

BOOK ANNOTATIONS

Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa's Most Repressive State. By Martin Plaut. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. ix, 253. \$21.95 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY PIERRE J. ALLEGAERT

In 2015, a total of 157,000 Africans traveled from Libya to Italy. The largest national group, of just over 39,000 people, were Eritreans. The U.N. Refugee Agency estimates that approximately 131,000 Eritreans live in Ethiopia, the majority of them in camps. Many Eritreans are willing to pay smugglers thousands of dollars to escape, occasionally through journeys that last years and span multiple continents. Migrants face the threat of rough seas, corrupt border guards, human traffickers, forced deportation, organ harvesting, and indefinite conscription if caught by government officials, but many still choose to abandon Eritrea. What exactly about Africa's most repressive State forces so many from their homeland?

Martin Plaut frames *Understanding Eritrea* with reference to Winston Churchill's description of the Soviet Union as a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside in an enigma." Much like the Soviet Union, Eritrea, since achieving independence in 1991, has remained a riddle to outsiders. The totalitarian government refuses to allow foreign news correspondents to be based in the country and grants U.N. agencies limited access. Instead of seeking to prove a particular thesis about Eritrea, Plaut's work provides a glimpse into the modern history—rife with ethnic tensions, ideological struggles, and geopolitical conflicts—of a State largely inaccessible, both literally and figuratively, to the outside world. In his book, Plaut succeeds in creating a detailed and readable handbook on Eritrea's recent development. Still, his work would benefit from greater reference to central themes. He often fails to cultivate more personal connections with the country's contemporary characters and historical figures, though perhaps this is a function of Eritrea's self-imposed alienation.

Plaut is far less of a stranger to Eritrea than most: he is former Africa editor of the BBC World Service, has published

extensively on Africa, and is currently a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London and an advisor to the Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department. However, even researchers, academics, and government officials lack fundamental information about Eritrea's inner workings. Eritrea's government has never published a budget nor conducted a census, neither before nor after independence. A 1997 report by Eritrea's National Statistics Office stated that the country's population is not known with any degree of precision; estimates vary between approximately three and six million, but are complicated by the high number of Eritreans who have fled the country in recent years. This knowledge gap, existent even among Eritrea's leaders, makes Plaut's exhaustive research all the more impressive.

Following a loosely chronological order, Plaut divides his book by subject matter into chapters on Eritrean history: Eritrea's often fraught, but symbiotic relationship with its neighbor Ethiopia; foreign relations; political repression; economy; emigration; exile; opposition; and, lastly, an outlook for the future. Binding these occasionally disjointed accounts together are the two common threads of Eritrea's fierce, nationalistic independence and the significance of personal relationships in governance, foreign relations, and the regime's control over the diaspora.

Much like the Soviet Union, Eritrea has relied on the promotion of a singular ideology to overcome its troubled history and to unite its diverse populace. Eritrea is incredibly diverse: the country's peoples are most clearly divided between the majority Muslim eastern and western lowland areas and the majority Orthodox Christian Tigrinya highland areas. Eritreans speak a total of nine languages and often maintain cultural connections within their ethnic, linguistic, or religious communities that cross national borders with neighboring Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sudan. While Plaut comprehensively discusses Eritrea's myriad cultures and complicated political history, detailed maps or diagrams would greatly assist the reader in tracing his arguments.

Foreign powers like the Greeks, Saudis, Yemenis, Egyptians, and Ottoman Turks all reached and exercised varying degrees of control over Eritrea before the consecutive eras of Italian colonialism, British military rule, and federation with neighboring Ethiopia. After driving out the Italians in 1942,

the British struggled to solve the Eritrean riddle, alternating their allegiance between Muslim and Christian blocs, which in turn led to increased internal strife. Britain ultimately passed the question of Eritrea's status as a State on to the United Nations. The United Nations opted to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia. Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia's absolutist regime failed to achieve unity.

The incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia in 1962 spurred opposition and armed struggle. While these tensions gave birth to different rebel factions, Plaut rightfully focuses on the collective spirit that defined the Eritrean resistance to the violent repression carried out by the ruling Ethiopian military committee, the Derg. The rival Tigray People's Liberation Front sought to liberate Ethiopia from the Derg and allow for self-determination of Ethiopia's ethnic groups. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front did not recognize a right to self-determination, instead opting for a unified political identity within the former colonial territory. During the guerilla campaign, the Eritreans went so far as to forbid all discussion of family and origins, in part to ensure a unified focus on the goal of independence. Plaut bounces among various movements, ideologies, and key figures, before settling his attention on one in particular. A revolutionary leader, Isaias Afwerki, would become president of Eritrea after the rebels took the capital Asmara in 1991 and would rely heavily on this sense of collective identity to maintain his grip on power to the present day.

Isaias's charisma and leadership allowed early supporters to overlook the president's undemocratic tendencies. Isaias has since maintained power for over two decades, and he emerges as Plaut's most captivating character. He, much like the country he rules, is a near-complete enigma. After returning from a trip to China in 1967, Isaias sought to emulate Mao Zedong in his work with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. During the war for independence, the idealistic nationalist used secret power structures to rise to the top of the rebel movement. Plaut offers interesting facts about Isaias's leadership style—for example that he eschews formal dress for shirts and sandals and has not diverted government resources to modernize his father's undeveloped village—yet Isaias largely remains a mystery. He has eliminated political parties and the free press and has instituted a system of indefinite government

service, enforced by threats and torture. He often travels secretly between residences in order to avoid assassination. He has removed or jailed former allies and friends, but his motivations remain obscure. Isaias's continued power is captivating, and greater attention to his background, rise to power, and style of rule would be welcome. However, the dearth of available information may dictate Plaut's brevity.

Strict nationalism and personal connections have also come to define Eritrea's role beyond its borders. Despite various alliances and trade relationships with Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and the European Union, Eritrea remains largely inaccessible to foreign investors, and diplomatic relations are subject to the whims of Isaias. Instead, Eritrea relies on a shadow economy grounded in smuggling, human trafficking, a tax imposed on Eritreans abroad, and forced government service, often in the form of hard labor. Plaut dives into the intricacies of this smoke and mirrors system, including explorations of an elaborate series of front corporations used by government officials for global money laundering. While foreign nations have tried to eliminate Eritrea's foreign tax regime, Eritreans abroad often pay out of fear of being blacklisted and becoming restricted in their ability to visit relatives or receive assistance from Eritrean embassies. Eritrea continues to support pro-regime litigation and publicity efforts abroad. In fact, regime-backed actors have launched online campaigns against Plaut and other foreign commentators. Furthermore, Isaias advocates for the tax as a means of buffering Eritrea's defenses against its indubitably hostile neighbors, an aim many Eritrean émigrés who experienced the years of conflict with Ethiopia may still be inclined to support.

Plaut next comes closest to creating personal connections in his chapter on emigration. He recounts graphic stories of torture, abuse, and rape of migrants broadcast over the phone to relatives abroad in hopes of coercing them to pay off traffickers. Most striking is the detailed account of a twenty-eight-year-old migrant named Biniam, who traveled from Sudan via Libya, Italy, and France to the United Kingdom, where he was ultimately granted asylum. Biniam paid £2,549 for the year-long journey, which included time in prison, four attempts at crossing the Mediterranean, and hiding in a truck's cargo. Still, like the book overall, the section on flight opts mostly for

a big-picture approach, focusing on statistics and policies, as opposed to an evocatively personal one.

After providing an overview of Eritrean history, politics, and foreign relations, bound together by the themes of fierce nationalism and personal connections, Plaut offers his projections for the mysterious country's future, creating one of the work's most compelling chapters. Isaias's campaign of oppression may have stifled hope for political pluralism, and Eritrea remains entwined in conflict with Ethiopia over the implementation of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's ruling on contested border regions. However, foreign and regional powers also retain significant interest in stability in the Horn of Africa, given the area's geopolitical importance, creating a potential point of cooperation as Isaias's regime seeks increased investment in the Eritrean economy. As one of the foremost experts on Eritrea, Plaut dissects the prospects of an overthrow of Isaias, leading to the frightening possibilities of a power vacuum or of Islamic extremism, or the chance of a more liberal faction of the current ruling class slowly assuming power. Still, as with the economy, population size, or Isaias's motivations, outsiders maintain only minimal access to information. Accordingly, Eritrea remains, for the most part, a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities. By Joanna Mossop. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xxiv, 278. \$120 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY DANIEL BARRON

When Grotius published *Mare Liberum* in 1609, human knowledge of ocean waters beyond a short distance below the surface was largely limited to conjecture and myth. The sea floor itself was likewise both literally and figuratively unfathomable. Four hundred years later, science, commerce, and law have extended their reach into the sea considerably. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) awarded coastal States a significant degree of national sovereignty in waters and on the seabed up to 200 nautical miles (N) from their coasts, which constitute the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and beyond which most traditional freedoms of the high seas still apply. Coastal States are also, how-

ever, granted certain sovereign rights over their continental shelves, which are essentially the extension of the continental landmass into the ocean to the point where it reaches the sea floor. In some areas of the globe, the continental shelf, and thus coastal State sovereignty, extends beyond 200 N from the coast and into the waters of the high seas. The central thesis of Joanna Mossop's new book, *The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities*, is that, as commercial interest in economic resources located on the extended continental shelf intensifies in the coming decades, the tension between the legal regimes governing the high seas and the continental shelf will intensify. In light of this incipient conflict, Mossop argues that States should turn their attention to the development of a functional body of international law governing activities on the extended continental shelf sooner rather than later.

As Mossop acknowledges, activity on the extended continental shelf at present is essentially limited to deep-sea fishing that incidentally impacts sea floor ecosystems; more intensive forms of commercial and scientific intervention remain largely hypothetical. The consequence of this status quo, along with the fact that the international legal system remains substantially dependent on State practice as a basis for the development of new law, and the highly technical nature of the underlying subject matter, is that Mossop's book is largely descriptive.

The book is structured in three main sections. The first section consists of a description of how the continental shelf is defined scientifically and juridically, the different types of ecosystems that it contains, and the various ways in which its living and non-living resources can be exploited (Chapter 2), as well as a history of the development of the international legal regime governing the continental shelf (Chapter 3). The principal activities described in Chapter 2 are fishing, bioprospecting (i.e., sampling living organisms in search of genetic material for use in pharmaceutical or other commercial applications), extraction of hydrocarbons and minerals, and marine scientific research. Mossop, an international lawyer by training and currently a Senior Lecturer in law at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand, provides an impressively concise and lucid overview of the scientific, technical, and economic issues involved in undertaking these activities in remote

maritime environments, including potentials benefits as well as risks.

Chapter 3 focuses on the Convention on the Continental Shelf (“the Convention”), adopted in 1958, and its supplanting by UNCLOS’s provisions on the continental shelf in 1982. According to Mossop, the Convention established several important principles relating to sovereignty over the continental shelf. These included the principle that a coastal State’s sovereign right to explore and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf are exclusive and inherent (i.e., that they do not depend on occupation or express proclamation by the coastal State), but also that the coastal State’s rights did not affect the rights of other States in the water above the shelf, such as navigation, fishing, conservation of living resources, or scientific research.

Mossop argues that while UNCLOS did not fundamentally change the Convention’s articulated doctrine of sovereign rights over the continental shelf, the establishment by UNCLOS of the EEZ complicated how these rights might be exercised functionally. A coastal State’s sovereign rights in the EEZ include the right to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage the natural resources of both the seabed and the waters, as well as jurisdiction over the establishment of artificial structures, marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. According to Mossop, early suggestions in the UNCLOS negotiation process that the EEZ and continental shelf regimes be joined conceptually were rejected. However, since the EEZ covers both the water and the seabed, the coastal State’s sovereignty over the continental shelf to 200 N was clear. Beyond 200 N, a dispute arose as to whether the continental shelf should be part of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction or be under the sovereignty of the adjacent coastal State. The result was a compromise with two main elements: first, under Article 82, coastal States are required to pay or contribute a percentage of the production from exploitation of non-living resources on the shelf beyond 200 N to the International Seabed Authority (ISA), a U.N. agency that manages the seabed beyond national jurisdiction (which is termed “the Area”); and second, under Article 246, a coastal State may only refuse permission for scientific research on the shelf beyond 200 N where the research is significant for marine resources and where the State has publicly designated

areas in which exploration or exploitation is occurring or will occur within a reasonable period of time. As in Chapter 2, Mossop's description of the history of UNCLOS is succinct and accessible even to a reader with minimal understanding of international maritime law, and her case for the potential for conflict between the high seas and continental shelf regimes is clear and convincing.

Mossop acknowledges that the most contentious issue pertaining to the continental shelf to date has been the technical determination of its outer limits. Under Article 76 of UNCLOS, States are required to submit information on the limits of their shelves to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a technical body elected by State parties to UNCLOS, which will then make recommendations on the limits of State's shelves. Mossop stresses that conflicts over the CLCS's mandate and methodology are beyond the scope of her book, whose subject is not the establishment of sovereign rights but rather the *exercise* of those rights in contexts where there are competing claims

An analysis of the exercise of sovereign rights on the extended shelf would follow naturally from the preceding chapter, but instead, in the second section of the book, Mossop returns to the subject matter of Chapter 2 with an extended analysis of the various legal regimes applicable to different types of activities on the extended shelf. Chapter 4 discusses living resources; Chapter 5 discusses non-living resources; and Chapter 6 discusses marine scientific research. In Chapter 4, Mossop argues that, in addition to their sovereign rights, States also have a variety of environmental obligations on the extended shelf under UNCLOS, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and customary international law. Mossop suggests that States implement Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in order to protect vulnerable ecosystems on the extended shelf, either unilaterally or in concert with a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) and adopt a co-operative approach to permitting research, including negotiating benefit-sharing agreements under the CBD where commercial applications are contemplated. Chapter 5 is largely concerned with the operation of UNCLOS Article 82. Since no hydrocarbon or mineral exploration has yet occurred on the extended shelf, there is no extant State practice in the area, and the discussion is limited to the elucidation of theoretical

issues. Mossop concludes that Article 82 is likely not part of customary international law and advises that non-party States (to UNCLOS) commit to its obligations as a matter of policy, as well as that States cooperate through multilateral organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Chapter 6 focuses on issues in the application of Article 246. Here, Mossop argues that coastal States should give effect to the intention of UNCLOS to facilitate scientific research by not restricting access to a designated area more than necessary to achieve the goal of the designation, and that States should recognize the relationship between the obligations of the CBD and UNCLOS, developing processes that incorporate the requirements of both if necessary. Mossop's call for States to exercise restraint and engage in multilateral cooperation is logical, and her elucidation of the relationship among the various applicable treaties is insightful. This section would benefit, however, from a more detailed explanation of the status in international law of RFMOs and how States' sovereign rights on the high seas and the continental shelf are affected by multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, action (e.g., the basis in international law of the right of RFMOs to restrict fishing rights on the high seas as compared to the analogous rights of individual coastal States).

It is only in the final section of the book that Mossop addresses the most crucial element of the analysis: the relationship between coastal States' rights and the freedom of the high seas. Under Article 78(2) of UNCLOS, "the exercise of the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided for in [UNCLOS]." Chapter 7 proposes a framework for assessing whether a coastal State's interference with high seas freedoms is justifiable. The framework accounts for five principle factors: the likelihood of interference with continental shelf resources and the attendant level of harm; the relative importance of the interests at stake; the principle of minimal interference (i.e., that any necessary interference be as minimal as possible); the role of international or regional institutions; and consultation with affected States. Mossop then applies this framework to two examples: (1) bottom trawling for fish on the high seas, and (2) restrictions on navigation around survey vessels above the continental shelf. Chapter 8 addresses the

question of coastal States' enforcement rights against foreign vessels operating on the seas above the extended shelf. This question is analytically distinct, according to Mossop, because enforcement jurisdiction does not always follow from prescriptive jurisdiction in international law. Mossop offers a balanced analysis and concludes that coastal States have a right to enforce domestic regulations pertaining to the extended shelf by boarding, inspecting, and detaining foreign vessels suspected of violating those regulations. Chapter 9 offers examples of multilateral and bilateral cooperation for the purpose of protecting the extended shelf, including Portugal's cooperation with the OSPAR Convention parties and the North-east Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) to protect an ecologically sensitive area of its extended shelf, and cooperation between Mauritius and the Seychelles to submit a joint application to the CLCS in respect of joint development of a shared area of extended shelf. It also provides a general overview of relevant international and regional organization through which interested States could work in the future, including RFMOs, the IMO, and the ISA.

This third section is the most compelling of the book. In fact, the book would arguably have been better organized had it been structured in its entirety along the lines of Chapter 7, with the first section remaining as written and the second and third section combined into an overview of the issues arising from the differing legal regimes governing the high seas and the extended shelf. This could have been followed by a series of hypothetical examples exploring how various scenarios involving different resources and activities might be resolved by references to existing sources of law and Mossop's proposed evaluative framework. Nevertheless, Mossop has written a concise, well-balanced, and technically literate analysis of an important emerging issue in the field of maritime law—an issue that will likely only become more salient as the need to mitigate and adapt to global climate change gains in urgency and geopolitical tensions concerning sovereignty over marine resources increase.

Caretaking Democratization: The Military and Political Change in Myanmar. By Renaud Egreteau. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. ix, 193. \$51.79 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY ANGELINE CHEN

On November 13, 2010, Aung San Suu Kyi, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 and political heroine of the people of Myanmar, was released from house arrest by the military junta. For many both domestically and in the eyes of the international community, this served as a gesture of good faith and signaled an initial retreat of the military from political life in Myanmar. In *Caretaking Democratization: The Military and Political Change in Myanmar*, Renaud Egreteau posits that far from being removed from the political scheme of Myanmar, the military continues to operate with significant influence, despite sociopolitical and economic changes in the past decade. Egreteau qualifies Myanmar's movement from military-controlled authoritarianism to semi-democracy by highlighting the military's continued presence in domestic politics and foreign affairs. He argues that it remains to be seen how much actual change the new government can carry out given the military's deeply entrenched role; the challenges that the fledgling, semi-democratized government face may prove to be ultimately insurmountable.

Egreteau begins by laying out the historical background of modern Burmese government as its foundation. He then turns to analyze the country's political and social opening—or moderate democratization—since the early 2010s, examining the ways in which the military's "pacted transition" has bred an arena more welcoming towards parliamentary politics and the expansion of democratic institutions. In a language that is easily accessible for both seasoned academics and those with limited knowledge of government and Myanmar in general, Egreteau paints a holistic—if sometimes confusing—picture of modern Burmese politics and the problems facing the current government, even in the face of moderate victories. The overreliance on statistics and narrow, conflicting examples ultimately portray Myanmar as a less developed State than depicted in the first few chapters of his book. For example, the jarring shift between Chapter Three, titled "Restoring Parliamentary Democracy," and Chapter Four, "Patterns of Persis-

tent Praetorian Behaviors,” seems to invalidate the strengths of democracy that Egreteau was initially praising. While this may reiterate his thesis that Myanmar’s state of democracy is shaky and uncertain in the long-term, it dilutes the power of his glowing praise of the “new” government.

The varying levels of military involvement as laid out by Egreteau are as follows: the military as the (1) arbitrator or moderator, (2) guardian or participant-ruler, or (3) praetorian ruler. These operate on a sliding scale, with the most extreme involvement being praetorian rule, where the military assumes all governmental functions and occupies a position of force in prescribing a political-military order. The book focuses on the recent transition from junta rule in Myanmar to a semi-democratic government with multiple political parties and institutional structures. The lack of an ideological revolution or foreign intervention coercing this change is intriguing in that the military *voluntarily chose* to withdraw from political domination. From a comparative politics standpoint, this is a particularly idiosyncratic detail. While Egreteau mentions this point repeatedly, what fails to be fully fleshed out are the reasons *why* the military has made this transition. It is monumentally important to understand the rationales for withdrawal, especially given the military’s permanence as a political actor. The “pacted transition” is never explained explicitly and seems to be referenced as an established, unquestionable fact. Since the sustainability of this pacted transition and the young semi-democratic government is in question, more attention should be paid to the causes of military withdrawal.

The author’s time living and studying in Myanmar allows him to draw from his own personal experiences and from a wealth of academic research of Burmese history and politics. In the early chapters, Egreteau focuses on the broadening of civil society that has come to be known as the “Burmese Spring.” As a proxy for democracy, a robust civil society suggests that political development is trending towards a more sustainable democracy. Progressive policies in Myanmar under the new government, such as suspending internet censorship and significantly freeing the media, permitted the public sphere to more freely discuss issues. Even Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports could be easily accessed in Myanmar, in stark contrast to more authoritarian regimes in Singapore and China. Telecom companies began

providing services to the country, enabling many citizens to create social media profiles and engage in active and open dialogue. Egreteau notes that these developments are not completely perfect, as they are still marred by a tradition of restriction and censorship. This may be because the longer the totalitarian or dictatorial rule, the weaker the democratic achievements of a civil society are. Egreteau classifies this as a “significant caveat for post-junta Myanmar.”

A notable component of the “Burmese Spring,” the book argues, was the relative distancing from Chinese overdependence, exemplified by the Myitsone hydroelectric dam episode. The Myitsone Dam was a joint venture between the China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) and the Burmese Government’s Ministry of Electric Power and would have provided 6,000 megawatts of electricity for Yunnan, China. After much local opposition and violence within Myanmar regarding the construction of the dam, the Burmese government caved to local pressures and suspended operations. This was met with wide international support from countries such as the United States and European Union member states. Though this departure was characterized by periods of violent clashes and brutal reactions from local police forces and the country’s judicial system, Egreteau still acknowledges a generally “great[er] space for advocacy and political debate,” as it heralded an era of pushing back against Chinese political weight.

Again, however, Egreteau dodges the root of these changes, leaving a gaping hole in his audience’s understanding. He alludes to international pressures and positive consequences of Myanmar’s liberalization, suggesting that the new government is altering its institutions to reap the benefits of being accepted by the international community, but does not explicitly deal with this equally important half of the discussion. The hasty remarks of overdependence on China and the lifting of international sanctions imposed by the United Nations as potential factors for the post-junta transition are briefly touched on and leave more questions unanswered than not. Without explicitly considering the causal connection between the transition and potential catalysts, the reader is left to make the connection between these complex events and causal factors.

Egreteau then transitions to more sobering observations about the Burmese political system: the military's presence continues to loom in the background of politics—and sometimes stands overtly in the forefront—and does not seem to be going anywhere any time soon. These last chapters of the book examine the reality of the military's role and underline the weaknesses that continue to stymie political development. The parliamentary system established in Burma is an extremely young one with a weak multiparty system; there are more than twenty political parties represented in the government and many more that fail to obtain representative seats in the Assembly of the Union. As an example of the fragility of the multiparty political setting, Egreteau mentions a joke that is frequently told in Myanmar—if two Burmese men walk into a coffee shop, they will leave having formed three political parties. The failure to merge and form stable political parties with cohesive platforms and agendas is a problem that continues to plague many Southeast Asian semi-democracies. This inability to consolidate legislative work for future parliaments is a troubling feature, making the military's stability all the more threatening.

Due to the comprehensiveness of Egreteau's exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of the government in Myanmar, *Caretaking Democratization* reads more like a textbook than an argumentative piece. He effectively considers the counterarguments—that the transition to democracy is not as good as it appears on paper—but his efforts to portray an unbiased opinion results in the rebuttal of his previous arguments extolling the success of the “new” Burmese government. Each of his arguments is backed up with extensive evidence including in-depth interviews with Burmese political actors and well-researched academic studies and scholarship. The strength of the democracy is, as a result, diluted in the conflicting facts he presents both complimenting and criticizing the success of the new semi-democracy. While this may be intentional on the part of the author in depicting a true picture of the country, the argumentative position of the book becomes confusing and gets lost in the counterarguments.

The conclusion of the book is the most powerful; its title, “*Glasnost* Without *Perestroika*,” is particularly fitting when describing the recent political transition in Myanmar. *Glasnost*, symbolizing a degree of liberalization and transparency, has

begun, but has not happened hand-in-hand with *perestroika*, or meaningful institutional reform. Revolution has not pushed for significant change. Without change, the “new” Burmese government remains held back by the same constraints that the old government faced. As is characteristic of many Asian polities transitioning from authoritarian rule, traditions of deeply-rooted systems of patronage, iconification of leaders, and failure to adequately address ethnic and religious cleavages may lead to the downfall of efforts to democratize. As long as the government remains constrained by these factors, the easier it is for the more unified military to retain the option to intervene at any point, sliding closer on the scale to praetorian rule again. With this threat hanging over the government’s head, any steps taken towards progress are still within the constraints of what the military has *allowed* the government to do. It stands to reason to consider what steps, if any at all, should be taken to dismantle clientelistic practices that breed corruption. Understanding the political culture is the first step to overcoming challenges, but Egreteau’s normative assessment falls short in considering potential solutions or alternatives. Merely recognizing the incompatibilities between Asian junta rule and Western notions of democratization, such as patronage and iconification of individual leaders rather than political movements, are not enough to overcome them.

Therefore, a significant exploration lacking in the book is understanding the reasons behind the military’s loosening of its grip on government. This information would be useful both for the development of Myanmar politically and for scholars of Burmese politics in general. Since this relinquishing of power appears to be conditional, it is of insurmountable significance to not only explore the history of Burmese politics and the transition, as Egreteau has done in great detail in this book, but also to craft a strategic response based on the factors that are making the military pull away. For example, if the military is chiefly responding to international pressures and kowtowing to the international community to end sanctions and keep their economy afloat without being completely dependent on China, then perhaps there is a threshold of economic independence that, when reached, will make the military reassume control of the government.

From a purely Machiavellian standpoint, it is hard to understand why someone who has complete power would relin-

quish it out of motives that are not self-serving. Although this book is intensive in its coverage of the history and role of the military, many questions regarding the future of the political system are still left unanswered. The potential alternatives and solutions have been virtually untapped in this book. Egreteau is deeply aware of the new government's limitations to carry out actual change, given the military's deeply entrenched role. The current structures keeping Myanmar's new government intact seem to be time-sensitive. It remains to be seen what will happen to the new trends of political development without the presence of political icon Aung San Suu Kyi, the extent of international help and foreign aid, and current instability between ethnic and religious groups. The current political system as it stands is unsustainable for more than a generation, and the unparalleled role of comparative politics scholars in helping to shape and understand future Burmese policy and institutional structure should not be overlooked.

Re-Imagining Offshore Finance: Market Dominant Small Jurisdictions in a Globalizing Financial World. By Christopher M. Bruner. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xii, 243. \$95.00 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY ZACHARY S. FREEMAN

Small territories often have a significant, even disproportionate, impact on international finance. Bermuda is a global center for insurance, Singapore for international finance, and Delaware for business incorporation. These small jurisdictions are often referred to pejoratively as "tax havens" by large, global economies, with their market dominance depicted as a function of exploitative tax policies. This theory of Market Dominant Small Jurisdictions (MDSJs) as parasites of larger financial centers such as New York or London is often echoed in popular media and sometimes even by large countries themselves to depict smaller countries as global powers only because of exploitative practices. In *Re-Imagining Offshore Finance*, Christopher M. Bruner argues that even a cursory analysis of these jurisdictions dispels this idea. While many of these jurisdictions have business-friendly tax policies, their market dominance cannot be fully explained by this. Bruner compares six of the most successful small jurisdictions to create a

model of the paradigmatic MDSJ: “A small jurisdiction with legislative autonomy and favorable geographic and cultural proximity to major economies has sought to establish a competitive niche in cross-border finance by investing heavily in human capital, professional networks, and related institutional structures; drawing together public and private expertise to create innovative regulatory structures at once conveying flexibility and credibility; and actively minimizing the political salience of cross-border finance, both domestically and diplomatically.”

Bruner provides in-depth analyses of Bermuda, Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Delaware. Bruner’s clear writing style makes his broad, abstract thesis approachable and easy to conceptualize. More technical writing would have made it more difficult to create a unitary model for such different jurisdictions. After all, finance is not a single sector, and these jurisdictions are not market dominant in the same sectors. Bermuda is dominant in insurance, Dubai in Islamic Finance, Hong Kong in initial public offerings (IPOs). After reading this book, it is very difficult to disagree with Bruner’s central thesis that these jurisdictions achieved their dominance through much more than tax policy. The most effective way that he does this is by comparing successful small jurisdictions to unsuccessful small jurisdictions, Nauru and the Netherlands Antilles, and successful large jurisdictions, New York and London.

Bruner cites geographic and cultural proximity to major powers as a major factor in the development of a successful MDSJ. It is critical that the jurisdiction serve some bridging function between major powers. Hong Kong provides a financial gateway to the more opaque and less business-friendly Chinese government. Dubai provides a key bridging function between Africa, Asia, and Europe. Switzerland enjoys a convenient central location in Europe. This centrality is critical for attracting the initial investments. Likewise, the remoteness of Nauru contributed to its failure as a MDSJ, because investors in places like Australia prefer the more developed (and closer to China) Hong Kong and Singapore. Familiar legal systems are also critical. Here, history plays a significant role. Every successful jurisdiction studied, with the sole exception of Switzerland, has a foundation in English common law, a system familiar to a majority of international investors. This stability is

critical to ensuring investors they will easily be able to manage their money and understand local regulatory schemes. Another unsuccessful jurisdiction, the Netherlands Antilles, was based on a Dutch civil law system, which was unfamiliar to foreign investors and decreased potential investments.

Cultural and geographic proximity to major powers is not the only uncontrollable factor important to a successful MDSJ. Other critical factors are legislative autonomy—though not necessarily sovereignty—a small population and land area, and minimal natural resources. Every successful small jurisdiction shares these features. Bruner argues that the absence of natural resources and limited human capital combine to encourage these jurisdictions to develop strong financial sectors with heavy investment in human capital. Again, Bruner compellingly argues this portion of his thesis. Every successful jurisdiction studied invested heavily in the human capital-intensive financial industry to compensate for weak natural resources reserves.

Resource poor regions, therefore, must develop a robust economic system in other ways. This requires heavy investment in professional networks, the autonomy to make innovative regulatory regimes, and responsiveness to business interests. Switzerland and Hong Kong boast some of the world's best universities, Dubai is the largest global center for Islamic finance, and Delaware has the most business-friendly laws in the United States. Successful jurisdictions develop by doing more than just instituting low tax rates.

For most of the book, Bruner asserts and reasserts the importance of regulatory stability and heavy capital investments without providing a frame of reference. Bruner makes it clear that the successful jurisdictions pursue these strategies, but does not mention what the unsuccessful jurisdictions do wrong. The final section of the book remedies this defect. Bruner's comparison of MDSJs with successful large jurisdictions and unsuccessful small jurisdictions elucidates why the pejorative "tax haven" designation is clearly insufficient to explain the market dominance of small jurisdictions. Nauru and the Netherlands Antilles both heavily relied on favorable tax rates and, in Nauru's case, heavy secrecy to attract foreign investment. For Nauru, this led to a reputation as a shady off-shore investment haven where criminals could store money. Its secrecy involved selling citizenship for favorable tax rates and

establishing shell corporations that existed only on paper. Nauru's reputation for financial crime and secrecy ultimately led to minimal investment in the south Pacific island and its collapse as an offshore financial center. The Netherlands Antilles relied almost exclusively on a tax treaty with the United States that allowed businesses incorporated there to avoid the withholding tax. When Congress passed an act making the treaty moot, the Netherlands Antilles lost its advantage immediately. This comparative analysis makes it difficult to call those successful jurisdictions "tax havens," since places that build their market advantage on only tax incentives tend to be fairly unsuccessful.

Unlike these unsuccessful small jurisdictions, the successful ones adopt strong regulatory regimes, boast low corruption levels, and offer more than low tax rates. Dubai for example boasts very low corruption levels relative to its neighbors in the Middle East. Though it has a low tax rate, it offers investors the ability to pursue Sharia-compliant finance. In the Islamic faith, Sharia is a way of life for many, permeating personal and business affairs alike. For example, Muslims practicing Sharia cannot invest in high risk bonds because of the prohibition on gambling. Like the other MDSJs, Dubai invests heavily in transportation and professional infrastructures. Like Singapore and Hong Kong, Dubai treats businesses like clients and implements measures affirming as much. All of these factors combine to make such jurisdictions trustworthy for businesses seeking to invest. Low tax rates alone are insufficient, but are part of a broader regulatory regime meant to attract businesses. There is fierce competition in international finance. Any jurisdiction with legislative autonomy can offer low tax rates. However, it takes much more to develop business trust and to offer clients something that other jurisdictions do not.

Bruner's central thesis can therefore be summed up as such: MDSJs are successful because of broad innovative regulatory regimes that offer businesses a competitive package that they could not get in another jurisdiction. Bruner clearly repeats this message throughout the book in different ways. For every jurisdiction that Bruner studies, he includes an in-depth analysis describing why and how it conforms to the paradigmatic MDSJ. This argument could have been more convincing if he had included more information about unsuccessful jurisdictions up front. Only in Part III does his thesis crystallize

into a compelling theory for why small jurisdictions become dominant in international finance. By comparing the successful MDSJs to the unsuccessful ones, it is clear that his theory is not built around confirmation bias, but around a careful comparative analysis between various MDSJs. This is difficult to conceptualize in the first two sections of the book, where Bruner introduces his theory and compares it to successful MDSJs.

Despite minor structural flaws, Bruner offers a compelling case for a model of MDSJs and thoroughly rejects the “tax haven” narrative often advanced by first-world powers. For an MDSJ to be successful, favorable tax rates, and perhaps secrecy, can only be part of a broader regulatory scheme. Favorable geographic and cultural placement is also critical. Access to major powers is important for a thriving trade industry. One interesting insight to Bruner’s study is that New York and London adopt many of the same techniques for which they lambast MDSJs. The United States is the third most secretive financial market in the world, behind only Hong Kong and Singapore. London acts like an offshore financial center in its own right, by giving international clients a favorable market to hide and invest their money. Looking closely, the parasite model completely breaks down, unless one is also willing to admit that major powers sometimes act like parasites themselves. Similar charges of exploiting secrecy and tax laws can be levelled against individual states within the United States. Bermuda and Vermont compete as offshore insurance centers. The British Virgin Islands and Delaware compete for business registrations. Bruner convincingly proves his proposition that the “tax haven” argument cannot survive even a cursory analysis.

Overall, *Re-Imagining Offshore Finance* is an excellent read for anyone with an interest in international finance. It provides a thorough conceptual framework for the rise of MDSJs. Bruner’s clear language and thorough analyses make a complicated theoretical analysis easy to understand and explain a fundamental question of international finance: how are small jurisdictions able to compete with global powers? His answer is his theoretical framework, which is both eloquently simple and compellingly rigorous. In rejecting the “tax haven” designation, he states that “sustained and even-handed focus on fundamental regulatory problems—whether manifesting them-

selves in small, potentially far-flung jurisdictions or in the world's major economies—should be the order of the day.” This statement both explains the success of MDSJs and the importance of continued regulatory oversight. Bruner concludes with a prediction: MDSJs “will very likely continue to thrive due to substantial innate advantages and the desirability of their unique service-based capabilities.”

States in Disguise, Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups. By Belgin San-Akca. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xvii, 292. \$36.95 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY ISABELLE GLIMCHER

From Syria to the Philippines, the world has seen the powerful effects of non-State armed groups fighting for everything from democratization to the creation of a caliphate. Much of the literature analyzing these groups has focused on the ways the end of the Cold War, and the rise of so-called “failed States,” have shaped and enabled this proliferation. In so doing, academic analysis has centralized the State as the sole autonomous actor shaping these trends, and focused exclusively on the relationships between supporter State and rebel groups, or rebel groups and target States. Belgin San-Akca builds on this knowledge base by analyzing rebel groups and States as similarly autonomous and influential elements acting within a web of geopolitics. Within this web, she also considers the relationships between so-called target and supporter States, effectively expanding the reach of her analysis to the triad relationship between a supporter State, a target State, and a rebel group. Attempting to understand patterns and causation, *States in Disguise* asks what influences States to support certain rebel groups and what drives rebel groups to seek support from specific States. To answer this question, San-Akca mobilizes statistical analysis of a wide-reaching, original dataset identifying the factors that drive decision-making by both sides. Through this analysis, she finds broad trends suggesting certain social and political factors that affect the seeking and provision of intentional and de facto support to rebel groups.

Belgin San-Akca is an assistant professor of international relations at Koç University in Istanbul. She completed a bachelor's degrees in history and international relations at Bogazici

University, before receiving her PhD from University of California, Davis in 2009. As an academic, her book aims at a sophisticated audience, especially one interested in, and generally familiar with, international relations theory and statistical analysis. Throughout the book, however, the author effectively presents the key findings in straightforward language, comprehensible by anyone with an interest in the subject.

States in Disguise mobilizes an impressive original dataset on 455 rebel groups operating around the world since 1945, and the States that have acted as supporters and targets in that time. The dataset isolates 352 instances of State-selection and 342 cases of rebel-selection to understand the motivations and external factors driving decision-making on both sides. This original dataset provides information that was previously unavailable to academics and practitioners. First, this is the first dataset to code identity elements for rebel groups, thereby enabling analysis of the effects of ideational ties in the decision-making of States and rebel groups. Second, this represents the only comprehensive reporting on de facto and covert support provided by States since 1945. Finally, this dataset is the first to differentiate between intentional and de facto State support. With this additional information, San-Akca manages to expand analytical capacity in the study of relations between States and rebel groups. The dataset itself stands as an important contribution to the field.

San-Akca's analysis of the data is admirable for its scientific rigor. To qualify as a group, San-Akca requires that the rebels primarily resort to violence, using anything from guerrilla to terrorist tactics, that the group maintain no formal affiliation with any sovereign State, and that the group is organized and pursues political objectives, effectively exempting spontaneous protest movements and organized crime from the analysis. In operationalizing intentional and de facto support, she identifies instances of States providing safe havens for group members, safe havens for leaders, headquarters or other offices, training camps, training itself, weapons and logistics support, financial aid, the transport of equipment and supplies, and the provision of troops. All but the last of these types of support can be provided intentionally or de facto by States. San-Akca also identifies four main explanatory variables. First, she tests for the importance of an external threat environment between supporter and target States, i.e.,

whether the target and supporter States engaged in a militarized dispute in the last five years, or war in the last ten years. Second, she considers the internal threat environment, based on evidence of revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, or genocides and politicides in the supporter State. Third, she looks for ideational affinity between the target and supporter State, emphasizing shared ethnic or national identity, shared religion, or shared political ideology. Finally, she looks for patterns based on ideational affinity between supporter States and rebel groups, highlighting ethnic identity, religious affinity, and leftist or socialist ideology. In order to isolate salient patterns, San-Akca includes mountainous terrain, rebel group duration, geographical distance, and the Cold War as control variables.

This analysis yields powerful and significant findings. Isolating the choices of supporter States under her State-Selection Model, San-Akca shows that State decision-making is driven by strategic interests, domestic incentives, and ideational affinity. Strategically, a State is almost five times more likely to support a rebel group targeting its adversary. A State is also far less likely to provide support to rebel groups when it has traditional State allies. This suggests traditional conceptions of interstate balancing—whereby States ally with other States to counter-balance external threats—help explain State interactions with rebels as well. Taking domestic elements into consideration, the odds of a State providing support to rebels against the state's external enemies increase by almost 50% if the State is dealing with internal instability and is therefore less able to mobilize its own resources. In these situations, rebel groups serve as a convenient means to outsource confrontation. Finally, the ideational affinity element proves to be an important part of the calculus for States deciding to support rebel groups. A potential supporter State that shares ties with a rebel group's target is 45% less likely to provide support to the group, while States whose majority populations share ethnic or religious ties to the rebel group are almost three times more likely to support them than those that do not. This effect does not change when the target State is not an external adversary.

Isolating the choices of rebel groups under the Rebel-Selection Model, San-Akca shows that rebel decision-making is based on a group's need for survival, autonomy, and resources. To this end, strategic and ideational motives act as

mediating variables. According to the data, rebels are two times more likely to establish safe havens in the enemies of their targets, and the relative strength of the potential supporter State as compared to the target State has a positive effect on the likelihood that rebels select it as a source of support. Taking ideational affinity into consideration, rebels prove to be generally dissuaded from selecting States that share ideational ties with their targets, whereas States that have a majority population who share ties with the rebels have a 51% higher chance of being selected by the group as a source of support. Unlike in the State-Selection Model, domestic instability does not have a meaningful effect on the likelihood of its being selected by a rebel group extracting *de facto* support. This finding challenges the prevailing assumption that weak States are a preferred source of support for rebel groups. Considering some of the control variables, the data demonstrates that the Cold War had a negative effect on the likelihood of *de facto* support as rebels were about 36% less likely to seek support from external States. This is most likely because they did not need to seek such support as it was more readily available in a bipolar world. Driven by a similar lack of need, rebel groups targeting States with a high proportion of mountainous terrain proved to be 25% less likely to look for external safe havens.

San-Akca's dataset yields valuable information at a regional level as well. While the Middle East and North African (MENA) States were targeted by only 11.65% of rebel groups, they accounted for 16% of supporter States, and 26% of *de facto* supporters. East and South Asian countries were targeted by a higher number of groups, more than double the number targeting MENA countries, their proportion of support years was almost equal to that of the MENA countries, and East and South Asia represented 23% of *de facto* supporters. Sub-Saharan Africa evinced the highest number of rebel groups and the highest number of supporters, almost 33%. However, Sub-Saharan African countries represented a relatively low proportion of supporter States, accounting for only 15% of total support, and showing a pattern of providing brief rather than extended support over time. Significantly, Western Europe and North America accounted for 29% of *de facto* support, again challenging the assumption that weak States are the most valuable to rebel groups.

Taken together, *States in Disguise* presents an impressive set of insights into the factors driving States to select certain rebel groups to support, and rebel groups to select specific States from which to receive support. While the style of the writing can be dense and repetitive, especially given the intricate reporting of statistical findings, the insights yielded by the dataset have important implications for international policy going forward. The findings suggest that drawing States into the international community, and broadening membership in inter-state security organizations could discourage States from supporting rebel groups. The findings also significantly challenge the dominant beliefs that weak States create the most supportive environments for the fomentation of rebel groups; instead, democracies and other more powerful states are appealing both for their reliable resources and infrastructure, and their unwillingness to curtail free speech. Finally, the data suggests, contrary to much of the previous academic analysis, that the end of the Cold War period did not end the use of proxy warfare through States providing support to rebel groups. Instead, State support continues, and rebels have become increasingly active in the extent to which they contribute to this process by selecting States from which to receive or extract resources.

Both the dataset, and San-Akca's analyses, constitute valuable contributions to the field. She expands previous analysis by investigating rebel groups as autonomous entities acting within the web of inter-state geopolitics, and by considering the significance of the relationships between potential supporter and target States in the shaping of selection by States and rebels alike. While she acknowledges room for additional research, Belgin San-Akca's *States in Disguise* carries this area of academic discourse forward into a more practical, scientific, and comprehensive realm.

The United States and Multilateral Treaties. By Johannes Thimm. Boulder, CO: FirstForumPress, 2016. Pp. vii, 287. \$75.00 (hardback).

REVIEWED BY SARAH MOORE

At a time when international trade dominates politics, Johannes Thimm challenges the conventional wisdom that the

United States is reluctant to join multilateral treaties due to autonomy concerns and a culture rooted in exceptionalism. Instead in a highly persuasive and thoughtful book, Thimm argues that the root of American unwillingness to bind itself to multilateral treaties stems from its system of governance and domestic politics. "The unique features of the American political system," Thimm writes, "create an exceptionally high number of veto players in the treaty process." He concludes that this "result[s] in high barriers at the institutional level that explain why nonparticipation is the norm." By examining the various domestic actors that can inhibit or stall the treaty process, Thimm provides novel insight into U.S. policy towards multilateralism.

Through this precise and innovative study, Thimm examines four conventions, extracting meaningful generalizations about when the U.S. government enters into a multilateral treaty. Thimm carefully chooses the sample size with varying degrees of support, objections, impediments, and outcomes. With such a small sample size, it is not clear whether his conclusions will be applicable in all cases. However, he acknowledges this, and instead, focuses his investigation on the factors that either strengthen or weaken the likelihood of U.S. approval of a multilateral treaty.

Thimm's analytical style remains straightforward through each of the seven chapters, backed by empirical data and primary sources. His premise that domestic factors play a critical role in foreign policy relies heavily on international relations theory and realism. In examining the question of whether unipolarity leads to unilateralism, Thimm reviews the literature of the most renowned realist scholars including Kenneth Waltz, Robert Jervis, and John Ikenberry. He uses this analysis to argue that the structural aspects of realism are not relevant here because the literature only provides guidance for the behavior of non-hegemon States, not what the most powerful State will do in a unipolar world.

Without guidance in the literature of whether a hegemon is likely to avoid multilateralism, Thimm points to several occasions where the United States has actually sought multilateralism. It is here that his argument is the most convincing, offering a powerful example that after the Second World War, at the height of American preeminence, the United States built the foundation of the modern day multilateral system. Laying

the groundwork for the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, the United States advocated for a multilateral system built on cooperation. Therefore, Thimm rightly concludes that “unipolarity can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for unilateral policies . . . [because] the more powerful—and less constrained—a State is, the less its policies can be explained by structural factors.”

Thimm also rejects the conventional wisdom that American resistance to multilateralism stems from cultural reasons. Through the same post-World War II example, he challenges whether well-known American values—exceptionalism, individualism, skepticism towards government, and a double standard of U.S. action versus the norms it demands from other nations—have actually kept the United States from seeking out or joining multilateral conventions.

After ruling out that cultural and structural factors have led to U.S. participation in multilateral treaties, Thimm concludes that domestic factors drive U.S. decision-making, a novel, even if obvious, argument within the field.

Thimm reviews two treaties to which the United States is a party—Chemical Weapons Convention and Convention Against Torture—and two treaties to which it is not—Landmine Treaty and International Criminal Court. While acknowledging the relevance at times of factors such as presidential leadership, Thimm cleverly concludes that political, institutional, and partisan factors are determinant. To illustrate this, Thimm opens and explores the black box of American governance.

What are those domestic factors that determine whether and when the United States will participate in a multilateral treaty? Thimm introduces George Tsebelis’s concept of “veto players” and places it in the treaty context. Tsebelis defines veto players as “actors whose agreement is necessary to change the status quo.” In the treaty context, veto players are actors in a political system that can prohibit or impede the American participation in a treaty. Thimm then details the various partisan and institutional elements that make up the American treaty negotiation and ratification process. The two most important veto players he identifies are (1) Congress—particularly the Senate’s ratification powers, the Chairman of the Sen-

ate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Senate majority leader—and (2) the President, who himself holds the power to veto treaty entrance.

One of the most interesting points Thimm makes is regarding presidential leadership. Through four case studies, he explores when the President is able to influence the U.S. government's position to join or not join a multilateral treaty. On first glance it would seem that the President, given his veto power, will always be influential to U.S. treaty participation. However, Thimm's analysis of the four cases reveals a different conclusion. Sometimes the political and institutional factions within other areas of the U.S. government are so strong that the president's opinion is dwarfed. Thimm uses the International Criminal Court as an example where "both Pentagon and Senate opposition to joining the treaty was so strong that no effort from the president could have forced ratification." On the other hand, he argues that the Torture Convention illustrates an example of a case "where the consensus in favor of the treaty was so broad that presidential involvement was hardly needed to achieve ratification." The conclusion that Thimm draws from this is that "in those cases that are less clear-cut . . . presidential leadership really makes a difference." As he rightly points out, this is evident both in the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Landmine Treaty, where presidential leadership was much more pronounced in the treaty process.

Throughout his discussion about the specific political and institutional impediments to U.S. treaty participation, Thimm maintains a primarily descriptive tone. In fact, he remains objective throughout most of the book. He describes the nuances of the U.S. political system in depth, while still being accessible to readers of all backgrounds. Ultimately, Thimm concludes that the U.S. resistance to joining multilateral treaties is institutional because the American political process and its veto players make it easier to block a treaty than approve one.

While his findings appear objective and perceptive, a close read reveals a soft advocacy for reforming the American domestic political system. In doing so, he points to the negative implications of the status quo: the decline of U.S. global leadership and consequently the decline of U.S. influence and power. He urges reform of what he sees as congressional obstacles, such as rules that require the approval of a single con-

gressperson (i.e., the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) for treaty ratification to advance. These latter powers are not required by the Constitution, and in fact, Thimm argues that the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and majority leader have gained these crippling powers to influence treaty ratification through partisan politics.

As a solution to this situation, he calls for executive-congressional agreements that would allow for both efficiency and insulation from partisan politics by allowing the executive to usurp the Article II process. As an alternative, he suggests changing the congressional structure and votes needed for ratification to a simple majority. Such reforms, he argues, would allow for efficiency and insulation from partisan politics that have stood as an impediment for U.S. participation in multilateral treaties. In turn, this would enable the United States to respond and confront global issues that require multilateral cooperation.

However, his arguments have been heard before, and his solutions may not enable the United States to respond more quickly to pressing global challenges. The U.S. legislative process, which includes treaty ratification, by design is not nimble enough to make fast decisions and regardless of reform will remain clunky, inflexibility, inefficient. Nevertheless, Article II, Section II of the U.S. Constitution states: “[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” The fact that thirty-four senators can currently block a treaty is articulated clearly and was intentionally designed as a protection against the U.S. government entering into a treaty without popular support.

Perhaps, Thimms relies too heavily on the possibility of reforming the political process and overlooks the separation of powers doctrine set out explicitly in the Constitution as a reason why the United States does not join multilateral treaties. Specifically enumerating the relationship between the President and Congress in the treaty process, the American framers here—as in many other places—aimed to build a system that would prevent tyranny. To that end, they designed a government of three branches filled with friction and impediments, conventionally known as checks and balances. The U.S. government is not meant or designed to be efficient, it is

meant to be reflective of the People and protective of minorities. The answer to American participation in multilateral treaties may not lie in changing institutional factors as much as it may rest on further informing the electorate of the benefits of joining a particular treaty.

In its entirety, the book is fascinating for anyone interested in U.S. foreign policy, treaties, and international law. It is a timely topic in today's political landscape, growing more so after the United States pivoted to withdraw from key multilateral agreements earlier this year and as NAFTA undergoes renegotiation. Thimms concludes his book warning us of the implications of not reforming the treaty process. His perspective is interesting and informative and will certainly advance discussions of reform of the treaty process to interested readers. His analysis of the U.S. domestic system in the context of multilateral treaties is timely, but his work provokes reflection in additional policy areas that may be stifled by certain "veto players" and the extent to which presidential leadership can matter. Thimm's argument could not be timelier as nations around the world contemplate U.S. non-involvement in multilateral treaties such as the Paris Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and potentially NAFTA.

The Fate of the West: The Battle to Save the World's Most Successful Political Idea. By Bill Emmott. Great Britain: Profile Books Ltd., 2017. Pp. ccxxiii, 223. \$28.00 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY ALISON F. PERRY

The West is under attack, but it is not doomed to fall. So argues Bill Emmott in his timely new work, *The Fate of the West: The Battle to Save the World's Most Successful Political Idea*. Over some 223 pages, Emmott outlines the ailments plaguing the West, diagnoses their sources, and offers tailored prescriptions for varied manifestations. The author is bullish about the West's enduring viability as a model of governance, yet clear-eyed about the risk of decline. In his view, Western nations must work to retain their evolutionary capacity, anchored in the principles of openness and equality.

This work injects intellectual coherence into a dialogue often hyper-reactive to the news cycle. Emmott successfully demonstrates that the West stands at a crucial juncture, and

that Western leaders can, by their choices, either ensure its survival or enable its decline. Further strength comes from a series of case studies in which the author offers actionable prescriptions for how each country or region should reverse its path or maintain course. Emmott's arguments, however, are rooted in a fundamentally globalist perspective, and as such may not be compelling to readers already skeptical of that worldview.

The introduction and first three chapters set the stage for the West's challenges. Emmott defines the West not geographically, but according to a set of ideas guided by the "lodestars" of openness and equality. By this conception, "Japan, Taiwan, Slovenia and South Korea are now as intrinsically modern and Western as are Sweden, France and Canada." This definition is increasingly salient, though it has its dissenters. Speaking in Warsaw in July 2017, President Donald Trump characterized the West in civilizational terms, asserting, "Our freedom, our civilization, and our survival depend on . . . bonds of history, culture, and memory." This backward-looking, exclusionary view of the West caters to the fear of the "other" running through the rhetoric of Trump and fellow isolationists Marine Le Pen and Viktor Orban. Emmott's conception is superior because rather than excluding historically non-Western nations, it invites them to strive toward the Western model.

According to Emmott, his concept of the West is under attack. The rise of "distinctly unWestern ideas," from the movement resulting in Trump's election to Britain's vote to leave the European Union, manifest a dangerous isolationist strain. Emmott warns this approach has the potential to "destroy the West and much of what it has achieved," by replacing openness, domestic equality, and international alliances with closure and non-cooperation.

The explanation for the malaise is the heart of Emmott's thesis, what he calls "self-entrapment." An enduring feature of democratic governance is the tension between ensuring equal rights and allowing individuals to compete for unequal positions. According to the author, this "is an essential part of an open society but is also the greatest threat to it." Thus by granting participatory and competitive freedoms, Western societies invite behaviors that can work against their core principles. Emmott offers the example of banks and financiers, who "have built up political power by democratic means in order to cre-

ate privileges that damage the wider public interest,” by exacerbating inequality and inspiring resentment toward “the system.”

The author’s solution is “a constant effort to push back in the other direction, by promoting and making more credible the notion of the general welfare, of equal rights, equal treatment and equal voice.” Western societies must constantly reinvigorate the equality and openness upon which they are founded, a thread that weaves together the sections that follow.

Building on this diagnosis, the subsequent chapters present tailored action plans for five distinct scenarios: the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan, and Sweden and Switzerland (treated together). This section gives the work functional value to match its intellectual appeal, and offers policymakers a menu of possible outcomes that correspond to various courses of action.

Emmott characterizes the United States as prototypical, both of what open societies should aspire to and of how they can become sclerotic through lack of vigilance. It is also the prototypical case for optimism, historically evolving to meet changing times while maintaining its essential Western features. Prospects are less certain in the United Kingdom, which Emmott deems in need of a political shake-up to restore its sense of equality and political rights. The European Union’s structure as a multi-governmental institution makes it uniquely vulnerable. To endure, Emmott argues, it must blend more decisive governance with the courage to stand up against entrenched interests. Subsequent to the book’s publication, however, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel both won electoral victories, indicating that Europe may have temporarily shored up its staying power. Yet as of this writing, violence surrounding a recent separatist referendum in Catalonia may indicate that threats nonetheless remain potent.

The Japanese case—characterized by the author as a puzzle—comprises an “ultra-modern, highly developed democracy” plagued by a series of “false dawns,” and is a candidate for stealthy, step-by-step reform. Finally, Sweden and Switzerland are hopeful examples of democracies that have achieved recent revival through openness and restored equality.

Throughout these case studies, Emmott expands upon the theme of self-entrapment to argue that the true sources of and solutions to the West's challenges are found within. The Swedish and Swiss examples may indicate "this accumulation of problems, of traps, straitjackets and chains, is as much an illusion as were the tricks performed by Harry Houdini Our restraints and encumbrances are as self-imposed as Houdini's were." Likewise, the future of the European Union depends on "whether some of the stuck European countries could in the future look less like the Wizard of Oz and more like the great escapologist Harry Houdini." He thus casts the success or failure of Western nations in terms of their ability to manage or dispel illusions.

This premise yields rich grounds for criticism. It may be off-putting or even insulting to technocrats mired in these very problems, and begs the question of why they have not already unveiled the illusion or slipped out of the shackles, given their self-imposed nature. Even if some of the West's problems are internal, the author has not definitively demonstrated that many others do not result from external forces. One need only consider how the influx of refugees and spate of terrorist attacks in European capitals have strained the European Union's commitment to open borders.

The final section pivots to the future, where additional demons lurk. Emmott focuses on demography and technology, counseling that while these concerns must be taken seriously, they are manageable. Demographic shifts can be confronted by "adapting to and trying to overcome the economic, social and political consequences of ageing," while technological developments may offer "exactly what is needed as part of the process of adaptation to ageing." Also of concern are rival governing models that seek to eclipse Western leadership: ascendant China, declining Russia, and the Islamic State. Emmott remains convinced the West will prevail as the best, strongest case for global leadership.

The work concludes optimistically that, "the idea of the West, the world's most successful political formula ever, remains powerful, valuable and eminently revivable." The true challenge, as Emmott sees it, is not the cycle of global conflicts and economic downturns that have recurred periodically throughout the West's existence; rather, it is the internal weakness and self-doubt within Western societies. Emmott advises

Western leaders to confront these challenges by attending to the lodestars, openness, and equality.

To this end he offers several principles for the future. While these mostly reiterate prior themes, the final principle spotlights the importance of “international rule of law and international collaboration.” In the last several pages, the author argues that the core strength of the West comes from the international legal system and array of global alliances enjoyed by the Western community of nations. This explanation is compelling, even to a realpolitik reader or one who does not share Emmott’s affinity for openness. It would perhaps be even more powerful to lay out this argument at the outset, to prime the skeptical reader for the discussion of how to preserve openness with a clear argument of *why* it ought to be preserved.

Emmott’s work is cogent and persuasive, but it is not impartial. The author’s perspective is decidedly globalist, and his arguments are vulnerable to the criticisms of those who do not share this worldview. Emmott’s premises treat economic and cultural openness as unequivocally good, but whether they are remains a hotly debated question. America’s recent presidential election, along with the Brexit referendum, made clear the extent to which this debate continues to rage, and exposed the depth of the geographic West’s own internal confusion as to the costs and benefits of an open and global society. Indeed, by characterizing “the West” as a set of ideas, one risks papering-over the range of ideological diversity that thrives within the geographic West and its canon of political thought.

One need not disagree with Emmott to recognize his work is tailored toward those who already share his perspective, which may severely limit its ability to convince the rest. Emmott argues that the Western model is best for the globe overall. Even if this is true, it is important to acknowledge that some, if not many, are worse-off under an open, Western model than they would be under an isolationist one. Readers whose interests are threatened by the current Western trajectory may feel this work, like much of the dialogue among “elites,” does not treat them as real stakeholders with legitimate concerns. The ability to accommodate this diversity of viewpoints is part of what makes the West strong and a desirable place to live.

This globalist tilt feeds another core premise of the book, that the West's threats come primarily from within. Emmott implies that external challenges are transient or cyclical, and internal weakness poses the true threat: "[w]hat is special about this second decade of the 21st century is not the international weakness of Western countries, or systemic rivalries What is special, rather, about this decade is the internal weakness of Western countries." While the argument for periodic reinvigoration is compelling, the author should have devoted further attention to the possibility that today's external challenges may be unique and existential.

The Western model is relatively new in the historical sense, and has not been tested by the full range of global challenges. Other systems of governance that once seemed enduring, such as hereditary monarchies, lasted for centuries before being eviscerated by competing global trends. Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing world, where means of communication and societal institutions are constantly evolving, the reader is prompted to wonder whether a corresponding paradigm shift may be imperative for those participating in Western democracies. Emmott purports to dispense with threats posed by artificial intelligence, but other technological advances could still redefine the suitability of the Western model. A social media platform like Facebook, which integrates messaging services with the ability to send money and make phone calls, empowers individuals to organize political movements across geographic divides. Other advances can enable private entities to offer, and potentially dominate, functions traditionally provided by the State, such as blockchain-based cryptocurrencies independent of State control. Such developments could profoundly alter the viability and endurance of the West.

It is easy to pronounce that the West faces a critical turning point. Pundits do so every day. It is much more difficult to offer solutions that are both effective and maintain broad-based appeal. With clarity and precision, Emmott promotes learned solutions to twenty-first century challenges and dissects the strengths and flaws of open, democratic governance. While *The Fate of the West* is decidedly oriented towards those who favor a globalist model, it nonetheless presents a timely addition to the popular understanding of this geopolitical mo-

ment and offers guidance for those working to preserve the world's most successful political idea.

Governing Disasters: Engaging Local Populations in Humanitarian Relief. By Shahla F. Ali. Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. xx, 325, \$35.99 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY BETHANY J. SAUL

In the days following Hurricane Harvey, President Trump tweeted his amazement that the unfolding disaster was producing unprecedented flooding and destruction. “Wow - Now experts are calling #Harvey a once in 500-year [sic.] flood!” The U.S. government should not have been surprised. This is just one of the key takeaways from Shahla F. Ali’s latest work, *Governing Disasters: Engaging Local Populations in Humanitarian Relief*. Ali demonstrates that collaborative and effective governance is necessary to ensure emergency preparedness and strengthen disaster recovery. Through case studies and surveys, she notes gaps in chains of response and the resulting delays and inefficiencies, establishing the need for increased local engagement to maximize the impact of humanitarian responses to natural disasters.

At the outset of the work, Ali’s purpose for reviewing disaster response is clear—failures abound and there are networks, technological systems, and actors who are well placed to respond more effectively, efficiently, and economically. Ali presents empirical research from sixty-nine humanitarian aid practitioners working in more than eighteen countries in regions most recently impacted by major disasters. Her detailed review of humanitarian relief response to six major natural disasters demonstrates a need to design more coordinated processes for disaster relief that transcends national borders.

More specifically, Ali argues, “[T]he key to the efficacy of post-disaster recovery is the primacy given to local actors in the management, direction, and design of relief programs. Where local partnership and knowledge generation and application is ongoing, cohesive, meaningful and inclusive, disaster relief efforts are more targeted, cost-effective, efficient, and timely.” A major challenge confronting relief workers and development practitioners is the perception that local communities are the recipients of aid, rather than partners in leading aid efforts. In

fact, new governance scholarship already responds to this perception by placing primacy on collaborative process, stakeholder participation, local experimentation, public-private partnership, and flexible policy reformation, implementation, and monitoring. Ali's recommendations for the strengthened application of such decentralized local authority and coordination with national and international governance might achieve a more balanced post-disaster humanitarian response.

In the field of international aid and development, this is not a new concept, as Ali concedes. Certainly, "community involvement," "community-based," and "community inclusive" are part of the jargon in the field of humanitarian aid and relief. In fact, to a jaded aid worker or development practitioner, the initial discussion of "community-based" work in Part I of Ali's work might evoke an eye-roll or dismissal—surely, the word is reaching the tired level of similar infamous buzzwords like "empowerment" or "grassroots." However, in the later stages of her work, Ali successfully demonstrates a real and desperate need for effective community engagement in order to better support communities, cut expenses, and move national and supranational systems beyond "crisis-driven law-making."

Not only does a greater level of engagement with the local community decrease project costs and reduce delays—measured by various case studies and data—Ali's research also reveals that the level of engagement with a local community and perceived effectiveness of response have a statistically significant correlation. This is most strikingly apparent in Ali's discussion of the Community-Driven Development (CDD) strategy adopted by the World Bank in response to Indonesia's Tsunami of 2004. Not only did the CDD approach involve local community members through dissemination of information to assist with planning and implementing projects, all CDD projects procured materials and resources locally. CDD projects were completed eighteen months ahead of schedule and cost fifty-six percent less than those adopting a conventional approach. Meanwhile, in areas that did not utilize CDD, many rebuilt homes were ultimately demolished. The World Bank underlined: "while the upfront investment required to engage with communities may seem time-consuming, it has proven to pay massive dividends once projects commence." Throughout the work, recommendations such as this seem ob-

vious. However, the discussion of disastrous and disorganized post-disaster relief responses, such as Hurricane Katrina, reveal the dire need for policy reform that prioritizes local leadership and community engagement.

The strength of the work is in case studies such as Indonesia's Tsunami and the policy recommendations that Ali makes in the context of the various disasters. The six analyzed responses fall into three groups: international-lead response, state-lead response, and public-private partnerships. Ali reviews Indonesia's tsunami of 2004, the Haitian earthquake in 2010, the Thai flood of 2011, Japan's Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011, and Hurricane Katrina. Each inquiry demonstrates both a deep understanding of the distinctive nature of localized study, yet successfully manages to draw interesting parallels for lessons learned and policy recommendations. While, at times, Ali struggles to keep the narrative cohesive, this is almost entirely a product of the incredibly complex and expansive subject-matter. How she manages to organize the countless local, state, national, and supranational structures that manage disaster relief worldwide is a testament to Ali's careful documentation and presentation skills. The empirical data and anecdotal evidence demonstrate the importance of developing the local capacity to utilize local knowledge and provide opportunities for meaningful community involvement through multi-stakeholder decision-making.

While the book's case studies are primarily useful to policymakers and practitioners, legal scholars are not likely to find it particularly rigorous. At what is perhaps the book's weakest point, Ali develops an argument that there is an emerging obligation in international law to ensure local participation in humanitarian assistance. She argues that "legal instruments adopted by states, and self-regulatory mechanisms of NGOs . . . reflect the adoption of a human rights approach to humanitarian assistance, and are evidence of the progressive codification of an obligation to ensure local participation in relief activities." Typically, the existence of customary international law requires both state practice and *opinio juris*, but it is far from clear that Ali has established the emergence of either. It is true that the cited treaties and "soft law" instruments may, to some scholars of international law, reveal the initial developments of the rights of affected communities to a certain quality of humanitarian relief response. Furthermore,

Ali's review of the relevant legal scholarship points to an increasingly human rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance. However, it remains unclear in Ali's analysis how this recognition will crystallize or is in the process of crystallizing a duty for States to ensure local participation in disaster relief.

To bolster her argument, Ali cites the Sphere Charter, a self-regulatory charter of nongovernmental organizations and posits that it may, in the future, contribute to the formation of customary international law with respect to the right of beneficiaries to a specific quality of response by States and nongovernmental organizations in situations of humanitarian disasters. While various legal and policy foundations in humanitarian aid such as this one advance the notion of "thinking globally but acting locally," it stretches credulity to claim that States are now or will soon be acting out of a perceived legal obligation to ensure local population participation in relief activities. States are typically bound by customary international law, regardless of whether they have codified these laws, but it is hard to imagine that a State's failure to incorporate local communities in humanitarian relief work will be considered a violation of international law in the near future. In fact, the failings of various States and the missed opportunities for coordination with local governments throughout the second half of the work reveal precisely the opposite—just how far state practice is from securing this right for local communities.

While Ali's work is limited to disaster relief, the potential readership is diverse. Not only is her work instructive for students of international humanitarian law or development studies, it is immensely helpful to government and agency officials, practitioners, and aid workers. Critically, the work, particularly the six thorough case studies of recent disasters, should be required reading for agency coordinators and practitioners at the nexus of state-civil society humanitarian relief. Given the diversity of potential readership, Ali provides readers with an overview of new governance scholarship and its application to post-disaster humanitarian aid law and policy. Her summary of the scholarship and relevant policy, in light of her research objectives, offers a comprehensive exploration of the role of local actors, both current and conjectural, in post-disaster humanitarian relief.

Natural and man-made disasters like the recent series of hurricanes devastating North America and the Caribbean are

occurring with heightened frequency and intensity, necessitating an increased need for multilateral collaboration in humanitarian assistance and post-disaster relief. Climate science has shown that global warming is increasing the odds of future extreme weather in the United States and around the world. Astonishment or refusal to acknowledge this from state leadership impairs national and local communities' abilities to prepare for future disasters. There is a vast divide between States like Japan who are prepared to rebuild post-tsunami, and States like Haiti, who are still too crippled by failures to transition effectively from post-disaster relief to reconstruction and development. There is potential for learning and reform if politicians, development practitioners, aid workers, and scholars alike review Ali's examination of local community participation in disaster relief and recovery. In the wake of major hurricanes, it is hard to imagine a timelier read.

Salafism After the Arab Awakening: Contending with People's Power.

Edited by Francesco Cavatorta & Fabio Merone. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xi, 352. \$50 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY SYDNEY SAWYIER

Salafism After the Arab Awakening: Contending with People's Power is a collection of academic essays analyzing the impact of the Arab Spring on Salafism—a strict, purist form of Islam whose adherents try to emulate the Prophet Muhammad as closely as possible—in the Arab world. The main thrust of the collection is the increased politicization of Salafist movements. To that end, this collection represents an excellent mosaic of the intersection of organized politics and Salafism in the Middle East and North Africa. Scholars and researchers of contemporary politics in the Arab world will find this volume enormously valuable. This annotation will omit discussion of some chapters.

The first essay, “Revisiting Wiktorowicz” by Joas Wagemakers is a methodological critique and refinement of Quintan Wiktorowicz's influential categorization of different branches of Salafism. Wiktorowicz's paradigm—though heavily critiqued—is the standard analytical framework for discussing Salafism. The basic premise is that Salafists all share the

same ideology and goals, but their methods, that is to say their application of ideology to contemporary circumstances, greatly differs. The three branches consist of quietist-Salafists, politico-Salafists, and jihadi-Salafists. In broad strokes, quietist, or “purist,” Salafis tend to eschew political participation and discourage activism of any kind, rather focusing on education and dissemination of purist teachings. The “politicos” are more likely to engage in political activism, or even organized politics. Finally, the jihadis adopt a more militant position, even if most jihadi-Salafists are non-violent in their own practice. This approach has been criticized from many angles: its sometimes incoherent lens of “method;” the reduction of “method” to an attitude toward political authority; his reductive focus on Salafism in Saudi Arabia and the experience of the Soviet-Afghan War; his conflation of “quietists” and “purists” when all Salafists consider themselves to be “purists;” and finally his basic premise that all Salafists share the same creed. One of the main contributions of this collection, *Wagemakers* points out, is that while the authors generally accept this categorization of Salafist movements, they greatly nuance these categories and illustrate many instances of overlap.

The next chapter by Khalil al-Anani focuses on Egypt, where Salafism has gained a prominent position since Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak’s downfall in 2011. Although Egyptian Salafism had been dominated by quietist strains, several Salafi scholars changed their views in light of the success of the uprising that upended Mubarak’s rule. Many Salafis supported the uprising and many entered institutional politics thereafter in order to prevent secular and liberal Egyptians from taking over the country. Furthermore, many Salafists supported the coup in 2013, a lightning rod for transnational Salafism. The political foray has divided the Egyptian Salafi community, spawning inter-Salafi feuds and a vocal call for a retreat from politics.

A similar process took place in Saudi Arabia. As Stéphane Lacroix discusses, Saudi Salafists grew increasingly politically organized throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, some organizing around a platform for a constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia. The Arab Spring took place in a context where these claims gained significant traction and publicity. In response, the Saudi government significantly increased social welfare programs and job support for the marginalized and

poor—as many of these chapters point out, Salafism is particularly strong among youth and the poor. The government's efforts to appease the social and economic justice demands of the mobilized Salafists paid off as the fervor surrounding claims for a constitutional monarchy died down.

The monarchy in Morocco has also tried to manage the emergence of politico-Salafism, as Mohammed Masbah recounts in his chapter. In Morocco, Salafis took a sharp turn into the political sphere following the Arab Spring. While they have grown increasingly “political,” they have not been particularly effective in organizing themselves. The government there adopted a “stick-and-carrot” strategy which has had a moderating influence on Moroccan Salafis. Moroccan Salafi groups are recognizing that they need to be legally organized, involved in public debate, and need to develop a political vernacular that appeals to more secular or reformist Moroccans in order to be most influential in domestic politics.

Judit Kuschnitzki presents a case study of the only Salafi party in Yemen, the Rashad Union (Ittihad al-Rashad). The party was formally established following the March 2012 uprising in Yemen and Kuschnitzki's chapter traces the trajectory of al-Rashad and its positioning as a “Salafi” political party. She emphasizes that Salafism in Yemen used to be more quietist in nature, but the younger generation of Salafis grew to prefer a more activist role. She observes that “as these developments suggest, quietism can end up being a doctrinal dead end, too constrictive to be maintained systematically in the long run.” What is notable here is that the politicization of Salafis in Yemen actually began long before the Arab Spring. Rather than a trend of increasing politicization or activism, since becoming a political party, al-Rashad has been at pains to temper its conceptions of political practice and democracy so that they are less at odds with Yemeni quietists. In the final analysis, al-Rashad is playing an interesting balancing act in using “modified” Salafi concepts, trying to bridge quietist Salafis and politics, differentiating themselves from pre-existing Islamist political parties, and appearing inclusive all at once. While a very interesting case study, the chapter's silence on the current warfare in Yemen was deafening. It was particularly noticeable in this chapter—however this critique extends to the book as a whole—that while the conflict in Syria is discussed in great de-

tail, the piece does not adequately discuss Gulf state politics at the regional level nor the present conflict in Yemen.

The next chapter by Joas Wagemakers concerns political Salafism in Jordan, a subject untouched in academic literature thus far. While both Quietist and Jihadi Salafis in Jordan are acknowledged, there is a group of what Wagemakers calls “re-formist” Salafis somewhere in the middle ground between the quietists’ emphasis on doctrinal purity and education and the radicalism and use of violence associated with the Jihadi-Salafis. Wagemakers argues that “the Arab Spring . . . has had a dual effect on political Salafism in Jordan: while it has undoubtedly served as a source of inspiration for the country’s political Salafis, it has simultaneously increased the wariness of this trend among both state officials and Jordan’s quietist Salafis. . . . [W]hereas the Arab Spring seems to have stimulated Salafi groups to integrate politically in countries whose regimes have been overthrown, it has so far increased pressure on like-minded Jordanians to refrain from doing the same.” The principal forces impeding the politicization and mobilization of politico Salafis are the critiques from prominent quietist Salafis and bureaucratic pressures exerted by the monarchy, which fears a “Jordanian Spring.” In the final analysis, the Arab Spring “has left ‘reformist’ Salafis in general . . . with more enthusiasm for politics but with fewer opportunities to engage in it.”

Thomas Pierret’s chapter on Syria is the centerpiece of the book, elucidating the themes of transnational Salafism and “people power.” Many foreign governments (e.g., Saudi Arabia) and Salafi networks consider the Syrian Civil War a watershed moment for Salafism throughout the region, with the potential to shape the dominant form of Salafism. Pierret “presents the different nexuses of local military commanders, foreign private networks of support, and in some cases state sponsors, that stand behind the main Syrian insurgent coalitions of Salafi obedience.” Pierret writes that in the beginning of the conflict, military commanders were opportunistic regarding Salafism, leveraging Salafi networks for financial support; however as the war progressed, Salafi ideology has become a more prominent force. That said, Pierret writes that the Arab Spring challenged the old “vanguardist model” of jihad, demonstrating that “‘people power’ could bring about political change.” In order to harness the “political agency of

the masses,” some Salafi groups have been more pragmatic in their approach, advocating gradualism and declining to adopt the most rigorous Salafi positions.

Iris Kolman’s chapter on gender activism in Salafism is a case study on the role of Salafi women in Tunisia. She observes that “studies of why people support conservative strands of Islam deal with the preferences and beliefs of men, while women may base their choice for a certain belief system on a different set of constraints and incentives.” She analyzes both why women are drawn to Salafism—primarily young and/or economically disenfranchised women—and also the different sets of beliefs between quietist-, politico-, and jihadi-Salafi women about their roles in society. Her chapter thus poses a critique—which could have been made more forcefully—of the other contributors to the book, only one of whom—Lacroix in his analysis of Saudi Arabia—even superficially touches on the role of women in domestic politics, either as participants or symbols. Her chapter is also an implicit critique of a restrictive liberal-secular frame of reference that cannot reconcile abiding by purist Islamic gender codes with autonomous female choices. However, these differing ideological frames of reference have crucial implications for post-revolutionary Tunisian religious and national identity. As Kolman observes, “For this particular group of female Salafis, Islam is clearly a way of life, which means they would consider it a restriction of their personal freedom if Islam were relegated to the private space of individualised belief. On the other hand, they do not recognize that how they wish to live their lives may not be possible without limiting the freedom of women from other ideological backgrounds.” This latter critique is especially applicable to secular Tunisian women.

In general, *Salafism After the Arab Awakening* offers a revealing portrayal of how various monarchies have tried to manage the politicization of Salafis in the wake of the Arab Spring. For instance, in Saudi Arabia the monarchy catered to the demands of young and poor Salafis. In Jordan, the monarchy has heavily bureaucratized civil society, allowing political Salafi groups to organize but making it near impossible for them to become a legally recognized political party. Additionally, the case studies revealed that Salafism is most attractive to the poor, young, and marginalized. In post-revolution contexts,

these groups are likely to become more radicalized if they feel locked out of the transition process.

One of the main targets of this collection is in the definition of the “political” and how Salafists have entered the “political sphere” and made it their own. However, the definition of the “political” at time risks incoherence: the dizzying infighting about nomenclature—for instance, distinguishing the “political” from the “proto-political” from the “semi-political”—can be tiring and detracts from the rest of the book. To the extent that the book elucidates the political side of Salafism, it reveals a surprisingly flexible political program, reflecting the challenges of creating a “new social contract” following the anti-authoritarian uprisings of the Arab Spring.

This is not a book for readers unfamiliar with regional politics in the Arab world. There is a maze of political parties, military commanders, religious networks, and political alliances. For those who are familiar with this subject matter, *Salafism After the Arab Awakening* will offer a broad, yet nuanced take on the evolving socio-political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa. However, while the collection encompasses great breadth—illustrating the complexity of the intersection of politics and Salafism after the Arab Spring—this is to some extent at the expense of cohesion and an in-depth treatment of supposedly central topics, such as the transnational nature of Salafism or “people’s power.” In particular, the book’s attempt to illustrate the transnational nature of Salafism is constrained by the limited attention to the intricacies of regional politics beyond the Syrian War and major sectarian divides.

Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC. Edited by Zahra Babar. Georgetown University Qatar: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xix, 312. \$39.95 (paperback).

REVIEWED BY BREANNA SMALL

Reading the first pages of *Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC*, one is initially struck by the staggering migration statistics in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In the six GCC countries, the estimated non-local population ranges from twenty-seven percent to as high as ninety percent, with an aver-

age non-local percentage of fifty-nine percent region-wide.¹ The numbers shock, and the impulse is to exclaim, “This is like nothing else I have ever seen!” Editor Zahra Babar wants us to say just the opposite. In this fascinating collection of empirical and ethnographic studies, Babar aims to disabuse us of the notion that the much-focused on phenomenon of labor migration in the GCC is out of the ordinary. Seeing a troubling tendency to “exceptionalize” the phenomenon of labor migration to the GCC as something that could only happen in the fantastically oil-rich and repressive Gulf States, Babar fears we are missing the bigger picture: the factors at play in migration in the GCC play out all over the world. Characterizing problems in the GCC as “exceptional” is dangerous because it prevents us from making connections to larger global struggles for migrant rights.

To this end, Babar has collected a series of contributions that provide insight into an understudied issue: intraregional Arab migration to the GCC. Babar seeks to deconstruct the homogenous image of Arab migration in the GCC, with each piece in the volume delving into the particularities of one specific group of Arab migrants, classified by country of origin, occupation, or one of several other markers. Through her collection, Babar hopes to show the various economic, political, and social factors at play in Arab labor migration in the GCC and to shed light on the very normal nature of this migration phenomenon.

While contemporary news coverage of migration in the GCC focuses heavily on South Asian migrants, there is also a significant history of non-GCC Arab migration to the region. Arab migration exploded in the 1970s, as the discovery of petroleum began transforming the Gulf States from some of the poorest in the region to some of the wealthiest in the world. Economic transformation brought an increase in demand for labor, which neighboring Arab countries with high youth unemployment were happy to fulfill. Arab migrant workers have

1. Difficulties in obtaining data are a recurring theme in the studies presented in this collection, and as a result, the most recent data available may be a few years old. At times, contributors had to extrapolate certain assumptions from the data available. In this case, the data was procured at different points between 2005 to 2014, depending on the country in question.

often occupied positions in which they serve GCC Arabs—as their teachers, private tutors, and domestic servants—yet non-GCC Arab migrants are also high-ranking officers in multinational corporations in Dubai and soccer players for wealthy Gulf football clubs. Each subset of Arab migrant workers has different experiences in the Gulf, but all have a shared experience in their inability to fully settle there. From the chapters of this book emerges a picture of a region with large expat Arab populations who have become integral parts of GCC societies yet are not necessarily wanted. Since its transformation, the Gulf has needed labor. However, it has never intended for migrants to settle permanently, so it jealously guards its citizenship and ensures migrants always remain “other,” unsure when their stay in the Gulf might end. Thus, two major themes marking GCC migrants are integration and permanence. Most Arab migrants interviewed in the volume’s various studies had not integrated into the GCC due to persistent feelings of temporariness, created both by the migrants’ own desires to one day return home and by Gulf policies which conceive of migrants as temporary.

In Chapter 3, Natasha Ridge, Soha Shami, and Susan Kippels explain how while the education sector in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is dominated by non-GCC Arabs—and GCC citizens’ children are invariably educated by such teachers—the teachers continue to feel somewhat temporary in their host countries. While most interviewees enjoyed the higher pay and better opportunities for professional development available in the Gulf and wanted to stay, they expressed fears about their legal status. Generally unable to become citizens under the Gulf States’ strict nationality laws, they felt constant uncertainty about their futures, a burden which had unfavorable collateral effects. This uncertainty manifested, for instance, in acquiescing to requests to change students’ grades. A separate study showed that expat Arab teachers tend to be more impatient and more likely to encourage cheating, which Ridge, Shami, and Kippels suggest are concrete detrimental results of the teachers’ internalization of feelings of temporariness. Generally, teachers felt unable to psychologically commit to their schools and students. This early chapter provides a glimpse of how the precarious status of migrants can affect the well-being of both host country citizens and migrants themselves.

In Chapter 6, Abdullah Alajmi explores the situation of Palestinians in the UAE. In the GCC, locals often perceive Palestinians as inherently “political,” and therefore a threat to the stability of the region. However, Alajmi explains that many Palestinians are actually well-accepted in the UAE, as long as they remain “apolitical,” with their support for the Palestinian cause not straying beyond basic humanitarian concerns. This caveat to acceptance reminds us of political discourse around immigrants in many contexts, including the United States’, where the idea that all immigrants, even childhood arrivals, must be perfect in order to deserve to stay in the country has been salient and persistent in many political debates. The general acceptance which Palestinians have achieved in the UAE is tempered. Following the First Gulf War, Kuwait expelled two million Palestinians, as Palestinians as a national group were perceived to have supported Iraq. Most Palestinians interviewees in the UAE were working to obtain or had obtained other citizenships, to safeguard against any possible emergencies that could mirror what happened in the wake of the First Gulf War.

Hadramis, migrants from the Hadramawt region of Yemen, are the focus of Chapter 4. Hadramis feel a similar pressure to be “model” immigrants in Kuwait, where they are widely considered apolitical, loyal, and obedient by Kuwaitis. Second-generation interviewees felt resentful and stifled by this reputation. Like the expat Arab teachers in Qatar and the UAE, the Hadramis in Kuwait have served local families for years and have been crucial parts of the system, but remain unintegrated and always “other.” Caught between *talabat* (demands, usually monetary) from relatives back home and pressure from their *mu’azzib* (local sponsor) in Kuwait, Hadrami workers have little room for mistake. Like the previously mentioned teachers, they are afraid to ruin their reputation with GCC employers, as their ability to stay in the country depends on keeping their sponsor. Egyptians in Kuwait, the focus of Chapter 5, express similar fears. Interviewees mention often seeing news of Egyptian neighborhoods being raided for deportations and hearing stories of Egyptian immigrants unexpectedly deported after decades of work because a sponsor suddenly decides to stop renewing their visa.

The temporariness drives the lack of integration, and vice-versa. Gulf States—often seeing non-GCC Arabs as threats to

the local populations—prefer for migrants not to integrate, because a non-integrated “other” is less likely to stay in the region. Thus, Gulf citizenship policies are exceedingly strict.² Further, many migrant Arab workers are unable to integrate properly, as they often must maintain the power dynamic between themselves and their sponsors. Acutely aware of the precariousness of their situation, and continuing to feel like the “other” because of their lack of integration, non-GCC Arabs often avoid seriously planning for a future in the GCC. In this way, GCC migration is similar to other contexts. Intra-regional Arab migration is, as Babar puts it, the result of “national interests of states on either side of the migration divide;” and when a country makes immigrants feel welcome and secure about their status, they are more likely to integrate and settle, and vice versa.

Babar’s intention is to de-homogenize Arab migration in the GCC, yet one common theme shines through for all Arab migrants: instability. The chapters effectively show that while all Arab migrants suffer from the temporariness of their status in the GCC, the particular ways in which they suffer that instability are closely tied to class, education, and skill level. In Chapter 7, data on education levels shows that lower-class Yemenis comprise the main population affected by forced deportations from Saudi Arabia. Chapter 6 explains how some Palestinians can protect themselves from instability by spending exorbitant sums of money to acquire other passports. Chapters 8–11 paint a picture of class-privileged migration, ranging from business executives and highly-educated specialists to soccer players at Gulf football clubs and wealthy university students. Regardless of other markers like gender and nationality, their class mitigates ill-effects of instability and may also open doors to opportunities that could allow them to work and stay in the country.

In Chapter 9, we learn that a very select group of Arab migrants—highly-skilled and educated Lebanese migrants, mostly working in “business and administration” in the boom-

2. For example, in Chapter 9, Garrett Maher provides restrictions on Kuwaiti citizenship: a non-national wishing to acquire Kuwaiti citizenship must have a comprehensive knowledge of Arabic, be originally Muslim or have converted at least five years before applying for citizenship, and have resided in Kuwait for a minimum of fifteen years (or twenty, for non-Arabs).

ing economy of Dubai—consider themselves “permanent employees” and do not share the sense of precariousness that other Arab migrants in the GCC have. Yet, even those highly-skilled workers may not enjoy as stable an existence as they think they do. Garret Maher notes that highly-skilled workers can be subject to arbitrary monarchical decrees, such as sudden changes in visa rules or power granted to authorities to deport immigrants for minor offenses. Maher refers to this as an element of GCC exceptionalism. In view of the Trump administration’s recent immigration policy directives, such as the so-called “Muslim Ban”—affecting people across all strata of socioeconomic status—perhaps it is correct to consider that the generalized vulnerability of migrants to vicissitudes of those in power is yet another element of migration that is not, in fact, unique to the Gulf.

The volume generally leaves it to the reader to make explicit connections between Gulf migration and other situations of migration around the world. In a few places, a parallel is cursorily introduced: in Chapter 6, Manal A. Jamal acknowledges the increasing popularity of temporary work programs in Europe and North America, and in Chapter 7, Harry Cook and Michael Newson mention the similarities between Yemen-Saudi migration and Mexico-U.S. migration. Several of the contributors nevertheless refer to certain aspects of migration in the GCC as “exceptional,” weakening Babar’s contention that this book proves that the GCC migration phenomenon is not unique. In this sense, the addition of explicit examples of parallels in other migration contexts could have strengthened the thesis.

Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC is not intended as an explicit advocacy tool. It stops short of explaining which particular migrant phenomena the GCC-Arab migrant phenomenon mirrors and how, or that the solution to problems of migrant insecurity is making naturalization policies less restrictive, and it assumes a certain knowledge base. Given the specificity of the volume and the gap in Gulf-migration literature it aims to fill, such an assumption is perfectly acceptable. The ideal audience for this volume is one with familiarity in the wider field of migration, perhaps even in the GCC context, that has been itching for insight into nuances of the different Arab migrant communities in the GCC. This volume aptly provides such insight.

Rebel Law: Insurgents, Courts, and Justice in Modern Conflict. By Frank Ledwidge. London, UK: Hurst & Company, 2017. Pp. v, 222. \$39.95 (hardcover).

REVIEWED BY GRACIE SMITH

“Your job is to offer the people of Helmand a better deal.” This was the instruction given to Frank Ledwidge by a high-ranking British official just before his deployment to Afghanistan as the first justice advisor for the UK’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in 2007. Yet, Ledwidge quickly realized that providing a “better deal” was easier said than done—he had never visited Afghanistan, he did not speak any of the local languages, and he had no working knowledge of the local judicial system. How could he offer a better deal without understanding what a better deal would look like for the people of Helmand?

In his crisp and lucid new book *Rebel Law*, Frank Ledwidge couples personal anecdotes and observations with historical analysis to argue that providing a “better deal” to the people they seek to govern is a key strategy utilized by insurgents in their battle for legitimacy and effective control. While issues like corruption and land disputes within the incumbent government are often the cause of insurgency, they also provide opportunities for the insurgents to act as agents of justice and establish rule of law through a functional dispute resolution system. Because insurgents aspire to replace the current government and become the permanent government, they are not only in the business of revolution, but are also in the business of providing social goods such as health services, education, and infrastructure. Justice, according to Ledwidge, is just another social good. Likewise, law is just another weapon to be employed in tactical warfare—or rather “lawfare,” a term coined to define the use of trials and legal proceedings as a form of warfare in itself.

After an insurgency sets up a new rival justice system, the people will utilize whichever court system promises to resolve the dispute with certainty and enforceability. Ledwidge describes the establishment of “Dáil courts” by the IRA during the Irish revolution as the most robust example of insurgent judicial strategy. By late 1920, shortly after the establishment of the rival IRA judicial system, the local English courts were

empty of litigants as the locals took their business to the Dáil courts, often after being “encouraged” (i.e., threatened with violence) to take their business to the Dáil courts or else. Use of threats aside, the Irish insurgents managed to use a rival court system to establish its authority and legitimacy as the sole government in Ireland, contributing in part to the IRA’s military victory.

After unpacking the history of the Irish revolution and the use of courts by the IRA to establish legitimacy, Ledwidge transitions to questions of modern warfare, particularly Western “stabilization operations” in the Middle East. Examining the Taliban and the Islamic State, Ledwidge makes the controversial claim that these insurgents are in some ways offering a “better deal” to the people than the alternatives because they offer a basic level of security and judicial certainty and enforceability that would otherwise be absent. Ledwidge provides a compelling example of justice delivered by the Taliban against Khan, a member of the Afghan National Police, after he had wrongfully assaulted another man. After being tried and convicted under local Pashtunwali law, Khan was killed by the Taliban with the popular support of the people. While the Taliban did not use Pashtunwali in their judicial procedures, they were nevertheless viewed as the enforcer of justice in this instance. An Irish observer in Afghanistan interestingly noted that “this is exactly what would have happened in Cork in 1921,” adding credence to Ledwidge’s parallel between the twentieth century Irish insurgency and modern insurgencies in the Middle East. As for the Islamic State, Ledwidge asserts it “appears” to offer efficient and professional dispute resolutions in enough instances to help them acquire a certain level of legitimacy within the areas they are occupying. However, Ledwidge qualifies his own “better deal” argument by asserting that the harshness and cruelty exerted by the Islamic State will soon cause whatever appeal they may have with some locals to fade and render comparisons to the previous regime pointless. Ledwidge predicts their legitimacy will never be fully established as a result.

If the insurgents are offering the people a terrible deal—as in the case of the Islamic State—how hard can it be for the counterinsurgents to offer a better deal? In the latter half of the book, Ledwidge examines possible counterinsurgent responses to insurgent judicial strategies. Ledwidge’s stretches

his analysis to its thinnest point when he examines imperial approaches to ruling “ungoverned spaces” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Ledwidge adeptly discounts the legal fiction of an “ungoverned space” by pointing out that there were indigenous legal structures and traditions already in place in the lands across Africa and Asia occupied by British, French, and Ottoman forces during this time. However, Ledwidge argues that the co-opting of local indigenous dispute resolution systems through the development of a “dual mandate” system involving a certain depth of cultural competency by imperial rulers provides a basis for the concept of “legal pluralism” as the counterinsurgent’s solution.

While Ledwidge argues that imperial lessons should not be written off as “toxic” simply because they are linked to imperialism, his argument misses two key distinctions. First, this parallel assumes the counterinsurgent will be a foreign power who must learn about the local culture for the purpose of maintaining control in a way that “works” for the locality in question. What about the counterinsurgent group that shares the same cultural and national background as the insurgent group? It is likely in this circumstance that the counterinsurgent already has systems in place that would garner a level of institutional legitimacy from the local people, yet the insurgent group is somehow still gaining power. This is a circumstance Ledwidge alludes to at the end of Chapter 6, but he goes no further in unpacking this distinction and discussing possible tactics that could be used in this case. Second, Ledwidge confounds cultural supremacism with necessity by falsely equating the lessons of imperial rule to today’s “stabilization operations” in Iraq and Afghanistan. These modern occupations are not imperial conquests of the historical type he describes in arguing for legal pluralism. The United States and the United Kingdom are in Afghanistan as part of the—however misguided—“War on Terror” and do not have the goal of long-term occupation as part of their stabilization operations.

Although Ledwidge’s use of imperial history is imperfect, he succeeds overall by applying development scholar Thomas Carothers’s “problem of knowledge” with regards to cultural competency to support his argument for legal pluralism as a valid judicial strategy for counterinsurgents. Carothers’s view of law as “a normative system that resides in the minds of the citizens of a society” offers a relevant starting point, whether

the counterinsurgency is represented by a local or foreign power. While the Western paradigm offers state-centric justice as the best way to provide social order, Ledwidge argues that counterinsurgencies would be better served by acknowledging strong traditions of judicial pluralism in local cultures instead of trying to impose a Western “best practice” judicial solution, which he compares to performing an organ transplant without analyzing the blood type. For example, most Afghans are only familiar with Sharia, and many locals view the U.S. emphasis on gender rights as a “foreign imposition.” The overlaying of Western-inspired legal systems in Afghanistan and Iraq has often led to more instability, thus empowering the insurgents. By emphasizing cultural norms in judicial institutions, local accountability, deprioritizing Western rights-oriented goals (such as gender issues), and focusing on big single goals such as “fair dealing,” Ledwidge argues that the West would have more success in providing a better deal for the Afghan people.

If the goal is rule of law and “fair dealing” by an objective and measurable standard of increased stability, then Ledwidge’s strategy of legal pluralism offers a better solution than the current “one size fits all,” best practice approach employed by Western military intelligence. However, this approach prompts the question of “fair dealings for *whom*?” Ledwidge cursorily asserts that Western cultural assumptions in the form of “political correctness” contribute to the problem of knowledge. Logically, it would follow that any type of gender rights movement would need to be a grassroots movement, as opposed to being linked to a Western-style imposed rule of law. Ledwidge discusses land and property ownership at length as key factors in rebellions and insurgencies, thus implying that the right to property is a universally recognized human right. By assuming the universality of this right yet equating gender right with Western political correctness, Ledwidge implicitly raises questions of the hierarchy of rights as analyzed through the lens of judicial legitimacy. While the universality of gender equality as a human right continues to be debated along cultural lines, Ledwidge avoids an opportunity to analyze an issue relevant to his overall analysis—the nexus of counterinsurgent judicial strategy and human rights issues, particularly when these human rights issues are branded as “Western” and could make-or-break a counterinsurgency strategy.

Whoever offers a “better deal” to the people—the insurgents or the counterinsurgents—often wins the battle of legitimacy in the hearts and minds of the people. This battle for legitimacy is just as important, if not more so, as the use of force and traditional military operations in modern unconventional warfare. The modern approach to counterinsurgency continues to adopt a Western “best practices” approach that emphasizes a strong central state government while remaining willfully ignorant of cultural systems and institutions already in place, thus instantiating Carothers’s “problem of knowledge.” Ledwidge argues for the inclusion of legal analysis in intelligence preparation and training in a so-called “intelligence preparation of the battlespace.” It is simple to acknowledge the necessity of a legal strategy as part of the counterinsurgency’s plan. Yet, the true issue turns on *what* this strategy entails. While Ledwidge makes a convincing argument for legal pluralism, the question remains as to what should and will give way when tensions arise between ideas of universal human rights “from the West” and local cultural norms that may contravene these rights.


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