

International Economic Law and Governance: Essays in Honour of Mitsuo Matsushita. Edited by Julien Chaisse and Tsai-yu Lin. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp xxxv, 587. \$195.00 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY ALEX TAGAWA

Historically, nation-states and domestic governments have served as the primary sources of legal norms and policy-making authority. As the global economy has become more integrated, some of this power has started to shift to international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO). The relationship between these institutions and nation-states has become even more central in the context of growing domestic political forces pushing against the development of strong supranational and non-governmental organizations. In *International Economic Law and Governance: Essays in Honour of Mitsuo Matsushita*, Julien Chaisse and Tsai-yu Lin present a collection of essays, each of which focuses on an aspect of this relationship and analyzes a variety of contemporary issues in international economic law. As the title suggests, the book is dedicated to Professor Mitsuo Matsushita, who served as one of the founding members of the WTO Appellate Body. The book is broken into three parts. Part I consists of eleven essays dealing with the international dispute settlement system, both in the context of the WTO and international investment arbitration generally. Part II focuses on the influence that WTO law has had on other legal fields, including not only international economic law but also health policy, privacy law, and environmental protection. Finally, Part III primarily examines the issues facing the political and policy-making processes in both the WTO and international economic law as a whole.

While the essays in Part I are generally directed toward the rules-based international dispute settlement system, they cover a broad range of specific topics. The first two, *The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Dealing with Success* and *The Dispute Settlement System of the WTO: A Bright Picture with a Few Dark Spots* focus narrowly on the history and future of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Each of these essays notes the dramatic success of the DSB and the Appellate Body but also points out the problems that are arising as a result of its effectiveness. They note that, in some respects, the efficiency of the

DSB and the frequency with which it rules on WTO law has undermined the legitimacy of the political processes of the WTO, which has made relatively little progress as ever-more complex economic issues have come to face its members. The next essays in this section focus more specifically on the relationship between the rules of the WTO (and prior decisions by the WTO DSB) and the sovereign regulatory authority of its nation-state members. In particular, these essays focus on WTO DSB rulings on Article XX exceptions and the problematic impacts that DSB overreach can have on States' ability to regulate policy areas ranging from public health to environmental protection. Taken together, these essays present the general argument that judicial positivism results in limiting the regulatory rights of State members and risks destabilizing the system by damaging lower-income States' faith in the fairness of the organization as a whole. Part I concludes with a variety of essays focusing on both WTO jurisprudence and the international investment system. This section includes an analysis of the Systemic Integration Clause in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and its merits relative to WTO Article XX. In addition, it examines the relationship between investment arbitration and more traditional State-to-State dispute settlement (like the WTO DSB), both in general and in the specific context of Asia-Pacific investment treaty arbitration.

In Part II, the authors expand on the narrower analysis of the WTO DSB and international investment law jurisprudence to examine the relationship between and among different bodies of law in international economic law as a whole. It begins with Jan Wouter and Ines Willems' examination of the relationship between the G20 and the WTO. In particular, it focuses on the WTO's role (along with OECD) of ensuring that members of the G20 are compliant with their commitments to resist protectionism. The essay examines the WTO and G20 in terms of the complementary effect, competitive effect, rebalancing effect, and replacement effect, finding that, in general, the organizations have expressed and continue to display a desire for cooperation. Rolf H. Weber's analysis of the relationship between WTO law and competition law argues that while multilateral cross-border trade legislation has succeeded in reducing tariffs and facial protectionism, the failure of the WTO to properly address and create hard law cover-

ing competition and antitrust issues is problematic. Fredrick M. Abbott's essay builds upon this idea by focusing specifically on competition law in emerging markets. He focuses his analysis on the OECD countries that have strongly lobbied for standardized rules and practices with respect to the implementation and enforcement of competition law. While he sees some benefits associated with such harmonization, he argues that doing so could harm the economic development of developing countries in meaningful ways, and he recommends preserving the existing diversity in competition law. Part II continues with an examination of the problems arising from potential fragmentation created by the growing prominence of investment law and bilateral trade agreements. These essays focus on a variety of issues including the relationship between State-controlled entities and the multilateral trading system, the role of natural resource agreements in the international economic law system as a whole, developing coherence between WTO law and international investment law, the effect of national treatment provisions on State and international environmental protection, and the impacts of international economic law on domestic privacy law. Taken together, these essays provide a multifaceted examination of the complex issues facing international economic law and offer arguments both for and against additional legal and regulatory harmonization at an international level.

As the book moves to Part III, the essays turn again to focus on the issues in the political and law-making institutions of international economic law. Taken as a whole, this section of the book offers perhaps the most negative picture of the system as it exists today. Hoekman and Mavroidis begin this section by arguing that the rapid success of the WTO in reducing tariff barriers has led States to replace the protections that these barriers offered with regulatory hurdles for trading partners. They go on to contend that addressing these barriers is difficult in the context of the existing diversity of WTO membership and the organization's rules covering plurilateral agreements. They contend that this has created problems for some WTO member States who are prevented from capturing efficiencies from more individually tailored agreements. R. Rajesh Babu's *Decision Making in the WTO: From Negotiated Law-making to Judicial Law-making* suggests that the deadlock arising from consensus-based decision-making in the political arm of

the WTO has led to increased reliance on the DSB to effectively make policy. He worries that this increased reliance has undermined the rights and obligations agreed upon by member States which has, in turn, undermined the legitimacy of the rulings made by the WTO DSB. He argues that this can be particularly true for developing countries, who may view such judicially-driven decision-making as an attempt by economically powerful and influential actors to impinge on their sovereign regulatory authority. Junju Nakagawa argues that the rise of mega-regional trade agreements has created another threat to the stability of the WTO. These massive economic blocs can create regulatory fragmentation as they each adopt different rules and standards that ultimately contribute to divergence among WTO members. Bryan Mercurio offers an analysis of the impacts of the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). He suggests that this agreement—while sold as a mechanism for increasing access to medicines through more globalized intellectual property protection—has not delivered on this objective as evidence of any increased access is limited at best. The news is not all dire, however, as this section also offers some optimism through its analysis of developing agreements under the auspices of not only the WTO but the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). For instance, David Gantz and Laura Nielsen examine the potential role of the TTIP in creating new forms of economic governance and modernizing international economic law through the recognition of the rapidly growing interconnectedness of the world. Dukgeun Ahn examines the development of WTO trade remedy practices in East Asia, suggesting that such measures have evolved over time as East Asian members have shifted from targets of regulatory enforcement to users of the system.

This book offers a number of well-developed and nuanced analyses of many of the major problems that are facing the contemporary system of international economic law. That said, it should not be viewed as providing a complete picture of the system or even an overview of outstanding doctrine. Instead, the authors offer a credible, insider's view of the WTO and other branches of international economic law, and each identifies problems that might risk destabilizing the system.

Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention. By Scott Straus. Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Museum, 2016. Pp. v, 239. \$14.99 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY ANAIS BERLAND

Awareness of genocide and mass atrocities is greater than ever, but the world's post-Holocaust promise of "never again" remains unfulfilled. Daily news stories of civilian casualties in Syria serve as yet another grim reminder that, despite the rapid development of the human rights regime and international norms on atrocity prevention, much remains to be learned from the horrors of the Holocaust. Scott Straus's *Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention* seeks to address that need by simultaneously providing both a foundational introduction to the field and a critical assessment of knowledge gaps, making this a valuable read for beginners, policymakers, and practitioners alike. The author acknowledges a particular interest in reaching U.S. policymakers, and the frequent emphasis on a lack of easy solutions to prevent atrocities appears particularly targeted to this end. The book largely succeeds in addressing this wide-ranging audience, providing a parallel to the author's message that even with vast amounts of scholarship available on atrocity prevention, much more still needs to be understood. Overall, Straus's study provides an accessible framework for understanding the complexities and difficulties of atrocity prevention, and the ongoing need for continuous engagement and political prioritization.

The structure of the text provides a clear lesson plan, beginning with a broad historical overview of the important developments and failures in the latter half of the twentieth century, and concluding with the author's speculations on the ongoing evolution of atrocity situations and prevention methods. The heart of the book lies in the three middle sections, which address the stages of an atrocity situation: the precursors of atrocities, prevention and response, and the aftermath itself. With the exception of Chapter 8, where the author belatedly introduces the dominant actors of the international community, each chapter transitions seamlessly within the respective sections. The clear and concise language used throughout reflects the book's educational purpose, and the inclusion of visual guides and primary source excerpts break

down complex topics into an easily digestible format. Although the book at times could benefit from grounding theoretical concepts with more frequent examples from case studies, the author successfully impresses upon even a novice reader the theme that atrocities vary considerably in character, making prediction and prevention all the more difficult.

In the introduction, the author highlights the incredible progress that has been made in identifying, acknowledging, and responding to mass atrocities over the last eighty years. Although the majority of the book addresses the problems, failures, and complexities of international and national responses to mass atrocities, Straus never diminishes the substantial achievements that have been made in this area. The chapter's chronology begins with the period between World War II and the Cold War, describing how the lessons of the Holocaust shaped the development and acceptance of human rights and provided the foundation for international criminal law but also noting the reality that the international community often failed to follow the ideals enshrined in human rights discourse. The topics of sovereignty and national interest provoke a large range of scholarship in their own right, which is perhaps why the author only devotes a brief section to these two important obstacles to the development of atrocity prevention, possibly assuming reader familiarity with these prominent debates. The chronology continues with the 1990s and the significant milestones of the decade that helped bring international attention, if not consensus, to atrocity prevention. These milestones included the costly failure of Somalia, the embarrassment of inaction in the face of the horrors committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the rise of international criminal courts. The author then traces important developments of the last twenty years, including normative shifts and policy development, particularly exemplified by the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P), the growth of civil society participation, and the backlash to intervention in Libya. The chapter concludes with a discussion of more recent events, citing Syria and ISIL as further examples of how atrocities continuously evolve and further complicate our understanding of the nature of atrocity prevention itself.

The first question the author asks, and answers, is: what's in a name? But even this seemingly simple question leads to a complicated answer, and the author deftly reinforces the diffi-

culty of this subject matter by addressing the controversies of defining the terms themselves. Chapter 1: Concepts and Definitions highlights the ongoing debates between practitioners on the range of the terms and how the narrowness or wideness of the definition impacts policy choices. Given that the term “genocide” was coined less than a hundred years ago and that naming and shaming remains an important technique for human rights practitioners, it is fitting that the author begins by acknowledging the importance of the names themselves.

Beginning in Section Two, the author discusses the causes and triggers of mass atrocities, while also continuously identifying important research gaps. He begins Chapter Two with a focus on macro-level risk factors, which he further sub-divides into “common findings,” and “disputed findings” from surveying the existing scholarship. While these findings provide an easily digestible introduction for the novice reader, readers of all backgrounds will benefit from Straus’s explicit acknowledgment and discussion of the limitations of quantitative data, statistics, and modeling. In particular, the author emphasizes the difficulty in pinpointing causality in light of the presence of multiple factors and situation-specific circumstances. Chapter Three addresses triggers and escalation that precede mass atrocities in the short term. The author acknowledges that the research is particularly thin in this area, and this chapter reflects such in its substance. Although this section could benefit from concrete examples, the author nevertheless identifies important questions an outside observer should ask to help recognize relevant patterns. Chapter Four provides fascinating insight on the subject of perpetrators, addressing both questions of who and why. Straus challenges popular myths—such as the idea that leaders of mass atrocities share a common, traceable psychological trait (except perhaps strong ideological commitment). He also calls attention to the chilling consensus that most low-level participants are merely “ordinary,” and not just those especially prone to violent behavior. He explores this topic through a discussion of famous social psychology experiments that demonstrated how easily regular citizens could turn violent in non-atrocity-specific simulations, due to factors such as obedience to authority, greed, or roleplaying—even without the requirement of intense hatred or ethnic divisions. The case study of Rwanda, one of the most participatory mass atrocity situations, further explored the

motivations of individuals to become perpetrators. Straus concludes with one of the work's recurring themes—that cases are situation-specific, making prevention difficult even if individual motivations in historical cases are understood.

Section Three addresses the policies and tools of prevention, as well as the risks. Chapter Five addresses the emerging policy framework. Straus refers back to R2P as proof that there is a strong normative framework in place for international action but acknowledges that controversy remains despite the existence of a concrete policy. In particular, the backlash from the intervention in Libya and continued Security Council deadlock reflect the ongoing political pressures that dictate the application of a response and the concern that so-called humanitarian motives only mask national interests. The author also specifically tracks developments of U.S. policy from the Cold War to the Obama administration. Straus provides a succinct introduction to the sometimes subtle differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, while effectively employing examples from case studies to illustrate his points. In both Chapter Six, which addresses Tools and Approaches, and Chapter Seven, which pinpoints Successes and Risks, the author focuses on policy. Straus stresses yet again that while political will is necessary, it is not sufficient on its own. He also distinguishes atrocity prevention and response, persuasively reasoning that while it is easier to identify an ongoing atrocity than to identify risk factors, it is more beneficial to address a potential atrocity situation before the situation erupts. Straus next provides an overview of the range of possible options but acknowledges both theoretical and practical limitations with each tool. Notably, there is difficulty in measuring causality, some policies have never been tried, multiple factors contribute to effectiveness, and each tool carries a risk—even less coercive tools such as democracy-building. Straus also highlights that military intervention, in light of the range of options presented, is not the main option for responding, contrary to popular belief. Once again, Straus stresses there is no one set of best practices in this field and, in fact, the best approach is to have local knowledge in order to accurately address the situation at hand. While the author explicitly reminds policy-makers that what can be defined as success may not seem perfect, this section does not provide easy answers on how to define and mea-

sure success. Chapter Eight would feel better placed in another section, as it serves as a more introductory function. Nevertheless, it provides the important perspective that while States remain the most dominant actors, international organizations, regional mechanisms, NGOs, and transnational advocacy networks have also grown in sophistication and importance, particularly in recent years.

Section Four focuses on the aftermath of atrocities, particularly on peacebuilding and accountability. As past violence is itself a risk factor for further atrocity situations, Chapter Nine addresses the rebuilding process as a prevention technique in its own right. Reflecting the overarching themes of the book, the author stresses how difficult and context-specific this process must be, and how there is no simple or known solution. Straus identifies six factors that particularly shape this process, including the nature of the violence, politics, security, economy, local capacity, and external support. Chapter Ten provides an overview of transitional justice and international criminal law, describing the pros and cons of the different mechanisms. In particular, there is evidence that strengthening the rule of law and institutional capacity has positive effects and contributes to norm development. The author cautions that while the evidence demonstrates that these mechanisms have clearly identifiable advantages, they cannot serve as the only tool used to address mass atrocities, once again suggesting that a combination of policy options should be considered.

The book concludes in Part Five with an eye towards the future. While the author does bring up the rise of non-state perpetrators in various parts of the book, here he addresses how the phenomenon could significantly reshape policy tools and responses, which are designed for a state-dominated system. Another issue raised is the potential for perpetrators—not just responders—to learn from past mass atrocity situations and perhaps become even more sophisticated at causing large-scale violence. The author also names other potential drivers that might impact the type or frequency of mass atrocity situations, including climate change, migration trends and immigration tensions, and new types of technology.

The book provides an excellent survey of existing scholarship, as well as an accessible entry point to a complex subject. While this text serves as a fascinating introduction into mass atrocities, it is just as interesting to learn how much is not yet

understood about preventing and responding to atrocity situations. Although interest in atrocities is higher than ever, and this book provides a clear basis for understanding the subject, Straus himself states that knowledge alone is not enough to prevent mass atrocities. The author presents the complexities and difficulties of atrocity prevention in a realistic way—acknowledging that the task can seem daunting, while also conveying to his audience the importance of continuing to work towards a greater understanding of atrocities and how to implement effective tools to prevent them. The landscape and dialogue of atrocity prevention has progressed significantly in just a few decades, and there is no reason to doubt that further progress can be made now that atrocity situations are being studied more than at any other time in history. Although the promise of “never again” remains just a promise, there is more reason than ever to believe that one day we can fulfill it.

Wounded City: Violent Turf Wars in a Chicago Barrio. By Robert Vargas. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xii, 264. \$24.95 (paperback).

REVIEW BY VERÓNICA CASELLAS

In *Wounded City: Violent Turf Wars in a Chicago Barrio*, Robert Vargas explores why violence persists in pockets of Little Village, a neighborhood in the South Lawndale area of Chicago, despite the massive drop in overall crime in cities. Vargas, a Professor of Sociology at the University of Notre Dame, conducted an ethnographic study of Little Village focusing on the relationships between gang members, the police, non-profit organizations, and residents. In particular, Vargas attempts to understand the causes and effects of violence in particular blocks of the neighborhood.

Little Village, known as the Mexican capital of the Midwest, is a Latino-majority and primarily residential neighborhood with many businesses catering to the local population. Several street gangs occupy the residential blocks of Little Village: Latin Kings, Two Sixers, 22 Boys, and Satan Disciples. Vargas points out that, despite the presence of gangs, most of the gang violence relates to disputes over honor and respect, and not over the drug trade. Hence, the homicide rate in Little Village fluctuates greatly from year to year—both rising

above and dipping below the city average. However, Little Village's aggravated battery rates are significantly higher than the city's average, making it one of Chicago's most violent neighborhoods.

In order to understand where these bursts of violence are occurring, Vargas maps out the incidents and concludes that the homicides and batteries do not occur in random areas—most of the homicides, shootings, and aggravated battery cases are located in small pockets in the east side of Little Village. He further notes that, while some gang territories that are adjacent to rival gangs show significantly higher rates of violence, other areas have low violence rates. Vargas points out these inconsistencies and criticizes the conventional explanation that streets bordering rival gang territory are more likely to be violent. He urges other scholars to rethink their approaches in studying other neighborhoods. *Wounded City* presents such an alternative approach to thinking about the occurrences of violence within a neighborhood. While Vargas acknowledges that his study of a small neighborhood in Chicago is not an all-encompassing study of urban violence, he hopes it will provide a roadmap for future studies.

The study was conducted using mixed methods during several phases between 2007 and 2012. In the first phase, Vargas immersed himself for two years in three high school friendship groups, learning firsthand about the geographic concentration of violence in the neighborhood. During the second phase, Vargas designed a survey for teenagers between the ages of fourteen and nineteen years old. Vargas and five research assistants canvassed twenty percent of Little Village and surveyed sixty randomly assigned blocks. He asked parents open-ended questions about violence on their blocks and their thoughts on the police, recording their responses in field notes. Vargas later conducted interviews with gang members, the police, elected officials, and members of nonprofit organizations. While he informally interviewed gang members throughout his study, Vargas acknowledges that his study is not an account of gang life. Vargas diligently supplemented his fieldwork findings with statistical analysis of violent crime and historical analysis. He also used multiple sources to confirm anecdotes of violence, omitting those that he was unable to corroborate.

Vargas's study looks at the consequences of competitive relationships between not only gangs but between politicians, non-profit organizations, and police officers. Vargas identifies two types of turf wars that contribute to the concentration of violence in particular blocks of the neighborhood's east side: political turf wars and street turf wars. In terms of political turf wars, Vargas points to the decades of political battles to redistrict certain blocks by the Chicago Democratic Party to maintain control over wards. Supported by the Latino majority, the rise of independent political groups threatened the Democratic Party's control over these areas. By the 1980s, Little Village was split into multiple wards: the west side, consisting of the 22nd ward, and the east side, carved into three separate wards. While the west side of Little Village was controlled by independent political leadership that would funnel resources and programs to the neighborhood, the east side remained divided into multiple wards, reducing the amount of resources to fund social programs preventing violence. This political gerrymandering meant that the concentration of violence in Little Village would remain on the east side.

The second turf war that Vargas identifies is the war between gangs and the police over control of blocks. Vargas found that in order to maintain control over their blocks, gangs enforce a "code of silence" to prevent residents from reporting crimes and cooperating with the police. The police have tried to retake control of the streets by arresting gang leaders; however, Vargas observes that these acts sparked violence between gangs who fought to gain control of the newly vacant area.

Wounded City aims to convince citizens, organizers, and policymakers to think differently about the forces sustaining violence in poor neighborhoods. Vargas begins the book with an overview of his study. He then presents some of the problems with traditional studies on urban violence and with conventional violence prevention techniques like suppression and punishment. Vargas concludes that these tactics need to be supplemented with social interventions, such as support networks and social services. He calls for collaboration between the police and violence-prevention organizations.

Chapter Two provides more insight into the political history of Chicago and Little Village that shaped the differences between Little Village's east and west side. Vargas recounts

that since the 1960s, the mayor of Chicago, the City Council, and the Chicago Democratic Party have played a pivotal role in life in Little Village. The rise of political activists that shaped Little Village's west side and threatened Democratic control over the neighboring wards led to the gerrymandering of Little Village's east side. Vargas points out that these political battles for control over the wards contribute to the concentration of violence on the east side because residents on the east and west side have unequal access to violence prevention programs. East side residents can only rely on the police to prevent violence, while west side residents benefit from violence prevention organizations and other resources provided by the local leadership. Vargas also describes how the Latin Kings and other gangs evolved in the 1970s, helping readers gain a better view of all the factors that have historically contributed to this surge of violence in certain areas of the neighborhood.

Chapter Three gives the reader insight into the lives of residents in Little Village. Vargas divides the chapter by the three sections of the neighborhood: the Burbs and Westside Borderlands—both on the west side—and the Eastside Borderlands. While many west side residents have had access to organizations and city resources to reduce violence in their area, others have struggled to obtain the necessary support. In particular, Vargas describes how one block on the west side remains one of the most dangerous blocks in the neighborhood. Violence persists despite residents routinely contacting the police, appealing to their alderman, and attempting to confront gang members themselves. This and many of Vargas's accounts dispute the public perception that residents in gang-controlled territories do nothing to address the problem. Vargas attributes the inability to reduce this block's violence to a mix of the street's location and design—which make it ideal for drive-by shootings and getaway vehicles—the lack of funding available for each ward, and the dearth of violence prevention organizations. The chapter also compares the resources available to west side residents to those available to east side residents. After failing to receive institutional support, many residents resort to directly negotiating with gang members. Vargas again points out that urban ethnographers do not look at residents' attempts to reduce violence, and he attributes many of the problems on the east side to the disconnection from nonprofit and political resources.

Vargas, in Chapter Four, gives an account of how the west side has been able to reduce violence. Vargas recounts how violence prevention organizations were able to reduce violence around one of the most dangerous high schools in the city by using their connections with gang members, city officials, and the police. Vargas rightly criticizes the “tough on crime” slogan and emphasizes the need to supplement this with relationship-building programs and allocating adequate resources to the neighborhood.

Chapter Five focuses on the east side and the idea that gang members control residents by enforcing the code of silence. The chapter also discusses the war for control over the streets between police officers and gang members. While most residents believe that gang members get information on police informants and complaints through corrupt policemen, Vargas discovers that many gangs have police scanners, which allow them to figure out who talked to the police. Gang members then often retaliate against informants by burning their homes. Vargas also gives us insight into one of the largest gangs, the Latin Kings—a “supergang” that is also one of the largest wholesale drug dealers. This chapter openly criticizes the idea that the code of silence is the “product of the culture of poor neighborhoods” and that residents should be more open to talking to the police. Vargas notes that the issue is more complicated and that this idea does not take into account the complex relationship between residents, the police, and gangs. Vargas gives helpful suggestions including addressing the high caseloads of police precincts, the limited resources to combat violence, and the approach of the police to safeguarding informants.

Chapter Six looks further into the war between police and gangs in the east side. Here, Vargas focuses on the adverse effect of arresting gang leaders. Readers are given insight into this situation during one instance where Vargas describes how the police arrested the leader of the 22 Boys, dismantling gang leadership. Since the 22 Boys controlled a block surrounded by rival gangs, violence broke out in various attempts to take over the area. Vargas notes the adverse effect of police action on residents as well, finding that those living in areas that are taken over by rival gangs no longer have the benefits of the relationships they built with previous gang members and are often forced to start the relationship-building process anew.

Vargas does note that this adverse effect lies mainly with smaller gangs, as police raids against Latin Kings' leadership have not produced fights over territory and have failed to dismantle the gang. Vargas suggests an alternative approach to gang control, recommending that police forces should focus on reassembling the social order in which gangs operate and that policymakers need to find a way to fill the void left by removing gang control over an area.

Chapter Seven looks toward the future of Little Village. Vargas emphasizes the need to pinpoint underserved areas with high violence rates and to integrate the residents with city resources and nonprofit organizations. He also highlights the need for police to build relationships within the community to help preserve social order. Vargas calls for scholars to study not just the role of government while researching urban poverty and violence but also to narrow their research by looking at the relationship between political actors and the neighborhood.

At the beginning of his work, Vargas sets out the ambitious goal of making people think differently about urban violence, its causes, and how to address it. *Wounded City* achieves this goal by taking us into the world of Little Village, where violence is beyond the control of the residents. Vargas's methodology provides a new approach, taking a look at the root causes of Little Village's violent blocks, and addresses the problems caused by conventional violence-prevention methods. Vargas challenges scholars and policymakers into looking at alternative methods of studying and addressing violence, emphasizing the need to focus on specific areas and to address the concerns of that particular area. Vargas does recognize that what could work in Little Village might not be the best application of resources for other neighborhoods. However, he does not give a better insight at what other approaches might work elsewhere. *Wounded City* highlights the need for studies that stress the relationship among actors in the neighborhood. This book is a helpful tool for other scholars who wish to work out solutions for urban violence, notably by addressing its root causes.

The Disrupted Workplace: Time and the Moral Order of Flexible Capitalism. By Benjamin Snyder. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. ccxlix, 249. \$27.95 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY MICHAEL CHENKIN

For the modern American worker, “work time” no longer has a constant, steady, and predictable rhythm beginning at 9 a.m. and ending at 5 p.m. Gone are the bounded career paths and steady career trajectories that used to begin and end with the same employer. Rather, in *The Disrupted Workplace*, Benjamin H. Snyder, a Lecturer in Sociology and Social Policy at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand, argues that for twenty-first-century workers—from elite wall-street bankers and traders to long-haul truck drivers—work time has been transformed into something that is disruptive, revelatory, liberating, and all together unsustainable for many American workers. This new disorienting version of work time is largely the byproduct of a system of “flexible capitalism” adopted by economic and social elites that manage the modern workplace. It is not, according to Snyder, “an inevitable consequence of a highly competitive globalized market.”

According to Snyder, the historical dynamics that shape our conception of work time are complex. Snyder traces the evolution of our modern, dynamic, and complex understanding of work time from chronological time—a simpler understanding of work time. If work time, as experienced by twenty-first-century workers, is multi-dimensional and punctuated by a disorienting, disjointed rhythm and pace, chronological time or “chronos”—the “work time” of the twentieth century—is one-dimensional and bounded by clock time. In the workplace, chronos regulates aspects of a worker’s life such as their daily schedule, hourly pay, seniority, and length of time until a promotion. Chronos was thus the steady and relatively predictable reality for many twentieth-century workers.

Snyder asserts that flexible capitalism has altered our experience of work time, which he describes as existing beyond the seconds, minutes, and hour hands of clocks. Flexible capitalism is a product of elite American executives, economists, and management specialists who promote fluidity, flexibility, and nimbleness in the workplace along with “repurposing anything in the chain of production, exchange, and consumption

that is fixed, predictable, and resistant to change.” They believe that these elements are key to a successful, productive, and efficient workplace. This logic is applied to both high- and low-skilled workers.

For high-skilled workers, flexible capitalism has endowed them with autonomy at work to control the amount of time that they work in their offices. However, the advent of technology that has computerized the workplace for many high-skilled workers and endowed them with these same freedoms requires that they be “on the clock” and “plugged into” what is happening in the office 24/7. For low-skilled workers, flexible capitalism has disrupted job stability. Low-skilled workers are now frequently offered part-time jobs or hired on short-term contracts because many of their skills can be replaced with cheaper and often computerized alternatives. Snyder clearly demonstrates that work time affects both sets of workers differently.

Snyder characterizes work time as an experience that transitioned from the steady and predictable twentieth century to the disrupted and desynchronized twenty-first century. However, his monolithic description of twentieth-century work time elides a more nuanced analysis that should account for the experiences of women, ethnic, religious, and gender minorities, and the disabled. Such under-represented minorities faced open discrimination that either pigeonholed them into unrewarding, inconsistent part-time, and menial jobs, or excluded them in the first place from entering certain companies and industries. Because Snyder ignores the nuances of how work time was experienced by many minorities in the twentieth century, he is unable to see the interesting connection between modern work time as a recycled version of the one experienced by minorities in the twentieth century.

Snyder continues his study by examining how flexible capitalism has influenced work time for high-skilled workers, such as investment bankers and debt traders, low-skilled workers, such as long-haul truck drivers, and unemployed workers who were fired for being unnecessary or redundant.

For high-skilled financial workers, the forces of “disembedding” and “abstraction” alter their experience of work time. Disembedding describes the globalization of “social relations and social actions.” Due to disembedding, financial workers are required to be plugged into increasingly complex and

varied sources of information. Abstraction refers to the increasing digitalization of the financial work place and work product. The digitalization of the office means that financial workers are able to work anytime from anywhere in the world. As a result, the combination of disembedding and abstraction requires bankers and traders to be abreast of what is happening in the office and around the world no matter when the official workday or week ends. According to Snyder, such constant work requires of bankers and traders an uncanny ability to both endure and expend inordinate amounts of stress and energy.

Through a mix of general industry deregulation coupled with limitations on working hours, flexible capitalism has also transformed how long-haul truckers experience work time. Deregulation decreased the costs and increased the efficiency of shipping goods throughout the country. In turn, companies charged consumers lower prices for goods and services. However, the path to lower prices requires companies to privilege the on-time delivery of goods above all, no matter the effects on the truckers.

At the same time that the US government was deregulating the trucking industry, the government promulgated new regulations that applied directly to drivers, limiting—among other aspects of a driver's work—the number of hours drivers can work without sleeping. These new “hours of service” regulations, although well-intentioned, sometimes force drivers to stop driving and sleep when they are not tired and, conversely, to drive when they are tired. Over the years, the unpredictable and irregular hours ultimately destroy drivers' mental and physical health. They begin to suffer from conditions such as insomnia, sleep apnea, diabetes, and heart disease from the sedentary nature and the irregular sleeping hours of their job. Thus, for many long-haul truckers, flexible capitalism has transformed work time to the point that it can be deadly.

Flexible capitalism also shapes how unemployed American workers experience work time through the advent of “numerical flexibility.” Numerical flexibility describes employer tendencies to rely on frequent layoffs and the outsourcing of high-cost, inefficient labor to cheaper overseas markets. Numerical flexibility forces workers to adopt what Snyder calls a new temporal outlook on their careers or “a new time map.” Workers are encouraged to picture their careers as long arcs,

punctuated by multiple jobs, no longer from a single lifetime employer. American workers are encouraged to look towards the future with flexibility and hope, even when their futures seem bleak.

Throughout his analysis of work time under flexible capitalism, Snyder adeptly focuses on the myriad physical, economic, and social effects of flexible capitalism on twenty-first-century workers. For Snyder, flexible capitalism has not changed work time for the benefit of American workers. Instead, he believes that flexible capitalism produces overwhelmed, unsatisfied, and increasingly unhealthy workers. Snyder proposes that flexible capitalism also shapes twenty-first-century American workers' moral understanding of what is considered a good life.

Snyder posits that work time is filled with constant disruptions combined with moments of unity, which occur when people create something transcendent. This often happens when people work extremely hard individually or together and end up being in sync. For deal-oriented financial professionals, this requires pushing oneself to the brink of exhaustion as a team to experience the successful completion of a live deal. For long-haul truck drivers, unification occurs when truckers "run hard" and complete an impossibly difficult delivery or pick up assignment. Unemployed workers experience unification by engaging in a structured schedule of networking, resume writing, and job seeking, and by remaining positive and upbeat, despite lacking employment.

Pushing oneself to the brink, running hard, and structuring one's life to become indefatigably positive, Snyder believes, may lead to moments of great freedom, creativity, and satisfaction, but "over the course of years can lead to troubling feelings that will surely reach a breaking point" and ultimately lead to suffering. While Snyder acknowledges that flexible capitalism shapes workers' moral order, Snyder neglects to acknowledge that it is not just flexible capitalism but also the Protestant work ethic that dominates American work culture and may drive American workers to seek out moments of unity.

Snyder completes his study with a critique of the effects of flexible capitalism. Snyder believes that flexible capitalism's culture of disruption is both "a straight jacket and blinder" in

the sense that it does facilitate meaningful experiences for workers, such as unification. However, workers in pursuit of those moments are blind to richer and more fulfilling conceptions of what a sustainable, long-term, and stable working life is. Snyder issues several proposals for enriching and altering the work time structure for modern workers.

His proposals include openly acknowledging the difference between employer and employee flexibility. Too often jobs are advertised as being flexible, but they are only flexible for employers, who can dictate when and where they want employers working. Instead, Snyder recommends instituting protected weekends when employees are not permitted to do any work. Snyder also believes that employers must modernize the way they quantify and measure work time. Under this new system, they would take into account considerations like intensity, effort, and preparatory work, such as networking and searching for a permanent job.

Snyder's last proposal is to promote a culture of "sustainability." Snyder explains that sustainable work leaves the worker "able to regenerate herself physically, psychologically, and spiritually in the long term." However, Snyder's final proposal is by far his weakest. Promoting a culture of sustainability in the workplace is a valuable goal. Nevertheless, Snyder's other proposals are so effective because he concretely explains how employees, employers, and government regulators can deploy them in the workplace. By not explaining how to create sustainable jobs, Snyder's proposal is transformed into a mere platitude instead of a powerful tool to promote a healthy workplace and happier workers. If Snyder's goal is to critique flexible capitalism—a force that has been widely created, adopted, and promoted by the most powerful forces in corporate America—he must probe deeper and suggest more potent tools for combating these forces.

Snyder's study is an exploration into the disrupted and unstable life of the modern American worker under flexible capitalism. Although his work is firmly rooted in complex sociological theory, it is still very accessible to the general reader interested in the sociology of work, the history and theory of time, and critiques of capitalism. Nevertheless, Snyder's work suffers from a central flaw: it is too expansive. Each chapter could be its own study. For instance, several individual chapters attempt to explore how American workers experience

work time, examine the historical development of work time, critique flexible capitalism, and issue proposals for reforming the current structure of work time. Snyder's examination of such complexities results in a study that seems unfocused and, at times, superficial instead of comprehensive. Snyder could have both preserved the structure of his work and his desire to comprehensively analyze modern conceptions of work time by slightly expanding his page count beyond its 215 pages.

A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order. By Richard Haass. New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2017. Pp. xii, 339. \$28.00 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY ISABEL ESPINOSA DE LOS REYES

In a time of great change—when the American president speaks of border walls and dismantling NATO, and when populist candidates advocating against globalization seem to gain ground internationally—the world does increasingly look to be in disarray. Richard Haass's book provides a succinct overview of why and how we got here and what the United States could and should do moving forward to maintain some form of international order in a century where many problems require more interstate cooperation than ever before.

A World in Disarray is divided into three parts. The first section presents an overview of the history of international relations from the rise of the Westphalian system through the end of the Cold War. The author titles this period "World Order 1.0," a global order based on belief in, and respect for, States' sovereignty. The second part analyzes the twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War to argue that there has been a break from how the world has worked in the past. Haass, through an informal and personal style, runs through the motivations and thought-processes of decision-makers during challenging times. Drawing from his personal experience as the Middle East adviser to President George H. W. Bush and the director of the Policy Planning Staff under Secretary Powell, he constantly lays out the limited options available to the U.S. government at the time and evaluates all the alternatives. This allows the reader to step into the shoes of policymakers to better grasp the complexities of these issues. The book also

provides an interesting glimpse into other governments' motivations, decisions, and reactions to American actions.

Haass questions why there is so much conflict today given that the principal source of conflict throughout history—major-power conflicts—has been absent. He concludes that the “causes of the world’s increased disarray lie elsewhere, beyond the dynamics of direct major-power competition.” He then assesses U.S. actions and omissions, as well as the global cooperation (or lack thereof) regarding self-determination, terrorism, nonproliferation, climate change, cyberspace, global health, and economics. Overall, he finds a lack of consensus as to what is to be done and a “substantial gap” between what is desirable and what has proven possible when meeting the challenges of globalization. Haass casts this global gap as the primary reason for the current disarray in the world.

Haass argues that the current state of the world is one of interconnection and obligations beyond borders. Haass has numerous examples of how States’ decisions can have ripple effects on one another. For example, during the Arab Spring, the United Nations approved a humanitarian intervention in Libya. The humanitarian intervention soon morphed into a regime change mission, reinforcing Russia’s view that the Right to Protect (R2P) is a dangerous doctrine that can be used to violate sovereignty and overthrow governments. Haass laments that this episode will make gaining international support for humanitarian intervention in the future much harder. Russia later used humanitarian intervention “as the cynical pretext for its intervention in Ukraine.”

The last, and most interesting, section prescribes specific foreign and domestic policies that the United States should adopt to tackle the challenges of this new era—an era defined by wide distribution of power and the decreasing relevance of borders. Not until this final section does Haass explain the book’s thesis that the world requires an update to its “operating system”—what he labels “World Order 2.0.” This new world order entails implementing a new ideology of sovereignty that encompasses a State’s *obligations* vis-à-vis other countries, as opposed to the traditional concept of sovereignty which focuses on a State’s rights. Haass identifies three components of this revamped world order: (i) a new approach to multilateralism that allows for more flexibility and greater participation by non-state actors; (ii) a more conditional ap-

proach to relationships with other countries; and (iii) a broader definition of national security that includes many aspects which have traditionally been considered domestic issues.

It is impressive how much ground the author covers without losing the reader's attention or interest. Haass's writing is straightforward and sequential, diligently taking the reader through the cause and effects of specific events and foreign policy decisions. He organizes his ideas thematically and regionally, helping the reader understand the connection between multiple events and the decisions taken by governments in response. However, some assumptions and arguments warrant deeper analysis. Haass airily states that "[n]o other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mindset to build a global order. Nor can order ever be expected to emerge automatically." Yet, a more detailed explanation for why other great powers (or future powers) would not be able to take on this role appears to be lacking. Admittedly, Haass does not shy away from criticizing the United States and provides an objective analysis overall. Haass chastises the United States for appearing "hypocritical," pursuing "double standards," and thus "forfeit[ing] influence." He suggests, for example, that the United States should "put its money where its mouth is" and move to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty and to support the International Criminal Court.

As is usual in American foreign policy discussions, Latin America and Africa were only given a few paragraphs throughout the book, reminding the reader that the United States has rarely given these areas of the world the attention they deserve. Similarly, the book seems to lack opinions and sources from outside the Western world. All the scholarly work cited—with the exception of one citation to the 2009 *Arab Human Development Report*—are Western. Even though the book is about U.S. foreign policy, Haass's ideas could benefit from having non-Western voices critique and challenge his beliefs. It seems necessary in a foreign policy discussion to understand your allies and enemies' positions, especially in a world of global challenges.

Haass goes through the two Bush, Clinton, and Obama administrations, classifying each as either more formalistic and disciplined or informal and lacking structure. The reader would have appreciated a more robust analysis on why "pro-

cess is no panacea, but it can protect presidents, who too often opt for the decision-making process and staff they feel comfortable with and want, not the ones they need.” This discussion on the correlation between the process and formality of recent U.S. administrations and achieving successful foreign policy lacks a fuller explanation.

Another section with thought-provoking ideas but that ultimately leaves readers unsatisfied at times was the third portion of the book—the prescriptive section. This third section focuses on how the United States should act with respect to: (i) other major powers, notably China and Russia; (ii) global and regional challenges; and (iii) challenges at home. Among the various recommendations regarding foreign policy towards China and Russia, Haass suggests “maintaining increased US ground and air forces in Europe and increased air and naval forces in the Asia-Pacific.” Separate from his hard power tactics, Haass also recommends the United States bolster diplomatic and economic interdependence, “giving China and Russia a stake in maintaining or even expanding bilateral economic ties . . . to incentivize them not to do things that would threaten to upset a status quo that serves their overall interest.” The reader is inundated with a list of vague recommendations, without fully comprehending how these policy recommendations differ from those of the Obama Administration.

Haass criticizes the Obama Administration throughout his book, yet with regards to Asia, Haass supports Obama’s attempted pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, as he argues that in this region smaller efforts can yield large returns. Haass believes the U.S. should focus more on this region not only because of its sheer size and strategic military importance but also for the impact these countries may have if they come to an agreement on tackling global issues such as climate change and cyberspace. Regarding the Middle East, Haass recommends a combination of selective cooperation and diplomacy, leaving room for containment using sanctions and military action if needed to respond to an Iranian threat. Thus, he does not eliminate the option of military interventions but stresses that the decision-makers should utilize a “wars of choice” analysis and emphasizes that policy should not focus on reforming local societies. Throughout his policy recommendations for

each area of the world, Haass emphasizes the importance of diplomacy.

The last chapter brings the analysis back to U.S. domestic issues, claiming that to “lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order.” Haass lists important issues to address such as the need to increase U.S. rates of growth by providing better education, to create robust infrastructure programs, to enact immigration and tax reform, and to resolve the growing debt problem. Haass also urges that “[m]ore, not less, defense spending is required” because in an “increasingly dangerous and precarious world . . . there is no way the United States will be able to wall itself off from consequences partly brought about by its doing less.” Yet, there seems to be a disconnect between the new global issues he discusses earlier in the book—such as cyberspace and terrorism—and advocating for a larger military, as he leaves unanswered how a larger military would be helpful to combat those challenges.

At times throughout the book, but especially in this last section, the book’s premises appear slightly outdated, given the current Trump administration’s outlook on foreign policy and the role of the United States in the world. Haass boasts that the United States is the clear leader of the world order because it has “any number of innate strengths and advantages, including . . . excellent relations with its neighbors to the north and south.” Although few people believed Trump would win the election, the book now leaves unanswered key questions, such as what a Trumpist isolationist foreign policy would look like and what the consequences might be for the United States and the world.

Haass raises a critical point in passing, which merits closer attention. He states that evaluating U.S. foreign policy decisions requires a globally-minded citizenry that appreciates the complexity, risks, and benefits of global involvement. These messages resonate even more as Haass discusses what is required from the American president. Haass suggests that the president should “speak frequently and honestly to the American people, to level with them about the realities of living in a global world and what can and must be done to make America competitive and secure.” Haass also warns against the United States making any “sudden or sharp departures in what it does in the world.” Consistency and reliability, he explains, are es-

sential attributes for a great power. He adds that allies who depend on the United States for security need to be reassured of the United States' commitment. As we evaluate Trump's record thus far, it seems Haass would mostly disagree with the president's choices.

Through his concept of "World Order 2.0," Haass advocates for a new conception of sovereignty focused around a State's obligations beyond its borders, an opening of the world stage to non-state actors, and an expansion of what is considered national security. Some of Haass' policy recommendations are controversial, especially his call for expanding the role of the U.S. military in American foreign policy. Furthermore, many of his recommendations, including his call for a new world order based on "sovereign obligation," seem to warrant a more robust analysis. Haass's book could also benefit from engaging with counter-arguments and with non-Western points of view. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, Haass provides a comprehensive historical lesson on U.S. foreign policy, and, in doing so, sets the foundations for a provocative and much needed discussion of how to move forward in a world in disarray.

A Revolution Undone: Egypt's Road Beyond Revolt. By H.A. Hellyer. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xxxiv, 251. \$29.95 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY YEKATERINA FOMITCHEVA

A Revolution Undone: Egypt's Road Beyond Revolt by H.A. Hellyer illustrates the hope for reforms that the 2011 Egyptian protests represented and explains why "a few years later, all that remained of that larger-than-life story was an echo of the promising roar it once was." Hellyer argues that the Egyptian Revolution remains "undone." In other words, it has not yet been successful in delivering on the demands for bread, freedom, social justice, and human dignity—the Revolution's slogan. Throughout the text, Hellyer is not afraid to indicate mistakes major players made as well as recognize when his own views on the Revolution turned out to be wrong. He tackles the complexities of the events, rejecting the natural human desire to simplify. Furthermore, he carefully points out moments following the protests when the Revolution could have

taken a different turn. Ultimately, through rigorous analysis, a clear presentation of the circumstances, and occasional interjections of his own first-hand experiences in Egypt, Hellyer delivers a comprehensive account of the events in Egypt following the Revolution of 2011.

Hellyer is a scholar and political analyst of Egyptian and English descent whose work focuses on Arab affairs. He describes himself as “an Englishman in Egypt, an Egyptian in England, a European in the Arab World, an Arab in Europe.” Throughout *A Revolution Undone*, it is clear that Hellyer’s background informs his presentation of events as he looks at the Revolution through these various lenses. He organizes his account into three broad parts, beginning with a description of the protests themselves, continuing with a discussion of the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Mohamed Morsi in the 2012 Egyptian presidential election, and concluding with the aftermath of the removal of Morsi from power and the beginning of Abdeh Fatah el-Sisi’s presidency. Hellyer further breaks down these broad parts into narrower chapters and even narrower subdivisions, resulting in a detailed analysis of the key characters and major events.

Hellyer begins his account in Part I by discussing the eighteen days of protests that occurred in Egypt from January 25 to February 11, 2011. However, he does not simply restate the events. Instead, Hellyer paints a vivid picture of those eighteen days by incorporating personal anecdotes. He describes walking into Tahrir Square—the location of the protests—as seeing Egypt for the first time, despite having been to the country countless times before. To Hellyer, Tahrir represented “the best of what Egyptians could be” as he saw people “engag[ing] with their differences, with respect and dignity, without needing the heavy-handed authority of the state machinery to ensure civility.” Hellyer also examines how the protests accomplished what many, including Hellyer himself, thought was impossible: the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power. Hellyer argues that the actions of the Mubarak regime in response to the protests, the popular support for the protests, the Military’s opportunistic efforts to prevent Mubarak’s son from inheriting control, and pressure from the international community contributed to the success of the protests. In addition, while he recognizes that social media played a role in the protests, Hellyer rejects the narrative of the protests as a

“Facebook Revolution,” finding the characterization too simplistic. Hellyer argues that it was the combination of all the above factors that ultimately led to Mubarak’s downfall.

Hellyer also analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the revolutionary camp and the Muslim Brotherhood, providing a balanced critique of both players’ actions during the period after the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) removed Mubarak from power. Hellyer begins by discussing the revolutionary camp, which was made up of political movements, civil society groups, human rights organizations, intellectuals, media personalities, bloggers, and individual activists who did not identify with any existing groups. Hellyer argues that the main flaws of the revolutionary camp were its failure to organize and its continued reliance on protest as the main tool of opposition. However, Hellyer recognizes that expecting such organization from a movement that originated on the streets might be unfair. According to Hellyer, the lack of cohesion among the revolutionary camp had important consequences because it prevented the revolutionaries from backing a single candidate who could have changed the results of the 2012 presidential election. In addition, the over-reliance of the revolutionaries on protests prevented them from proposing an alternative to the military’s plan for Egypt following Mubarak’s removal.

Hellyer explains that unlike the revolutionaries, the MB was a “disciplined, focused organization.” Due to its “preference for slow, stable change,” the MB was initially reluctant to support the January 25 protests but eventually sided with the revolutionaries as public approval grew. However, after Mubarak’s removal, the MB abandoned this alliance. A history of repression under the Mubarak regime motivated the MB to seize the opportunity to gain power and, unlike the revolutionaries, support the military’s plan. The military’s roadmap benefited the already well-organized MB because the plan called for primary elections as the first step. An “overwhelming majority” of Egyptians ended up voting in favor of the military’s plan. Hellyer argues that this was a critical moment when the MB could have made a different decision and maintained its alliance with the revolutionaries rather than supporting the military and seeking power for itself. However, Hellyer acknowledges the complexities in this assertion. He points out that the MB were not the only group supporting the military’s

plan and that a change in MB support might not have swayed the results of the referendum. Yet, he suggests that at the very least, the vote would have been more contested and would have signaled to the military that its plan required changes.

Hellyer then explores in greater detail the significant events leading up to the 2012 Egyptian presidential election. He comments on what the military, the MB, and the revolutionaries could have done differently at key points in Egypt's transition to democracy. For example, he states that after Mubarak's removal, "the revolutionary camp departed the scene of popular mobilization and the military took control of the political arena." As a result, the revolutionaries missed a chance to develop political power, while the players that had such power (the military and the MB) did not "seem[] . . . invested in serious transformation." Instead of supporting a candidate that could have brought Egyptians together, the MB backtracked on its promise not to run a candidate and decided to seek power for itself. Hellyer also tells a personal story that illustrates his thinking at the time of the election. He describes sitting in a café with friends, contemplating a "nightmare scenario" that no one thought was likely: a runoff between "a reactionary representative of the right wing MB [Mohamed Morsi] and the most prominent pro-Mubarak candidate [Ahmed Shafiq]." However, this was exactly what happened, and the election was one where both candidates "depend[ed] on the unpopularity of the other to win."

In Part II, Hellyer focuses on the MB and the presidency of Morsi in more detail. Though Morsi had some moments of success in his short presidency, protests erupted once more after he passed a decree in November 2012 that increased his powers. Hellyer argues that a major mistake of Morsi and the MB was to treat Egypt as a stable democratic state while failing to recognize that Egypt was just going through a "democratic experiment," and that Morsi's position as president depended on the success of that experiment. Hellyer contends that the MB should have learned from the election—which they won by a very thin margin—that the solution to opposing views was inclusion, that "the MB needed to look for a consensus-based approach to ensure that the democratic experiment would endure and win out." However, the MB took the opposite approach, leading to a decline in support.

Hellyer claims to have predicted the military coup of July 2013. Hellyer explains the factors contributing to his contested and surprising prediction, while admitting that his analysis was not entirely accurate because he failed to anticipate some of the circumstances that led to the coup. In this explanation, Hellyer notes that though he thought a coup was highly likely, he never thought it was inevitable because “[t]hings could have worked out differently in 2013 had different stakeholders made different choices.” This is part of the appeal of Hellyer’s overall account: he indicates specific moments during the Revolution when those involved could have made different choices. Instead of resorting to a simple fatalistic story like some other analysts, Hellyer embraces the complexities of key events, uncovers the various interests of those involved, and offers explanations as to how and why the Revolution proceeded the way it did.

Part III discusses the circumstances in Egypt after the military—led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi—removed Morsi. In Part III, Hellyer emphasizes the strategic use of narrative by both the MB and the military in order to gain support. Those in favor of Morsi viewed themselves as God’s people and their opponents as God’s enemies, while supporters of the military accused the MB of being a terrorist organization. Hellyer once again recounts a personal story of visiting one of the pro-Morsi sit-ins at Nasr City, which the media claimed to be a terrorist stronghold. However, Hellyer tells of seeing no increased security, as would have been expected if the area was truly a terrorist stronghold. Instead, he saw “Mursi [*sic*] supporters politely patting down people as they came in.” Furthermore, Hellyer explains how Sisi’s administration attempted to rewrite the narrative of the January 25 protests to achieve certain political goals. They claimed that the MB was a terrorist organization, that the Egyptian people had been misled into electing the MB in 2012, and that they then took to the streets in another revolution in 2013 to correct their mistake. Hellyer’s thorough explanation of these tactics demonstrates the power of an easy and simple narrative to sway public opinion. It shows the importance of a rigorous analysis like *A Revolution Undone* that dives below the surface to reveal complexities so as to provide an understanding of the Revolution that is as accurate as possible.

In the final chapter of *A Revolution Undone*, Hellyer contemplates whether the Egyptian Revolution is “undone” not only in the sense of being left unfinished but also in the sense of coming full circle—from “autocratic regime [to] democratic experiment [and back to] autocratic regime.” He concludes on a hopeful note, arguing that “an Egypt of the future is never going to be the Egypt of 2010.” He states that, even though no one can change the mistakes of the past, Egyptians still have the future and the memories of the eighteen days of protests, which are “evidence of potentials and possibilities—perhaps beyond our current imaginations.” Ultimately, Hellyer’s meticulous analysis is beneficial for any reader who desires to understand Egypt’s road beyond revolt with all of its promises and wrong turns, and to use this comprehensive account to contemplate its potential destinations.

Pax Gandhiana: The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. By Anthony J. Parel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xiii, 204. \$74 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY ROSS S. GUILDER

Mahatma Gandhi is inextricably linked to his role as the resilient political leader of the Indian independence movement. While this achievement alone is remarkable, Gandhi’s legacy expands beyond the realm of day-to-day politics. His role as a political philosopher is oft-overlooked. Anthony J. Parel endeavors to change that. Parel’s book, *Pax Gandhiana: The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, expounds on Gandhi’s pioneering philosophy and its impact on the modern Indian political canon. However, Gandhi did not write a single treatise outlining his philosophy. As such, Parel sifts through Gandhi’s various political writings to construct and elaborate on Gandhi’s political philosophy and, in doing so, illuminates the theory that animates Gandhi’s better known political activities—nonviolence and *satyagraha*. Ultimately, Parel argues that Gandhi’s political writings are not disjointed political musings but rather form a unique and coherent political philosophy, whose originality rests in its critique of modern political philosophy’s narrow focus on economics and politics (*artha*) alone. Rather, Gandhi’s political philosophy contends that a peaceful socioeconomic and political order requires a

balance between the canonical ends of life (*purushartha*)—*artha*, ethics (*dharma*), forms of aesthetic pleasure (*kama*), and the pursuit of spiritual transcendence (*moksha*).

At the outset of *Pax Gandhiana*, Parel establishes the purpose of his book by clearly defining his thesis and consistently invoking this central argument as he explores the various facets of Gandhi's political philosophy. *Pax Gandhiana*'s introduction offers some context for Gandhi's theory. Parel first juxtaposes the aim of Gandhi's political philosophy and Pax Britannica, during which time economics and politics (*artha*) and aesthetic pleasure (*kama*) took precedence over ethics (*dharma*) and spirituality (*moksha*). Next, Parel compares Gandhi's philosophy to that of Machiavelli, noting vastly divergent perspectives on religion and State violence. While Machiavelli advanced the notion that ends justify means, Gandhi essentially believed that you reap what you sow. Notably, one should not violate moral norms to advance national interests.

In the subsequent chapters, Parel introduces the reader to various aspects of Gandhi's philosophy and explains the significance of Gandhi's contribution to the greater field. Permeating each essay is the theme that Gandhi's ideas are not simply utopian ruminations but practical ideas that can be realized through action and maintained only through balance. Although Parel assumes a basic level of understanding about political philosophy and undermines the force of his argument by frequently employing jargon, this work is accessible and highly recommended to anyone interested in learning more about Gandhi, political philosophy, or postcolonial studies.

The second chapter offers insight into the conceptual framework that animates Gandhi's political philosophy—a nonsectarian theory focused on balancing the canonical ends of life. Parel contends that one cannot understand Gandhi's political philosophy without exploring how Gandhi believed the canonical ends of life (*purushartha*) interacted. Parel thus explores some of Gandhi's key writings—including the forward to *Gokhale's Speeches, Autobiography*, and the Introduction to his translation of the *Gita*—to better understand Gandhi's perception of the canonical ends of life and his modern interpretation of it. To live a fulfilling and peaceful life, Gandhi believed that the four pursuits (economics and politics, ethics, aesthetic pleasure, and spirituality) must be balanced. Parel

emphasizes that Gandhi's theory is nonsectarian and transcends all cultures, as this theory is, at its core, focused on our common humanity. Moreover, Parel notes that postcolonial studies rarely acknowledge Gandhi's influence beyond his role as an anti-colonial leader. Parel attributes this, in part, to Gandhi's embrace of religion, in stark contrast to other postcolonial theorists.

The third chapter highlights Gandhi's role in both reviving the ancient Indian political canon that faded in prominence during the nineteenth century and reinvigorating the theories with novel, modern concepts, including civic nationalism. After providing a brief background into ancient Indian political thought, Parel discusses Gandhi's adaptations that brought this ancient theory into conformity with the multicultural reality of contemporary India. For example, Gandhi's philosophy omitted the old canon's ideas on monarchy, the need for State power to expand and conquer, and the caste system. Instead, Gandhi emphasized that civic nationalism—rooted in a shared sense of justice, rights, and duties—could generate a common national identity that would transcend the differences within Indian society. Additionally, Parel details Gandhi's conception of a modern Indian State that was secular, adhered to the principles of Gandhian nonviolence, recognized human rights, and sought to eliminate mass poverty with a modified version of capitalism. Finally, Parel demonstrates how Gandhi revived old aspects of the Indian canon, in particular the notion that modern science could coincide with spiritual truths. Despite the lack of focus on the historical context of these ideological developments, Parel's discussion about these developments is both detailed and insightful.

In his fourth chapter, Parel argues that one of the distinguishing, and perhaps most original, aspects of Gandhi's political philosophy is his focus on both political and spiritual *swaraj* and his contention that a society requires both to flourish. Political *swaraj* is defined as the sovereign State that protects the rights of all citizens. To achieve this type of *swaraj* requires the fostering of civic nationalism and rejection of religious and ethnic nationalism, as expressed in Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj*. Here, Parel provides excellent historical background to help the reader comprehend the evolution of Gandhi's notion of political *swaraj*. Furthermore, Parel defines spiritual *swaraj* as self-rule, or self-discipline, which requires a balance between

one's passions, ethics, and morals. Next, Parel compares this concept to negative freedom and outlines two methods to achieve spiritual *swaraj*: (1) daily spiritual exercises to balance one's mind and (2) the practice of civic virtue, including respect for all religions. Finally, Parel demonstrates that there is coherence in these seemingly unrelated concepts. Gandhi believed one could not achieve one type of *swaraj* without the other—a self-disciplined person cares not just about herself but the political well-being of her fellow citizens. Furthermore, a government based on the consent of the people helps protect the rights of the people; and a self-disciplined citizenry checks the government from abuse, as individuals do not narrowly focus on themselves but their fellow citizens. Although this theoretical discussion seems somewhat utopian—as Parel himself acknowledges that India has yet to secure completely spiritual *swaraj*—the unified theory of *swaraj* lends credence to Parel's thesis that Gandhi's writings are not simply daily ramblings about politics but part of a larger, coherent philosophy.

The fifth and sixth chapters discuss the political and economic foundations of Pax Gandhiana, the titular political order of the Indian State explored by Parel, which is rooted in civic nonviolence and a constitutionally limited State based on the consent of the governed. Gandhi philosophizes that a nonviolent State that can achieve peace both internally and externally. The first of these chapters aims to dispel false notions about Gandhi's conception of nonviolence. In particular, Parel argues persuasively that Gandhi did not seek absolute, monastic nonviolence but instead civic nonviolence as policy. Gandhi's nonviolence policy aimed to reduce the overall intensity and extent of violence. Gandhian political theory focuses on reality rather than utopia—it recognizes the utility of violence at some points in time, albeit limited instances of the lawful use of violence, to defend citizens' rights and maintain law and order.

The success of civic nonviolence depends, however, on two key factors that Parel identifies: (1) civic nationalism—and the resulting national unity—must take root in the nation as opposed to ethnic and religious nationalism, which incites social conflict; and (2) a coercive state must exist that governs with the consent of the people and maintains both order internally and security externally—a point Parel expands on in his

discussion of just war. Parel does an excellent job of acknowledging the debate among scholars about Gandhi's views on the coercive state, and then proceeds to clarify that Gandhi rejected the conception of a Machiavellian state.

Alongside Pax Gandhiana's political requirements set out above, Gandhi called for economic *swaraj*—an economy that recognized the dignity and equality of all people. Expressed in *Sarvodaya* and highly influenced by Ruskin's works, Gandhi aimed to reform capitalism to better address the scourge of poverty in India. Though Gandhi viewed the pursuit of wealth as a legitimate aspect of the pursuit of *artha*, he believed that the pursuit of the economic and political needed to be balanced with *dharma* and *moksha*. This chapter is perhaps Parel's strongest example of both Gandhi's originality in political thought and evidence of a coherent ideology. First, Parel expounds on Gandhi's concept of two parallel economic systems, one based on the profit motive and the other focused on benevolence, such as the teaching and medical professions. Next, Parel describes Gandhi's theory of trusteeship, which recognizes private property as an inalienable right but argues that those who create wealth have a duty to share excess wealth beyond the necessities for life with the rest of society. This innovative theory shifted the onus of helping the poorest in society from a centralized welfare state to the individual wealth creator. Finally, Parel discusses Gandhi's *Constructive Programme*, which aimed to solve national issues through voluntary, nongovernmental organizations. Parel cogently argues that this focus on the constructive program for nation-building in postcolonial India signifies a major shift in Gandhi's ideology from his previous emphasis on *satyagraha* (civil disobedience), and Parel believes that this shift has been ignored by scholars for far too long.

In his remaining essays, Parel expounds on Gandhi's views of civilization, the arts, and civil disobedience, mostly by way of comparison to other philosophers. The seventh chapter distinguishes Gandhi's perception of civilization, expounded in *Hind Swaraj*, from two other Indian scholars to establish both the uniqueness and novelty of Gandhi's philosophy. Here, Parel may have benefitted from an in-depth analysis between these scholars and Gandhi akin to his later comparison of Gandhi and Thoreau and a more straightforward structure. Regardless, Parel characterizes Gandhi's perception of civiliza-

tion as both apolitical and non-ideological, in stark contrast to the divisive ideas promulgated by the two other scholars. Gandhi also diagnoses modern civilization as deficient in dharma and moksha, thus lacking a spiritual center. The eighth chapter then explores Gandhi's views on the arts and its place within his broader political philosophy. Parel argues that given Gandhi's emphasis on balance between the four ends of human life, his interest in art makes perfect sense. Kama, including the pleasure of art, enriches and provides balance in one's life. This section is where Parel most struggles to construct a coherent philosophy held by Gandhi, as he intentionally chose not to write a treatise on art. Ultimately, the chapter offers interesting insight into Gandhi's views on art and how these views developed, tracing their roots to Tolstoy and Ruskin.

The final chapter explores the influence that Henry David Thoreau's writings had on Gandhi's philosophy and, as Parel claims, illustrates the exchange in political thought that occurred between India and the United States. First, Parel identifies and expounds on three of Thoreau's writings that particularly impacted Gandhi. Parel's significant contribution to this area is his analysis of Thoreau's impact on Gandhi, acknowledging that Thoreau did indeed have some impact. However, Parel claims that it is an overstatement to say that Gandhi derived his concept of *swaraj* in *Hind Swaraj* directly from Thoreau. More specifically, Parel demonstrates that Gandhi himself did not believe that his notion of civil disobedience was derived from Thoreau, and he further contends there is a conceptual difference between civil disobedience and *satyagraha* ("holding on to truth"). The book concludes with a comparison of Thoreau and Gandhi's views on the interaction between civil disobedience, social reform, violence, and virtue.

Recalibrating Reform: The Limits of Political Change. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 343. \$98.00 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY SIMON KRESS

Few scholars have the will or the wherewithal to trace the long denouements of climactic political change. Much more exciting are the photo ops and the grand rhetoric of promises

kept and bright futures in store that attend the signing of reforms into law. Simplified narratives of political change allay our appetite for Whig histories of American progress. But Stuart Chinn's *Recalibrating Reform: The Limits of Political Change* reminds us that the facts tell a different story. Such era-defining political transformations as Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the 1960s Civil Rights acts collided with the more conservative mechanisms of governance. In Chinn's terms, such collisions inevitably result in a "delimitation" of the reforms' far-reaching possibilities and a "construction" of new governing arrangements that nevertheless maintain many of the preexisting distributions of institutional power and individual rights. Chinn calls this process "recalibration."

While *Recalibrating Reform* supplies excellent, richly historical case studies, it ultimately aspires to the theoretical. The text opens with a detailed elaboration of Chinn's general theory of recalibration. Recalibration, the theory goes, follows most major political changes that require fundamental rearrangements of institutional authority and individual rights. For example, the Wagner Act of 1935, which sought to dismantle master-servant common law labor relations and establish a right to unionize and bargain collectively, resulted in the establishment of a voluntary arbitration model that preserved many of the employers' prerogatives that did not directly affect the right to collective bargaining. The stronger the institutional authorities and rights implicated in the reform, the theory goes, the greater is the extent of the recalibration. For brevity's sake, I will call this Chinn's interest-sorting thesis.

Chinn also correlates recalibration to the vagueness or open-endedness of the statutes themselves. For example, while the Civil Rights Act of 1866 left open the degree to which a range of reforms would implicate the balance of federal and state power, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was deliberately limited to the policy domain of voting. As such, the open-endedness of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 invited delimiting slippery-slope arguments, while the specificity of the Voting Rights Act invited a broad reading of the statutory language resulting in an effects test for minority vote dilution claims. Chinn treats this idea of recalibration as interpretive specification interchangeably with his interest-sorting thesis implying, oddly, that the open-endedness of a reform is the cause of latter delimita-

tion, as though Jim Crow stemmed from a drafting problem. This cannot be right.

To be fair, I do not think Chinn intends to make this argument. But left unsaid is the way open-endedness or specificity may be products of the negotiations of institutional authority that shaped the initial legislative process. In other words, specificity reflects greater interest sorting prior to reform; alternatively, open-endedness may flow from the haste with which a given reform was passed. If this is so, we should conclude that what happens before the reform may be as important as the nature of the reform itself in determining the reform's ultimate success. Chinn's project to narrate what happens after reform may lead him to under-analyze the continuities that survive the reform. Nevertheless, Chinn is right to see the interplay of interpretation and interest sorting. In short, recalibration is the phase where institutional actors create operational meaning out of abstract reform principles.

When reforms give rise to recalibration, Chinn finds a pattern of delimitation and construction, shaped by the interaction of the political branches and the judiciary. In the wake of major reforms, Chinn finds a recurrence of legislative stalemates where no party has sufficient power either to reverse the reform or resolve its loose ends. Into this vacuum steps the judiciary, where, responding to litigation testing the limits of the reform, the Court hands down rulings that delimit the scope of the reform. Having resolved the uncertainties of the reform, the judicial holdings establish a new baseline for legislative revision. This process of delimitation then gives way to a period of construction whereby institutional entities articulate new governing arrangements which are in turn conclusively entrenched by subsequent Court rulings. Using a set of diagrams, Chinn analogizes this process to the destruction, containment, and rebuilding of a bombed out city.

If this all sounds a little too pat, it's because it is. As any academic knows, raising interesting questions does not always lead to interesting answers. In his understandable desire to discern the large patterns of political change, Chinn carries his analysis to increasingly remote elevations. The content of the particular reforms, the particular rights and institutions implicated, the particular historical exigencies all become a little blurry. Fortunately, Chinn's analysis survives the reductiveness of his larger theoretical argument. In practice, his point is

more historiographical than polemical. It amounts to a relocation of the narrative arc of political change. In place of a simple dynamic of reform creating a new political order—which is then undermined or sustained—Chinn interposes a period of recalibration that arises from the reform and precedes the new political order. This new political order may not come into view until decades after the reform. By reframing the dynamics of political change, Chinn usefully opens up post-reform judicial decision-making as a discrete field of legal historical inquiry. In so doing, Chinn forces us to attend closely to the modalities of legal argument and judicial decision-making that emerge in the wake of major reforms and that serve to temper the more radically reconstructive potential of those reforms.

While Chinn considers three periods of reform and recalibration, the book finds its animating purpose in puzzling through what remains one of the most tragic of failed promises: the rise of Jim Crow in the wake of Reconstruction. Chinn is right to grasp this as “the most glaring oddity in American political development” and a paradox that must be faced if we would understand the complexities of American political and legal history. But Chinn’s claim that segregation and black disenfranchisement were the “logical consequences” of the Reconstruction Amendments runs ahead of his evidence. Such a claim both says too little and too much. On the one hand, consequentialist logic is simply the stuff of history-writing—the present is a consequence of the past. On the other hand, viewing segregation as the inevitable outcome of the Thirteenth Amendment strains credibility. Racial terrorist violence, wavering commitments among northern Republicans, and economic depression—among other factors—all contributed to that outcome.

Nevertheless, Chinn’s substantive analyses take in far more than his thesis would suggest. The case studies demonstrate mastery of an impressive range of disciplines and materials—history, political science, law—which allows Chinn not only to offer rich, fine-grained readings of briefs, oral arguments, and opinions but also to situate these documents in their historical context. This is rarer than it sounds. Too often scholars are limited by their disciplines—brilliant readings of cases ignore history or densely textured histories present cases in thumbnail. In the case of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, cases like *Blyew* (1872), *Cruikshank* (1876), or *the Civil*

Rights Cases (1883) are read merely as overt subversions of Reconstruction, symptomatic of a white supremacist Court. Indeed, they are that, but they warrant the greater scrutiny Chinn provides. Far from showing an animus toward the purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court in these cases seems most concerned with asserting its commitment to the basic legality values of notice, settlement, and predictability in the face of potentially far-reaching reforms. This concern meant that the Court repeatedly adopted the conservative slippery-slope interpretations of Reconstruction laws offered up by southern Democratic lawyers, responding to their warnings about flood-gates issues and unchecked federal authority.

By offering such a detailed account of the decision-making in these monumental cases, Chinn corrects the historical shorthand that has presented these cases as evidence of a thorough judicial condemnation of Reconstruction. To be sure, the state action doctrine elaborated in *the Civil Rights Cases* did much to undercut the advances in protecting the lives and rights of African Americans. Gutting the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that barred discrimination on race in public accommodations, the Court limited the enforcement power of the federal government under the Fourteenth Amendment to state laws or actions taken under state authority. The state action doctrine became the basis for a sweeping retreat of the federal government from protecting black southerners from a range of predations and cemented the hold of Jim Crow. But a close reading of the case suggests that the doctrine itself may have been more narrowly defined than subsequent rulings would have us believe. The Court seemed to presume that the state action limitation still allowed for federal actions in response to instances of state neglect with respect to private violations of rights. Moreover, Chinn's close readings offer insights that may be of use to litigators who seek to defend or challenge major reforms.

Nevertheless, Chinn's approach highlights the perils of writing about the Court when it acts to perpetuate abhorrent racist policies; akin to our appetite for grand narratives of national political progress is our desire to position the Court as above the fray of everyday politics. Take, for example, the Public Accommodations Act at issue in *the Civil Rights Cases*. The Act guaranteed equal treatment for African Americans in public accommodations and public transportation. While these

rights would eventually be guaranteed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the authority of the Commerce Clause, it has become received wisdom that the Public Accommodations Act had gone one step too far. The Reconstruction Amendments seemed to license a degree of political and civil rights, but a right of equal access to public accommodations and transportation was an overreach—both in terms of constitutional authorization and public acceptance. *The Civil Rights Cases*, which invalidated the Act, and *Plessy* (1896), which upheld the “separate but equal” doctrine of Jim Crow, are viewed as flawed decisions understandable in context. Michael Klarman, for example, observes that “most Jim Crow laws merely described white supremacy; they did not produce it.” Even for legal historians deeply critical of racist laws, the Court sits at one remove from the white supremacy its opinions served to sustain.

Chinn, it must be stressed, seems to be aware of this danger. He is careful to give voice to dissents, losing arguments, and subsequent scholarship that exposes some of the willful inconsistencies in the rationale of the decisions. Moreover, Chinn notes the real political effects of Supreme Court rulings that either lend or withhold the imprimatur of constitutionality to legislative actions. But to say that the Court is animated primarily by structural concerns about federal power—arising merely from a tendency of the Court to delimit broad-based political reform, regardless of the content of the reform—risks naturalizing the rise of Jim Crow. Perhaps it is a modality of academic argumentation, but in the interest of presenting a “general theory of recalibration,” Chinn underplays the radical contingency of all political change. This form of argument is particularly insidious when it abets the fiction that the Court somehow transcends the ideology of white supremacy. Reading the sophistication and nuance of his case studies into his occasionally reductive theoretical framework, however, one comes away from *Recalibrating Reform* with an enhanced understanding of judicial decision-making, political process, and the role of the judiciary in shaping political reform.

Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence Against the Armenians, 1789–2009. By Fatma Müge Göçek, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xviii, 680. \$39.95 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY ANDREW MARNELL

On May 16, 1978, President Jimmy Carter spoke at a White House Reception honoring Armenian Americans. Regarding the Armenian Genocide, he stated, “[I]t’s generally not known in the world that in the years preceding 1916, there was a concerted effort made to eliminate all the Armenian people, probably one of the greatest tragedies that ever befell any group. And there weren’t any Nuremberg trials.” It is this lack of acknowledgement, and its pernicious consequences, that Fatma Müge Göçek explores in *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence Against the Armenians*. Deftly interweaving memoir and historical analysis, Göçek unearths the narratives that have been systematically silenced in the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide. These narratives are contextualized in a broader historical framework—Göçek’s analyses both the events of the genocide and the history of violence that preceded and succeeded it. Drawing upon a varied collection of personal accounts of those affected by this history, as well as her first-hand experience as a scholar of Armenian-Turkish relations, Göçek questions why violence against Armenians has been normalized and, ultimately, why this violence is endemic to Turkish society. Göçek concludes that by refusing to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish state is engaging in a form of “foundational violence”—violence that has perpetuated itself for decades. Because of this, “[t]rue democracy therefore remains a constant challenge for Turkey as its failure to acknowledge the collective violence embedded in its past keeps reproducing such violence in the present.”

Göçek’s analysis is fundamentally based on her scholarship of Turkish-Armenian relations and, as a result, is incredibly personal. Göçek begins by placing her book within this framework—discussing her contributions to the Workshop on Armenian Turkish Scholarship at the University of Michigan, where she helped assemble the stories and perspectives of scholars and journalists of both Armenian and Turkish de-

scent. Göçek's inclusion of this personal perspective is poignant and furthers the work's emphasis on personal narratives as its central source of analysis. Göçek's audience is presumably one that already has a basic grasp of the events of the Armenian genocide and an understanding of Turkish-Armenian relations. Göçek spends little of the work's nearly 700 pages discussing the historical timeline of the Armenian genocide in basic terms, with most of this discussion instead focused on complex analysis that is interspersed throughout the work's 356 memoirs. As a result, those that are unfamiliar with the events of the Armenian Genocide may find themselves adrift when attempting to read *Denial of Violence*, and a brief, introductory historical summary would have been a welcome addition to making the work accessible to a wider audience. As it stands, Göçek's work is one that presumes knowledge of Turkish-Armenian relations.

Göçek structures her work into four main chapters, each cataloguing stories from a particular era in Turkish-Armenian relations: Imperial Denial of Origins of Violence, 1789-1907; Young Turk Denial of the Act of Violence, 1908-1918; Early Republican Denial of Actors of Violence, 1919-1973; and Late Republican Denial of Responsibility for Violence, 1974-2009. This structure does provide *Denial of Violence* with clarity, as each chapter's respective memoirs are contextualized within discrete time periods of Turkish-Armenian relations that Göçek conceptualizes and defines. Göçek introduces and analyzes the memoirs, but, curiously, provides little information about the sources of the memoirs, which are listed in the work's appendix, or how the identity of each source may have informed the memoirs Göçek catalogues. While additional information may aid in providing further context to a relatively uninformed reader, Göçek does let each memoir stand alone and, more importantly, speak for itself. Each serves as a record of the conflicting narratives and personal experiences that both shaped and were shaped by the Armenian Genocide, but leaves some of the analysis regarding each memoir's respective source to the reader.

The first chapter of the book, although technically spanning the years of 1789–1907, primarily focuses on the Hamidian massacres and the Ottoman bank seizure, both of which occurred in the 1890s. Göçek lays the groundwork for the later justifications that the Turkish government would use

when persecuting Armenians—namely sowing fear and distrust of Armenians as sympathizers of Europe and threats to the security of the Ottoman Empire. Through exceedingly complex historical analysis, this chapter succeeds at discussing the subtle, insidious tools that the Ottoman Empire would use to legitimize and normalize the violence against Armenians in the following decade.

The second chapter of the book focuses on the critical years during the First World War and the years of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1916. Göçek uses not only the compiled memoirs of those persecuted during these years, but more importantly, also records the experiences of those who were instrumental in the persecution and violence against the Armenian population. In this way, Göçek's work provides a crucial insight to the reader, allowing one to see firsthand, through the voice of the perpetrators, the ways in which institutionalized violence against a particular group can be justified, normalized, and ultimately, erased. It is in this chapter that Göçek's historical analysis is at its most incisive and informative, and the memoirs Göçek has collected are insightful, often moving personal accounts.

The third chapter of *Denial of Violence* builds upon the foundational elements of the first two chapters, transitioning into an account of how the Armenian Genocide was systematically denied by the Turkish government during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. Göçek argues that, because the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire was integrated into the oligarchy of the newly formed Turkish Republic, the government quickly moved to disclaim and deny the history of the genocide. Göçek explores the multiple avenues of control implemented by the government, including the media and education. In the current political and social climate, this chapter seemed the most relevant and prescient to the ways in which mass media and education are used as systems of oppression and control through the control of information.

Finally, Göçek brings her discussion of the competing narratives of the Armenian genocide to the twenty-first century, as she discusses the ways in which journalists, academics, and international organizations are working to challenge the denial of the Armenian genocide by the Turkish government. This final chapter seems to be the most personal for Göçek, as she

discusses a colleague who, because of his work as a journalist advocating for recognition and reconciliation by the Turkish government, was murdered in Istanbul in 2007. The case, which remains unsolved, is one of the critical aspects of the chapter and further grounds the work in Göçek's personal experience. Göçek also explores the ways in which violence perpetrated against Armenians mirrors much of the cross-cultural and cross-racial violence that plagues the Middle East today. One particular strength of this chapter, besides its topicality, is the inclusion of *Armenian* narratives that also seek to exclude and rewrite history, namely the selective exclusion of massacres of Turkish citizens perpetrated by Armenians during World War I and the attacks by Armenian terrorists in recent decades. The inclusion of these competing narratives, and Göçek's critical analysis of the calculated inaccuracies of Armenian accounts, lends *Denial of Violence* a further layer of reliability and honesty—showing the reader that the stories of victims can also be selectively rewritten to silence contrary voices.

Denial of Violence is not an easy read for those that may be uninitiated to the complex history of Turkish-Armenian relations. Yet, Fatma Müge Göçek's work is one that provides poignant insight, topical socio-political commentary, and a thorough analysis of the ways in which those in power can shape the stories of the oppressed—for instance, by using levers of control of information, such as formal education and the media, as a means of silencing competing voices. At nearly 700 pages in length, Göçek's work is not a brief introduction to these forms of control or their aftermath, but rather a complex, dense work that weaves together memoir and historical analysis over the course of three centuries. Göçek's goal of both giving agency to voices that have been systematically silenced and exposing the tools of oppression responsible for this silence is laudable, and, for the most part, accomplished. Although *Denial of Violence* could have benefitted from a clear historical timeline for the uninitiated reader, as well as a winnowing of some of the memoirs, Göçek's exploration of the denial of the Armenian genocide is meticulously crafted and incredibly expansive. Those that are interested in furthering their knowledge about the Armenian genocide and its aftermath would do well to read *Denial of Violence*. Ultimately, Göçek's work is one that spans not only centuries, but also gives critical insight into the ways in which history is shaped by

those who tell it. As Göçek charts the interlaced memoirs spanning 300 years, she brings to light stories that have gone untold for far too long.

What Is a Human? What the Answers Mean for Human Rights. By John H. Evans. New York: New York, Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. ix, 189. \$35.00 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY ELISABETH PONCE

John Evans' 2016 book *What Is a Human? What the Answers Mean for Human Rights* is a particularly important read in a world where human rights abuses continually mount. To understand why human rights abuses occur at all, according to Evans, it is foundational to first ask *what* defines a human being. Answering this question—which in Evans' parlance involves developing an "anthropology"—implicates the degree to which people, amongst other contested topics, condone taking blood from prisoners against their will, committing suicide to save money, and using troops to halt genocide. Conventional academic literature asserts that the so-called philosophical and biological anthropologies lead to less support for human rights, whilst the theological anthropology leads to greater support for human rights. Evans' work reveals that while the manner in which people define a human can impact their support for human rights, most individuals tend not to adhere to neat academic anthropological categories, instead conceptualizing human beings in a more nuanced manner. Importantly, the anthropologies currently held by the public are unlikely to be used to validate abusive treatment.

It is important to note at the outset that while Evans concludes that the anthropologies utilized by the public seem unlikely to be used to support maltreatment, one issue with such a conclusion is that Evans' work cannot and does not evaluate how a person holding a certain anthropology actually treats other humans. Evans reports that "asking people about their past behavior is considered by Institutional Review Boards at universities to be ethically problematic as such questions are thought potentially to trigger negative emotional reactions and/or result in the revelation of sensitive information." Evans' work and conclusions thus rely on the responses generated by asking what people believe a human is and how

humans *should* treat one another. Given that the questions asked of respondents are framed in this normative sense, as opposed to measuring actual behavior, it seems prudent to be cautious in accepting Evans' conclusion that the anthropologies held by members of the public are unlikely to result in maltreatment of humans.

In his groundbreaking undertaking to reveal how the public conceptualizes humanity, Evans divides notions of human beings into four anthropologies: the theological, the biological, the philosophical, and the socially conferred. Until Evans' work, scholarly input singularly contributed to the so-called "academic debate," namely what experts determined made someone a human. Evans' unique contribution to this field of literature consists in his rich in-depth interviews with ordinary people, in which he distills their varied and complex conceptions of what constitutes humanness. Evans begins by examining the core tenets of these four delineated categories. Foundational to the Christian theological anthropology is that a human is one who is formed in God's image—the *Imago Dei*. Central to being made in the *Imago Dei* is the ability to communicate with God. In contrast, the central component of the philosophical anthropology is, "that certain clusters of properties are sufficient to make something a person' . . . this view 'is almost universally accepted among philosophers', but consensus on what exactly those properties or traits are remains elusive." The biological anthropology is crucially defined by reductionism—humans are DNA, a genetic sequence. The socially conferred anthropology is the term Evans gives to describe the ethos that the in-depth interview respondents employed.

After outlining these anthropologies, Evans then discusses the academic consensus on how holding particular anthropologies influences human treatment. The idea is that, "the public is taught an anthropology that . . . either intentionally or unintentionally teaches . . . [a] general depiction of the human being which is then consciously or unconsciously learned, and . . . these general depictions justify particular treatment, such as not respecting human rights." Per academic critics, while the philosophical and biological anthropologies lead to less support for human rights, the theological anthropology bolsters support for human rights. After this lively sum-

mary, Evans grapples with the real subjects of his book— members of “the public.”

In order to test the extent to which members of the public truly endorse academic anthropologies, Evans employed a public opinion poll of 3,600 respondents. A randomly selected group of respondents read a short description of the tenets of one of the four anthropologies. The description was labeled as a college professor’s views. The respondent then answered whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement overall, rating their level of agreement on a seven-point scale.

There appear to be several issues with this method of evaluation. First, as Evans himself acknowledges, assessing the extent to which the public endorses a particular anthropology is “heavily dependent on the wording of the survey questions.” The question posed to respondents in ascertaining public perception of human beings’ specialness vis-a-vis animals exemplifies this potentially problematic dependency. The survey asked, “Which statement comes closest to your view about comparing humans to animals? Are humans incomparably special, special, somewhat special, or not special at all compared to animals?” The framing of this question is arguably leading; in having three options deeming humans more special than animals, perhaps respondents were more apt to pick a choice deeming humans “special” than they would have been had the question been bifurcated into “special” or “not special.” Results could also have been different if the survey had asked respondents to rank how special humans were compared to animals on a ten-point scale. The framing of these questions inherently involves choice; readers of Evans’ work must bear this in mind when reading *What is a Human?*. The four to five bullet point descriptions of the various anthropologies are similarly subjectively framed. When interpreting Evans’ results, it is important to bear in mind his utilization of a technique with inherent limitations. He evaluates the degree to which the public endorses a certain academic anthropology purely via survey questions and anthropology descriptions framed by Evans himself. Additionally, it seems problematic to reduce the complexities of the various anthropologies to mere sound bites.

Despite these methodological limitations, Evans’ engagement with public perspectives provides three contributions to the anthropology debate. First, Evans ascertains whether those

individuals who use key tenets of the academic anthropologies when conceptualizing humans—i.e. the philosophical, the biological and the theological—truly “advocate different stances on human rights.” Interestingly, Evans finds the claims of academic critics to be largely true, concluding that those who agree with the basic components of the biological and philosophical anthropologies are less apt to promote human rights. Given the richness of the academic debate concerning these perspectives, it would be interesting to know whether a respondent’s agreement with the tenets of an anthropology would differ if they received say a 500 or 1,000 word depiction.

The second contribution of Evans’ work is to assess—via in-depth interviews with Ph.D. students and members of the general public—how members of the public conceptualize human beings. Evans’ interviews reveal that the general public has largely abstained from adopting the key tenets of the academic anthropologies as delineated above, particularly with regard to the biological anthropology. While the academic biological anthropology is criticized for defining humans as object-like, the general public tends not to appeal, “to abstract principles like humans being chemicals.” Instead, the general public tends to define a human by analogizing to those who resemble humans or are their offspring, so called “established humans.” Moreover, members of the general public typically mix myriad components of the various anthropologies and value different traits as essential in defining a human. Additionally, while the academic philosophical and biological anthropologies’ definitions of humans largely ignore “social traits,” or having the capacity to suffer and the ability to empathize with those who are suffering, members of the public tend to stress such traits. Perhaps unsurprisingly, highlighting social traits generally leads to greater support for human rights. Most importantly, Evans ultimately concludes the anthropologies that the public uses appear unlikely to be used to validate abusive treatment. While this is certainly a noteworthy finding, given the methodological limitations highlighted earlier, it is hard to fully concur with his conclusions.

The third contribution of *What is a Human?* is its evaluation of the extent to which the academic anthropologies have been or will be promoted in public. Evans bases such conclusions on how different sets of interviewees use the various academic anthropologies. He concludes that higher education is

a key source of propagation of the academic anthropologies. Understandably, biology Ph.D. students are more apt to make use of the biological anthropology, while humanities Ph.D. students are more likely to use the socially conferred anthropology. Christian institutions are the key disseminators of the theological anthropology. As for the academic philosophical anthropology, Evans concludes that higher education is unlikely a key propagator given that neither the humanities nor the biology Ph.D. students utilized that anthropology in conceptualizing human beings.

Evans' work brings a fresh and much needed perspective to a debate that was previously singularly focused on the commentary of academics. His work offers many insights on how the public defines a human, as well as providing reasons for optimism within the inherent confines of a sociological study. However, it seems unlikely that Evans' work will have a lasting, broad impact in the human rights field for two reasons. First, his work solely unpacks American anthropologies and the impact that such anthropologies have on support for human rights. While the book is certainly an excellent starting place for understanding anthropologies' ability to influence maltreatment, solely examining American attitudes seems myopically insufficient to predict behavior in our globalizing, internationalized world of over 7.4 billion. Additionally, while Evans concludes that the anthropologies the general public uses are unlikely to lead to maltreatment—a conclusion worthy of inspiring cautious optimism—Evans draws no inferences from his studies on how anthropologies could be used to improve human treatment. He similarly neglects to really draw conclusions as to why certain anthropologies foster greater support for human rights while others promote less. Given the wealth of information derived from all of Evans' interviews, and the necessity in this day and age of improving our collective lot, it is a shame that Evans does not more deeply engage with ways to ameliorate human maltreatment.

International Law and Its Discontents: Confronting Crises. Edited by Barbara Stark. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. v, 293. \$54.95 (hardback).

REVIEWED BY SNEZHANA STADNIK

International Law and Its Discontents: Confronting Crises is a recently published collection of articles that analyzes international law's ability to confront ongoing global crises. Far from being an introductory book on international law critiques, this compilation is for advanced students and academics of international law well versed in the current critical analyses and discourse. Building on topics discussed at an Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, the book's contributors continue the conversation about international law's discontents, using a theme exemplified in Sigmund Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents* and Joseph Stiglitz's *Globalization and Its Discontents* to deconstruct power. In the introduction to the book, editor Barbara Stark notes that the writers' shared objective "is to expose international law's complicity in the ongoing economic and financial global crises and to assess its capacity—and its will—to address them constructively."

The book is divided into four parts: environment, gender, sovereign states, and international political crises; and each part consists of two chapters. The book's eight contributors all share a critical approach to assessing international law's shortcomings, specifically those that surfaced as a result of crises identified by Stark in the introduction, namely: the Great Recession of 2008, global inequality, and crises in developing states. The writers survey the impact of the crises on particular groups, sovereign states and international law itself, without pinpointing too strictly the affected "discontents." Instead, the contributors themselves appear to be the most discontented of discontents, leaving the reader skeptical whether they truly remain hopeful in international law's transformative potential.

The first part concerning the environment begins with an article discussing the international community's adoption of the principle of sustainable development, where Ileana Porras, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the University of Miami School of Law, notes that the principle has not led to any meaningful progress in environmental protection. Porras examines the social construct of scarcity, as well as the fear and

anxiety associated with it, and argues that sustainable development has in fact contributed to binge development—which she characterizes as “hyper-consumption, irrational, performance, wasteful and excessive.” She further asserts that “[i]nternational law can never be fully dissociated from its commitment to international commerce nor free of its ordinary biases.” Recognizing the limits and biases in international law, Porras nonetheless sees it as an aspirational space of hope and warns against the securitization of issues so as not to feed fears and anxieties. Porras suggests setting aside the international law conception of sustainable development, but does not provide an alternative.

Karen Mickelson, associate professor at the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, writes the second article on environment. Drawing on Freud’s assertion that “the principal task of civilization, its actual *raison d’être*, is to defend us against nature,” Mickelson argues that modern environmentalism is a rejection of this view. Rather, it depicts nature as that which must be defended against civilization. This insight comes from Mickelson’s observation that the current ambivalence toward international environmental law might be a result of the need for economic growth and prosperity underpinning the global economy. Since constant growth and prosperity are perhaps inconsistent with environmental sustainability, Mickelson suggests that international law has been complicit in justifying this war against nature. International law has not resolved the tension. Using the metaphor of a kaleidoscope, Mickelson looks for patterns in how international law has historically addressed the tension, mainly identifying “moderate agenda[s] that could be assured a wide degree of political support.” To question the present social order and our present economic model, both of which are often taken for granted, Mickelson looks to TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) scholarship to highlight the need for third world voices on the “environment versus economy” equilibrium and alternative understandings of human well-being.

The second part, concerning gender, begins with an article that examines the relationship between international law, crisis governance, and the role of gender “in diverting attention from larger injustices perpetrated in the name of emergency.” Diane Otto, Chair in Human Rights Law at Melbourne Law School, looks at two examples of gender “panics”: (1) sex

trafficking and (2) sexual abuses by international peacekeeping forces. She shows how the international community's sex trafficking and peacekeeping reforms suppose that the source of harm is "wicked individuals rather than . . . structural conditions of inequality, poverty and destitution that motivate people to migrate." To combat and resist these crisis narratives that often normalize paternalistic laws, Otto suggests a counter-crisis strategy: strategic disruption via "un-crisis" thinking. This would involve questioning the certainties of the crisis paradigm that could remove the dynamic of panic and allow revisiting the problem of structural inequalities. One such example would be the reframing of sex-trafficking as a labor exploitation issue. Ending with a sober belief in international law's emancipatory power, Otto echoes Special Rapporteur Philip Alston in encouraging international lawyers to avoid being the "handmaidens" of free market globalization.

In the second article on gender, Barbara Stark, the editor of the book and law professor at Hofstra University, points to the failings of international law to improve global welfare. She cites a Harvard School of Public Health study that shows the "decline and stagnation in average heights among women in fifty-four poor and middle income countries." As changes in height are often proxies for changes in standard of living, Stark points to the global financial crises for exacerbating the relative impoverishment of these "shrinking women" compared with the height of their grandmothers. Using the concept of fragmentation, Stark shows how two different international law regimes affect these women: the free trade regime has not alleviated global inequality and the human rights regime has ineffectively "mainstreamed" women's rights. Stark notes that the "future of the shrinking women . . . may well depend on international law regimes which they cannot imagine, and which are oblivious to them."

In the third part, on sovereign states, Dan Danielsen, law professor at Northeastern University, examines the public/private divide by examining the role of firms and states in market regulation in light of the 2008 global financial crisis. He argues for a global public regulatory order that captures shifting conceptions about what is private and public, drawing on Foucault's notion of fluid governance. Such an order would require balancing and bargaining the content of rules that recognize not only the limits of States' ability to shape economic

activity outside of their jurisdictions, but also the increasing but limited power of corporations to shape global governance. The challenge for Danielsen is “finding new institutional and political mechanisms for contesting the pervasive inequities in power, resources and well-being across the globe.” He urges the exploration of a more dynamic institutional approach to the political economy and conceptions of global governance, where firms and states co-produce the global public regulatory order. While recognizing how these terms are deeply embedded in the modern political economy, Danielsen provides little guidance for how to descriptively characterize States’ and corporations’ rule, nor how to draw the boundaries for public and private rule.

In the next essay on sovereign States, Andrew Strauss, law professor and Associate Dean at Widener University School of Law, examines the problem of global income inequality and the adequacy of the global regime equipped to weigh in on these issues. Strauss argues that structural inequalities in global income contributed to the global economic crisis of 2008, but also notes the silver lining—global income inequality creates political preconditions to catalyze a democratic regime to represent the global public. Strauss proposes a solution: the democratization of international society through a Global Parliamentary Assembly (GPA). Siding with the functionalist view that the international system develops incrementally, Strauss offers suggestions on how to make the GPA an effective institution, addresses critical perspectives, and explains how the GPA’s lack of formal power would not detract from its “claim to exercise increasing authority in the name of the global citizenry.” Though a GPA could help give a global voice to those disadvantaged in the current global economy, Strauss fails to take into account the great amount of political will that would be necessary to make an institution that can do more than the current U.N. General Assembly.

In the first article of the final part, concerning international political crisis, Brad Roth, professor of law and political science at Wayne State University, and Sharon Lean, associate professor and Graduate Director of Political Science at Wayne State University, evaluate the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA), formed by the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. They assess how this leftist, counter-hegemonic approach to law and politics in the form of New

Latin American populism challenges the normative global order, specifically the dominant understanding of human rights, democracy, and State sovereignty. Roth and Lean note that most ALBA member States have not been able to opt out of global economic initiatives but that there has been an improvement in social inclusion and the status of economic and social rights. The authors comment that though “ALBA governments have given renewed voice to Third World concerns about the basic structure of the global order, they have not succeeded in changing the terms of the international conversations.” Balancing the views of staunch supporters and harsh critics, they conclude that ALBA has at least “renewed the presence of Third World militancy, disrupting global capitalism’s aura of inevitability and creating space for more nuanced forms of resistance to unbalanced trade and investment regimes and to the dominant global political elites.”

In the last contribution, Jeanne Woods, professor of international studies at Loyola University College of Law, studies the interplay between global capitalism and the law of war. Woods canvasses historical views of the norms of war, citing Vitoria, Grotius, and Vattel. Arguing how historical norms of war facilitated wealth accumulation by dominant powers in Europe, Woods argues that these norms undergird modern capitalism. She surmises at the resurrection of just war theory and its role in both early and modern capitalism. Woods posits that the current structural crisis (i.e. a “relentlessly expansionist system that situated the conquering powers of Europe at its center and the dominated peoples of the South on its periphery”) could culminate in an escalation of violence, leading to a wide-scale global war as modern capitalism “confronts multiple intersecting crises.” In her view, these crises have “reconstructed a paradigm of permanent war.” Citing Freud’s belief in man’s ability to temper and harness destructive instincts and Stiglitz’s view that globalization increases interdependence, Woods believes innovative technologies and human rights norms are useful tools that still have the potential to change the world.

The main crises considered in this book are the Great Recession and structural global inequality. There is room, however to question the authors’ definition of crisis, considering that global income inequality has been around for centuries. Even Stark, as the editor of the work, states that these are

“*ongoing* economic and financial global crises.” As acknowledged by Stark in quoting a proponent of disaster capitalism, crises create opportunities that did not exist before. Though the authors do not genuinely appear to have large amounts of “critical faith” in international law’s transformative potential, perhaps their critical faith could be channeled to examine the windows of opportunity for “strategic disruption” that the cited crises created.

Intrigued by the title of this book, readers might expect to see more analysis of current legal issues in international law. Though the authors consider various international law regimes, the emphasis is more on what international law broadly has been unable to accomplish, namely freeing itself from global capitalism and creating a democratic and equitable world order. The authors all implicitly highlight the difficulty in dis-embedding international law from the current neoliberal structure, causing one to wonder if a more fitting title for this book might be *Global Neoliberalism and Its Discontents*.