs.

Though Brooks and Wohlforth’s critical assessment could not have anticipated the recent upheavals in American politics and renewed questioning of America’s leadership around the globe, their analysis serves as an important bulwark against claims that retrenchment can assure American greatness. As the authors themselves recognize, further study is needed in regional arrangements and individual policy issues to understand how the United States may be able to alter its positioning yet maintain the pursuit of its core objectives. While claims of the demise of American global engagement are perhaps premature, critics who assert retrenchment without considering the consequences of such action should heed Brooks and Wohlforth’s warning. In a time of increasing global integration, disengagement from world affairs is not only reckless but would also directly threaten the United States’ capacity to pursue its core national interests.

Buddhism & Political Theory. By Matthew J. Moore. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xiii, 146 \$74.00 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY SAMUEL RACKEAR

Buddhism is not only one of the most practiced religions in the world, but Buddhist political thought and theory also

guide governments and their policies in some Asian countries. Despite its popularity and prevalence as both a religion and a political theory, very little has been published comparing Buddhist religious tenets and teachings to political theories and government policies. In *Buddhism & Political Theory*, Matthew Moore seeks to introduce Western political theorists to the Buddhist political theory tradition and to provide a roadmap for political and religious scholars who are interested in the study of Buddhism and its relationship to political theory.

Moore suggests that Western political theorists can learn a lot from Buddhism and its political theory. He demonstrates this by exploring what he sees as the three underlying tenets of Buddhist political theory—ideas that he believes are familiar to Western political thinkers as well. First, that Buddhist political thought is based on a complete denial of any existence of the self; second, that Buddhism focuses on political minimalism and a strong insistence that politics lacks importance to human life; and third, that Buddhist political theory rests on an ethical theory that views all moral claims as being both naturalist and irrealist. Moore explores what these three basic tenets of Buddhist political theory have in common with Western counterparts, as well as how they diverge from mainstream Western thought.

Moore divides this book into two parts. Part I focuses on the texts of early Buddhism and the political ideas that they express. It then continues to examine the transformation of Buddhist political thinking from openly embracing enlightened monarchy to advocating for and supporting republican government. In order to show this transformation, Moore explains the various national experiences of government transformation in Buddhist countries, and then compares these experiences and their underlying motivations. Part II examines whether it is possible to draw a coherent and useful political theory from the texts examined in Part I. In this section, Moore does an excellent job of discussing and examining parallels and distinctions between Buddhism and Western approaches that advocate for similar, yet distinctive, political theories. Through this analysis, Moore convincingly argues that Buddhism not only has relevance in the world of modern Western political thought, but is an ideology that Western political thinkers could benefit from exploring.

Throughout Part I, Moore does an excellent job of giving background information and summaries of the basic tenets of Buddhism. He accomplishes this by using Chapter I to provide commentary on the most important early texts and how they are commonly interpreted by experts. Moore continues the first chapter by exploring the three main debates that are of interest to political theorists regarding Buddhism: (1) whether early Buddhism contains a theory of government, (2) whether any theory of government put forward by the early texts discussed by Moore supports monarchy or a form of republicanism, and (3) the role that politics plays within Buddhism overall.

Moore's summary and analysis of the most important early Buddhist texts are both simple enough for a novice reader to understand and provide a good backdrop for the rest of the discussions given in Part I. As his discussion of the early texts continues, Moore describes their differences, but connects them all through their common focus on attaining happiness through morality. According to Moore, the role of politics in this journey is to ensure social stability and peace by promulgating laws and rules.

Moore believes that the early Buddhist texts advocate for an enlightened monarchy based on a primal social contract, not republicanism. The text says that monarchy led by a spiritually advanced King would lead to the best society and that the Buddha acquiesced in monarchy as the only practical form of government. The overview of Buddhist political thought that Moore provides in the opening chapter gives an introduction that is critical to understanding the analysis that Moore puts forth in the rest of the book.

Chapter II focuses on additional early Buddhist texts, but does so in a manner that does not seem entirely necessary for the purpose of understanding the aspects of Buddhism and its underlying political theory that are explained and analyzed by Moore later in the book. The level of analysis of these texts is stuck in a middle ground of sorts where Moore would seemingly benefit from either going into greater detail and telling us more about the texts, explaining how they tie in to the rest of his work, or by giving an even more cursory overview of what they say. As it stands, Chapter II is not particularly helpful for either developing Moore's thesis, nor for helping the

reader understand any aspects of Buddhism or Buddhist political theory that are important to the rest of Moore's analysis.

While Chapter III is composed in a similar style as Chapter II (except for the fact that the sections are divided up by countries rather than by texts), it is much easier to follow and much more interesting from a historical perspective. The focus of this Chapter is how Buddhists justified the shift in their governments from absolute monarchies to either popular republics or constitutional monarchies in which relatively little authority was retained by monarchs. Moore explains that today, virtually all Buddhists see Buddhism as being compatible with a republican form of government, and points out that no modern influential Buddhist thinkers are currently calling for a return to absolute monarchy. Depending on the country and how the shift occurred, the justification of the shift to a "western" form of government varies. However, the one that seems to be the most widely accepted (and also advocated for by the fourteenth Dalai Lama) is that the important issue in Buddhist political theory is creating a government that reflects and nurtures Buddhist values. The form that the government takes is relatively unimportant as long as the central goal is achieved. While the analysis given for each country is both informative and analytically sound in its analysis of what drove change and justified it, this section could have also benefited from greater depth and exploration, as it was one of the more interesting sections of Moore's book.

Part II begins with a comparison of the Buddha's theory of the self (and its implications for politics) with the ideology of Nietzsche, who Moore believes is the Buddha's closest Western analogue in terms of ideology. As in Part I, Moore does an excellent job of providing an introduction and laying the groundwork before delving into the main topic of Chapter IV—the self—and its relation and importance to the political theories of both Nietzsche and the Buddha. Moore then provides the reader with not just his own analysis on the two theories, but with those of other prominent theorists as well. This is particularly useful because it gives the reader access to multiple avenues from which they can explore the relationship between the Buddha and Nietzsche's political theories.

Moore argues that Nietzsche and the Buddha offer the same description of the self, but he believes that the two offer radically different advice when it comes to the attitude that

people should adopt regarding their experience of being selves. These different views ultimately lead Nietzsche and the Buddha to hold different beliefs about the role of the self in politics. The Buddha sees no-self as leading to the basis of the best possible social order. Nietzsche believes that the Buddha's position is too extreme and leads to nihilism. For his own part, Moore agrees with the Buddha's view of the self and its role in politics, a view he eloquently defends at the end of Chapter IV.

Moore's argument on the Buddhist parallels to Western theories of limited citizenship in Chapter V is the easiest to follow and the best supported. To make his case, Moore revisits one of the theories discussed in Part I—Buddhism's focus on limited citizenship and lack of importance that the ideology attributes to politics. Moore returns to some of the texts discussed in Part I to show how Buddhism emphasized staying away from politics, until an emergency forces one to partake, and even then, political participation should be less personally important than achieving enlightenment.

In Chapter V Moore does an excellent job of tying in Buddhist teachings on limited government to Western ideals. Moore's section on Thoreau is particularly noteworthy. As in previous chapters, Moore provides the reader with the analysis of several other political theorists, allowing the reader to make conclusions before Moore provides his own. In the same vein, Moore's inclusion of the political theory of John Howard Yoder, an American Mennonite theologian, is an important addition to this Chapter. By adding the political theory of an individual whose views are offered through the lens of Christianity, Moore draws comparisons between one of the most popular Eastern religions with the most widely practiced Western religion, providing an interesting layer to this analysis. Moore concludes the Chapter by accurately pointing out that in most societies, the vast majority of citizens do nothing more than what limited citizenship theorists ask to be allowed to do: they obey the laws, pay taxes, and vote, but beyond that, people generally tend to their own personal affairs. This adds to Moore's point that Buddhist political theory is applicable to Western societies and governments.

Chapter VI focuses on Buddhism's ethical theory, something that Moore refers to as the hypothetical theory of ethics. While this Chapter provides a very helpful summary of the theory and its sources, it would have benefited from more com-

parative analysis of Buddhism's ethical theory and that of Western thinkers. A great comparison is given towards the end of the chapter between Buddhism and William Connolly's theory of immanence politics, but more attention should have been given to this throughout the Chapter, instead of solely at the end.

Moore uses the final Chapter of his book to summarize and recount his main points and arguments from earlier chapters in a clear and concise manner, a helpful tool for the reader. He focuses his analysis on the three most important aspects of Buddhist political theory: the theory of limited citizenship, the theory of no-self, and the hypothetical theory of ethics. In doing so, Moore presents his opinions in a very straightforward manner. He flatly rejects the "cynical dismissal" of Buddhist political theory and strongly advocates for its ongoing value. Moore ends the book by once again emphasizing that Buddhist political thought deserves a rightful place in the minds and scholarship of modern political theorists.

Through this book, Moore provides a thorough backdrop for those looking for an introduction to Buddhism and its underlying political theory. While not every section was equally relevant or of equal analytical quality, the overall work is highly informative and should achieve Moore's goal of promoting scholarship on this underdeveloped topic.

